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- What is a cynic? A man who
knows the price of everything
and the value of nothing.
- And a sentimentalist is a man
who sees an absurd value in
everything, and doesn't know the
market price of any single thing.
Oscar Wilde (1854-1900)
Lady Windermere's Fan,
1892, Act III

Abstract
Forests provide several valuable services to the Swiss population such as wood, recre-
ational opportunities, carbon sequestration and habitat for biodiversity, among others.
Since wood exploitation contributes to forests maintenance, it is acknowledged that a
reasonable intensiﬁcation of wood harvest would beneﬁt other forest ecosystem services
in Switzerland. In addition, because of its CO2 neutrality, wood is expected to take
a growing part of the material in construction and energy production. However, in a
context of international competition and harvest restrictions, wood prices are pressured
downward and marginal costs increase. Hence, the Swiss forest industry is not willing
to harvest more wood, despite the associated potential beneﬁts for the society.
This thesis examines Swiss people preferences regarding forests ecosystem services. It
applies diﬀerent market and non-market valuation methods to analyze how much the
Swiss population beneﬁts from the forest. Non-market forest ecosystem services, such as
recreation or biodiversity are found to be highly valued. I argue that, since a reasonable
wood harvesting creates positive externalities on other forest ecosystem services and,
since the forest industry is responsive to prices, a better institutionalized Payment
for Ecosystem Services system, by increasing the wood production, could assure both
economic and environmental sustainability of Swiss forests and thus kill two birds with
the same stone.
Keywords: Switzerland, Forest, Ecosystem Services, Non-market valuation, Wood
JEL classiﬁcation: D61, Q23, Q26, Q31, Q57
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Résumé
Une pierre, deux coups : Essais sur la valeur des services des écosystèmes
forestiers suisse
Les forêts fournissent de nombreux services à la population suisse : approvisionnement
en bois, activités récréatives, séquestration du carbone et habitat pour la biodiversité
comptent parmi les fonctions forestières. Il est reconnu qu'en l'état actuel des choses,
l'exploitation du bois contribue à l'entretien des forêts suisses. Ainsi, une intensiﬁca-
tion raisonnable de sa production serait favorable aux autres services des écosystèmes
forestiers. De par sa neutralité carbone, l'attrait du bois comme matériau de construc-
tion et pour la production énergétique devrait croître dans le futur. Cependant, dans
un contexte de compétition internationale et de restrictions d'exploitation, les prix du
bois diminuent et les coûts marginaux de production augmentent. L'industrie forestière
suisse n'est ainsi pas disposée à produire plus de bois, malgré les potentiels bénéﬁces
engendrés pour la société.
Cette thèse de doctorat examine les préférences de la population suisse pour les ser-
vices des écosystèmes forestiers. Elle applique diﬀérentes méthodes d'évaluation, mar-
chande et non-marchande, pour analyser les bénéﬁces générés par la forêt. Les services
non-marchands, comme les activités récréatives ou l'habitat pour la biodiversité sont
particulièrement appréciés et la population y attribue une valeur économique très im-
portante. Comme la production de bois génère des externalités positives sur les autres
services des écosystèmes forestiers et, comme l'industrie forestière est sensible aux va-
riations de prix, il serait judicieux d'améliorer le système de paiements pour les services
écosystémiques des forêts suisses aﬁn d'intégrer ces externalités. En faisant croître la
production de bois, ces paiements pourraient assurer la durabilité économique et envi-
ronnementale des forêts suisses et ainsi faire d'une pierre, deux coups.
Mot-clés : Suisse, Forêt, Services écosystémiques ; Évaluation non-marchande ; Bois
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Introduction
Since the launch of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2000 (MEA, 2005), the
concept of ecosystem services (ES) and its economic valuation have received a great at-
tention from scholars. Undertaken by the The Economics of Ecosystem and Biodiversity
(TEEB), this approach mainly aims at recognizing value, demonstrating value and
capturing value of ecosystem services (TEEB, 2010). The use of the ES concept has
a number of interesting advantages: First, since all decisions that involve trade-oﬀs
involve valuation, either implicitly or explicitly (Costanza et al., 2014, p.153), ES val-
ues can be integrated in more complete Cost-Beneﬁt Analyses (CBA) thus ensuring
a more eﬃcient allocation of resources. Second, improving indicators of economic de-
velopment is another goal that can be achieved through the assessment of ecosystem
services. The demand for better sustainable development indicators, which would en-
compass non-market goods and services provided by the environment, has indeed been
stressed by many economists, notably Stiglitz et al. (2009). Third, although this use
is controversial, the assessment of ES could be used to derive compensations for envi-
ronmental damages, as was done in the Exxon Valdez (1989) (see Carson et al., 1992)
or Deepwater Horizon (2010) (see Bishop et al., 2017b) cases. Finally, ES assessments
can be used to design Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) and internalize economic
externalities.
Nevertheless, the ES concept comes with a number of reservations, either ethical or in
connection with the methods. First, as Monbiot (2012) argues, the valuation of ES is
often linked, at least in the population's mind, with commodiﬁcation of nature, which, in
turn, is tied to privatization of ecosystems. Then, since neo-classical economists usually
think in marginal terms, this approach may not correctly take into account thresholds
eﬀects. Indeed, the gradual depletion of a given resource may be economically justiﬁed
until the (mostly uncertain and unpredictable) threshold of irreversibility is reached.
Another criticism of ES elicited values is its subjectivism. Indeed, the economic assess-
xxiii
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ment of ES uses the so-called preference-based approaches, which assumes that each
individual knows her preferences and is able to reﬂect her individual perceptions of
value. While this assumption is questionable, many criticize the very anthropocentric
nature of the approach.
Although some criticism is acceptable for some cases, the beneﬁts brought by the ES
approach largely justify its study and usage in parallel with other approaches, if done
cautiously with up-to-date and tailor-made methods.
Forest ecosystem services
Forests cover about 30% of the Swiss territory (Source: FSO) and the population
directly and indirectly enjoys the valuable goods and services that they provide. These
services, known as Forest Ecosystem Services (FES) are deﬁned and categorized into
ﬁve main functions according to the Swiss Federal Oﬃce for the Environment (FOEN,
2014c) and four main functions according to TEEB (2010)1. In this thesis, we use the
following FOEN typology (the TEEB correspondence is indicated in parenthesis).
1. Production function (Provisioning): forests produce natural resources. On
the one hand, they supply wood, which has a broad range of uses: construc-
tion, paper, furniture, energy production, etc. On the other hand, non-ligneous
products such as wild game, fruits and mushrooms can be collected in forests.
2. Puriﬁcation function (Regulating): healthy forests sequester carbon and
purify the air. Their existence thus reduces the greenhouse gas stock in the atmo-
sphere, which helps mitigate climate change. Forests also naturally ﬁlter water
and transform rain into drinking water at lower costs than artiﬁcial treatments.
3. Protection function (Regulating): forests protect land from soil erosion and
infrastructures from avalanches and rock slides.
4. Cultural function (Cultural): forests provide areas of recreational activities
and preserve the landscape diversity.
5. Biodiversity function (Habitat): forests are home to many animal and veg-
etable species.
1The TEEB (2010) is based on the Common International Classiﬁcation of Ecosystem Services
(CICES (2016))
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By providing goods or services, these functions contribute to the economic welfare of
the Swiss population. The sum of the above-mentioned FES' values corresponds to the
concept of forest Total Economic Value (TEV) (Costanza et al., 1997). In Switzerland,
the only attempt to assess forests TEV was made by Rauch-Schwegler (1994).
Total Economic Value 
(TEV)
Direct use values
Non-marketed services
Cultural
- Recreation (Chapter 3)
- Landscapes and identity
Marketed goods
Provisioning
- Roundwood (Chapter 5)
- Energy wood
- Non-wood products (berries, 
mushrooms, game)
Indirect use values
Non-marketed services
Regulating
Purification
- Water, Air (Chapter 4)
Protection
- Avalanches, soil erosion
Non-use values
Non-marketed services
Habitat for biodiversity (Chapter 1-2)
Existence value
- Option value
- Bequest value
Figure 0.1: Categories of forest values and their links (Source: own conception but
based on Montagné et al., 2005)
A representation of forest TEV and its components, split according to the type of
values is given in Figure 0.1. These values can be split into 3 main categories: i) direct
use values, which, in the case of FES correspond to the uses of forest products and
recreation, ii) indirect use (or passive use) values, which refer to passive uses, such as
the enjoyment of free protection and puriﬁcation infrastructure oﬀered by forests and
iii) non-use values, whose concept is usually linked to biodiversity but not exclusively,
since it is not speciﬁc to any function but can encompass them all. Krutilla (1967)
was the ﬁrst to deﬁne the existence value that stems out from the very existence of an
ecosystem. Option value refers to a potential future use of FES and bequest value to
the possibility for future generation to enjoy it.
In Figure 0.1, we indicate the rough correspondence between the values under scrutiny
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and the corresponding chapters of this manuscript. However, in this thesis, we do not
fully adopt the TEV framework because of its rigidity. The TEV concept, if understood
as the total stock's value of an ecosystem, as often, is controversial. There are indeed
several reservations to its use, which has led scholars to present a multitude of values
for each FES rather than a single aggregated value. First, use and non-use values are
diﬃcult to compare: methodologies are diﬀerent and each methodology comes with its
own biases. In addition, values can be elicited in marginal terms or in absolute terms,
which can only be compared with diﬃculty.2 Second, it is often diﬃcult to clearly
disentangle values, which leads to the problem of double counting. Third, conﬂicts
and synergies, also represented in Figure 0.1 with the black and grey arrows, respec-
tively, are badly taken into account in the TEV framework, as of today and should be
extensively studied. Wood exploitation, in particular, can indeed impose positive or
negative externalities (see Borzykowski and Kacprzak, 2017), which would need to be
integrated in the TEV. On biodiversity, ﬁrst of all, forest lightening can foster some
endangered species that need light to develop. However, the heavy machinery used in
forest exploitation can cause soil compaction and thus reduce habitat opportunities for
fauna and ﬂora. In addition, an appropriate management of dead wood is crucial to
develop fungi and insect biodiversity and unexploited natural forests can also host a
number of species that are unable to adapt in other types of forests. Then, on recre-
ational activities, the forest exploitation creates, maintains and secures forest paths,
which allow increasing forest recreational opportunities. On the other hand, it can
cause noise and restrict access to some forest zones. On the protection function, ﬁnally,
the rejuvenation of forests resulting from wood exploitation, improves forest ability to
retain rock slides or avalanches. Young trees are also better able to resist wildﬁres and
to capture the CO2 from the atmosphere, hence to mitigate climate change.
Recreational activities can also conﬂict with other forest functions. The population
visits can bother fauna and destroy ﬂora. In addition, they impose higher costs to the
forests exploitation as more caution and securitization of the work spaces are needed.
Biodiversity can also impact other forest functions. A diverse forest in terms of fauna
2Although the TEEB advise to elicit marginal values, communication sometimes requires the es-
timation of absolute values. While this is acceptable on a small scale, the use of absolute values on
a larger scale comes with its own issues. For example, the harvest of all trees in Swiss forests, by
increasing the supply, would certainly impact the price of wood. It is therefore impossible to use the
current price as a correct indication of value. In addition, this baseline scenario corresponds to a
situation where forests do not exist in Switzerland, which is unrealistic, in particular when assessing
the value of forest protection function. Humans have indeed settled in forested regions on purpose. If
the forest were not present, they would not have settled in these regions.
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and ﬂora can attract recreationists, hunters and pickers and thus improve the forest
recreational value. In exchange, the particular care to forest biodiversity imposes a
higher cost burden to the forest economic exploitation. The same occurs with the
protection function.
Analyzing conﬂicts and synergies between FES and their values is certainly of great
interest. A better understanding of these relationships would for example make the
TEV framework more credible. This, however, is out of the scope of this thesis, given
the available data, and is thus left for future research. However, a consistent theoretical
TEV framework could be derived, as explained in Johansson and Kriström (2015).
These values are expected to change considerably in the near future due to climate
change. First of all, harsher meteorological conditions will test forests' ability to adapt.
In accordance, forest biodiversity may decrease or increase. Forests could also be under
higher pressure because of more frequent natural disasters. Second of all, one can
expect a growing demand for FES. Indeed, climate warming and demographic growth
may increase the number of people willing to enjoy a walk in cool forests. The value of
forest recreation may therefore increase, as well as other FES.
While goods are available on markets, most services provided by forest ecosystems
possess public goods characteristics. Indeed, it is obvious that existence values and other
non-use values have non-rivalry and non-exclusivity properties. This is also usually
veriﬁed for other ecosystem services such as recreation, puriﬁcation and protection.
Therefore, there exists no market and thus no price for these services. While priceless
and valueless are antagonist adjectives linguistically, in the case of ecosystem services
the lack of price may lead policy-makers to underestimate the value of an ecosystem and
design ineﬃcient resource allocations. This fact points out the need for other valuation
techniques known as non-market valuation.
Context
Although there are important regional diﬀerences, in general, Swiss forests grow both
in surface and wood volume since several decades at a rate of 0.2% per year on average
(Source: FSO). There are three main reasons for this evolution: First, climate warming
allows forests to grow at higher altitudes, where trees could not survive in the past.
Second, the surface of agricultural land has decreased, in particular in mountainous
regions, leaving room for forests to develop. Third, the wood harvest is lower than
Swiss forests natural growth. The latter fact also causes forest ageing, which, in a
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context of fast changing climate, can be problematic. Indeed, old forests usually are
unable to sequester more CO2, which aﬀects climate warming. They are also less able to
adapt to a changing climate. Hence, to reduce the risk, forests owners should rejuvenate
their forests and choose the tree species accordingly.
The Swiss legal framework highlights forest multifunctionality by ensuring that forest
can fulﬁll their [multiple] functions (LFo, 2013, art. 1, al. 1, let. c). The Swiss law on
forest is indeed one of the most restrictive regarding the wood harvest. In particular,
clear cutting is forbidden and the wood production is only one forest function among
others. The Swiss civil code (CC, 2017, art 699, al. 1 ch. 1) also highlights the open
nature of forests by allowing the free access to all of them. Therefore, according to legal
and economic deﬁnitions, forests provide public goods and services, whose ﬁnancing is
usually problematic.
In this context, it is acknowledged that a (reasonable) increase in the wood har-
vest would be positive for other FES and improve forest resilience (Borzykowski and
Kacprzak, 2017). Following this observation, the Swiss government is willing to increase
the wood production by 50%3, promote the use of Swiss wood in construction and for
energy provision with its wood resource policy (FOEN, 2008) and its forest policy 2020
(FOEN, 2013b). However, forest owners already complain about the costs caused by
the multifunctional forest management, which are not fully compensated and imposed
by the law. While there are already cases of PES for some Swiss FES, none of them
is linked to the quantity of wood produced. The Confederation indeed subsidizes spe-
ciﬁc cantonal measures fostering biodiversity, maintaining protective forests and forests
roads to about 40% of their costs, following convention-programs between the Confed-
eration and the Cantons (FOEN, 2015,b, 2016). Cantons are then free to allocate the
money to the forests owners according to the programs. These PES, however, do not
give incentives for more harvest.
The production of Swiss wood is thus too low, compared to the optimal level. The ob-
served under-provision of Swiss wood is indeed a standard economic issue when positive
externalities are present.
However, while a production intensiﬁcation would be mostly positive, foresters also
recommend that some forests zones (10% of the total forest surface) remain unexploited.
These indeed host a particular fauna and ﬂora, which need to be protected to avoid
3It is worth noting that production levels are very low as of today. They indeed reached the lowest
level in the last 10 years in 2016, such that a 50% increase would not stop the growth of the standing
wood stock in Swiss forests.
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their disappearance. A healthy Swiss forest would therefore be composed of diversiﬁed
forests types.
Economic vs. environmental sustainability
A sustainable use of forest ecosystem services has two interconnected sides: the environ-
mental sustainability and the economic sustainability. Inevitably, in the laissez-faire
situation, the balance leans towards one side or the other, leading, in the extreme cases,
either to forest destruction or to the forest industry collapse. Hence, the Swiss law on
forest (LFo, 2013) prevents the degradation of forests ecosystems but also imposes a
higher burden on the forest industry by increasing harvesting costs4. Environmental
sustainability may therefore be obtained at the expense of economic sustainability.
Indeed, the forest industry is currently under pressure: revenues from wood production
generally do not cover the costs, which leads to important deﬁcits, and ﬁrms involved
in forest management are either heavily subsidized or publicly-owned. In a context of
international competition, wood prices are indeed pressured downward and marginal
costs are high.
Given the positive externalities of wood harvesting, an institutionalized PES system
linked with the quantity produced could however increase the wood production and
increase the proﬁtability of forest exploitation. Indeed, as per standard in microeco-
nomics, integrating positive externalities in the price would lead to the socially optimal
provision (Pigou, 1920), hence improving both economic and environmental sustain-
ability of Swiss forests.
However, unexploited natural forests might also be appreciated by the population
since they can host other fauna and ﬂora species than exploited forests. Also, forests
owners might not be proﬁt driven and hence, might not be responsive to price changes.
In this thesis, I assess the value of Swiss forests functions and apply diﬀerent methods
from revealed and stated preferences to understand how much the population beneﬁts
from the forests. I ﬁrst ﬁnd that the population is willing to pay an important amount
of money to promote natural forests reserves and forest biodiversity and that the cre-
ation of new forest reserves is justiﬁed in terms of cost-beneﬁt analysis. Second, forest
recreational beneﬁts are also found to be substantial. Third, an analysis of the Swiss
4See Monat (2017)
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roundwood market reveals that actors are sensitive to price changes, particularly on
the demand side.
I argue that, since a reasonable wood harvesting creates positive externalities on other
forest ecosystem services and, since the forest industry is responsive to prices, a bet-
ter institutionalized Payment for Ecosystem Services system to the forest industry, by
increasing the wood production, could assure both economic and environmental sus-
tainability of Swiss forests and thus kill two birds with the same stone.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: A brief overview of methodologies
and data is presented at the end of this Introduction. Then, Chapter 1 analyses the
responsiveness to scope of the Contingent Valuation (CV) method. Indeed, according
to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) panel (Arrow et al.,
1993), CV estimates must show adequate responsiveness to scope to be considered
valid. I thus analyze the answers to a cantonal survey and ﬁnd that the identiﬁcation
of scope responsiveness depends on the assumption on the statistical distribution of
willingness to pay. This ﬁrst survey serves as a pre-test for Chapter 2. Chapter 2 thus
builds on Chapter 1 and analyses the CV answers of a national survey with the goal
of assessing a non-use value of Swiss forests biodiversity. It gives economic justiﬁcation
to a federal program of the Forest Policy 2020 aiming at increasing the surface of
protected forests. Chapter 3 considers Swiss forests recreation function and uses the
Travel Cost Method (TCM) to estimate the use values of diﬀerent forests zones. It
derives recommendation for the management of forest recreational zones. Chapter 4
uses an experimental approach to analyze the acceptability of international vs. domestic
reforestation as voluntary carbon oﬀsetting. Chapter 5 uses a rich yearly time series
data set to derive supply and demand price-elasticities for roundwood. Finally, a general
conclusion is made.
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Methodologies
The economic analysis and assessment of FES require diﬀerent methodologies (Riera
et al., 2012), the so-called Preference-based approaches. Three categories of techniques
can be mentioned: i) (Indirect) Revealed Preferences methods (RP), ii) Stated prefer-
ences methods (SP) and iii) Market methods sometimes referred to as direct revealed
preferences. The choice of the method is subject to the type of value assessed (use or
non-use values) and, obviously, to the type of data available. A bibliography of Swiss
FES assessments using these methodologies can be consulted in Elsasser et al. (2009)
and Elsasser et al. (2016).
Revealed Preferences
Revealed preferences methods derive people's preferences by observing their behavior.
These methods are therefore reserved to use values, since they imply some kind of
action. The Travel Cost Method (TCM) is a very common RP technique ﬁrst developed
by Hotelling in the 40s. It aims at deriving an implicit demand curve for some activity
using costs (in particular travel costs) that individuals bear as price and frequency
as the quantity purchased. Indeed, the essence of the travel cost model stems from
the need to travel to a site to enjoy its service. A participant who chooses to visit
a site must incur the cost of overcoming the distance. (Haab and McConnell, 2002,
p. 138) and these costs are necessarily lower than or equal to the beneﬁts of a site's
visit. The Hedonic Pricing Method (HPM) is another RP technique which is often
used in relationship with health or housing markets. HPM consists in decomposing
a given price into diﬀerent components to isolate their eﬀects on price. This method
is of particular interest for the assessment of forests proximity on housing prices (see
Schaerer et al. 2008).
Within the framework of this thesis, TCM will be applied to assess the demand for
recreation in Swiss forests. To my knowledge, the most recent article on this topic at
the national level is the one published by von Grünigen and Montanari (2014) based
on WaMos2 (FOEN, 2013a), a national survey launched by the Swiss Federal Oﬃce
for the Environment and before them, on the basis of WaMos1, the work of Ott et al.
(2005). These studies only provide estimates of mean travel costs and do not derive any
demand curve nor consumer surplus. Also, Swiss forests are considered as homogeneous
in these studies, which is an important drawback given their actual variety. Among
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other studies, Baranzini and Rochette (2008) assess the demand for a particular forest,
namely the Pfyn wood in Wallis. This study ﬁrst suﬀers from endogenous stratiﬁcation
as the survey was administered on-site. Also, the authors use a simple OLS estimation.
The technique can indeed be improved by applying a stratiﬁed count model instead. An
interesting meta-analysis of forest recreation values in Europe is provided by Zandersen
and Tol (2009) and guidelines in Parsons (2003).
Stated Preferences
Stated Preferences methods apply, generally but not exclusively, to non-use values.
In theory, any good or service can be assessed through SP methods. However, when
data on behaviors are available, RP are generally preferred. Some scholars indeed
argue that SP data are less reliable than RP data because of hypothetical and strategic
biases, although SP methods have become more acceptable in recent years (Haab and
McConnell, 2002).
The Contingent Valuation (CV) method is a SP economic valuation technique, which
elicits the individual Willingness To Pay (WTP) for a change in environmental quality,
by proposing a hypothetical scenario. Since the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 1989
(Carson et al., 1992), the literature has grown rapidly, with variable conﬁdence (see Car-
son, 2012). For the sake of comparability and reliability, in 1993 the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) panel provided some guidelines (Arrow et al.,
1993) that remain a landmark in the ﬁeld. A number of criticisms (and answers) have
arisen since then and diﬀerent techniques and validity tests have been developed to
mitigate biases5, eliminate contradictions with economic theory6 and elicit truthful
preferences7. However, CV WTP estimates remain very sensitive to the assumptions
imposed by econometric modeling and are still aﬀected by several biases. Policy im-
plications remain therefore controversial. Hausman (2012), for example, makes a case
against the use of CV. Some (subjective) hints to the question Is some number better
than no number? are available in Diamond and Hausman (1994).
Another SP method is the choice experiment (CE) or discrete choice that proposes to
trade-oﬀ between diﬀerent alternatives and the status quo, each of them having diﬀerent
5Hypothetical bias, yea-saying bias, starting-point bias, part-whole bias, among others.
6Scope eﬀects, temporal validity, among others.
7Incentive compatibility or strategic behavio.
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levels of attributes (Boxall et al., 1996) (See Olschewski et al. (2012) for an example
about forest's protection function in Switzerland).
In this thesis, I apply the contingent valuation method to assess the WTP for a program
based on the Swiss Forest Policy 2020 (FOEN, 2013b), which consists in doubling the
surface of protected forests in Switzerland (from 5% to 10% of total forest surface).
This scenario thus mainly assesses non-use values of the forest biodiversity function.
CV has been applied to diﬀerent forest services in Switzerland. Bernath and Roschewitz
(2008), for example, propose a CV, assessing WTP for an entrance permit in urban
forests areas near the city of Zurich. On the topic of tropical forests conservation,
Baranzini et al. (2010) analyze WTP for a decrease in deforestation. Related work, but
not speciﬁc to forest is the PhD dissertation by Jäggin (1999) that elicits WTP for a
biodiversity conservation program in the Jura.
Recent Swiss studies use the payment card elicitation format, which is not considered
as incentive-compatible according to Carson and Groves (2007). Also, the NOAA panel
(Arrow et al., 1993) recommends to use the referendum format. Meta-analyses of CV
forest ecosystem valuation are available in Barrio and Loureiro (2010) and Meshreky
et al. (2014).
Market methods
Some forest ecosystem goods such as wood products or non-wood products are available
on the market. In these cases, market methods can be used if the market is not deﬁcient
and if the price integrates all externalities (Monke and Pearson, 1989). In the case of
non-wood products, Kilchling et al. (2009) have surveyed consumers to assess their
demand.
The case of the Swiss roundwood market will be analyzed in this thesis. The study
of the demand for an ecosystem good allows to reveal price and cross-elasticities and
analyze the impact of diﬀerent covariates on demand and supply. Using time series
analysis, changes in technology along time and structural breaks can also be analyzed.
In Switzerland, the only empirical work investigating historical wood consumption is
Pauli et al. (2009). This study, however, suﬀers from an important drawback as the
empirical analysis is performed with a simple OLS.
An analysis of preferences for international vs. domestic forest carbon oﬀsets is also
performed with an experimental approach, which can be considered as a market method.
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Data
Several data types and sources were used in this thesis. The diﬀerent methodologies
indeed require speciﬁc data, such as survey data, experiments and macro data. The
diﬀerent data types and sources used in this thesis are presented in the following sub-
sections.
Survey data
Non-market valuation is usually based on survey data. To understand the perceptions
towards Swiss forests, assess their value, and test the scope responsiveness issue (Carson
and Mitchell, 1993a), we ﬁrst ran a face-to-face pilot survey in the streets of Geneva
from January to March 2014. The construction of the questionnaire was cautiously
preceded by pre-tests, focus-groups and qualitative surveys. Descriptive statistics and
results from this pilot survey are available in Baranzini et al. (2014) and Baranzini et al.
(2015).
After the pilot, we integrated the information into a phone survey at the national
level and collected 1200 representative observations in Q4 2014. The ﬁrst part of the
questionnaire was designed to apply the individual travel cost method and assess the
recreational values of Swiss forests. The second part tried to observe potential con-
ﬂicts arising from the diﬀerent forests functions. The third submitted an hypothetical
scenario to use the contingent valuation method and elicit the individual WTP for the
creation of new forest reserves.8
Experimental data
We ran an online laboratory experiment at the end of 2015 on more than 300 partici-
pants, who were advertised that they could earn up to CHF 10. Once their endowment
was determined thanks to some exercises, they were asked if they were willing to al-
locate some of it to carbon oﬀsetting reforestation programs, either domestically or
internationally. Participants were randomly assigned an informational treatment, try-
ing to foster or hamper international carbon oﬀsets and could really spend their money
on each program.9
8The questionnaire is available in the Appendix B, in French.
9The questionnaire is available in the Appendix D.
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Macro data
I collected historical data on wood markets in Switzerland by accessing to the archives
of the Federal Statistical Oﬃce and its website (FSO, 2015c). Many diﬀerent sources
were used but in particular Siegenthaler and Ritzman-Blickenstorfer (1996) and yearly
numbers of the Statistique forestière suisse and the Annuaire la forêt et le bois (FSO,
1976, 1990; FOEN, 1996, 2014g). I was able to collect data on quantities (1851-2013)
of aggregate timber and energy wood production in Switzerland, prices (nominal and
real) of these aggregates (1928-2013) and prices of substitutes (steel and heating oil
(1906-2013)).10
10A complete description of sources, assumptions and aggregation methods are available in the
Appendix E, in French.
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Chapter 1
Scope eﬀects in contingent valuation:
does the statistical distribution
assumption of WTP matter?
Written with A. Baranzini and D. Maradan and published in Ecological Economics (Borzykowski
et al., 2018). We are grateful to the staﬀ and students of the Laboratory of Market Studies
for their valuable support for the survey, to members of the Geneva green spaces service for
their comments on the questionnaire, to Bengt Kriström and to three anonymous reviewers of
Ecological Economics. We thank participants to the 2015 Workshop on Non-Market Valuation
in Nancy and to the 2016 EAERE conference in Zurich for their comments.
Abstract
Economic theory assumes that willingness to pay (WTP) increases with the quantity of the
consumed good. This implies that there should be a scope eﬀect in contingent valuation
studies. However, in previous issues of Ecological Economics, several authors criticized the
contingent valuation (CV) method for the absence of such eﬀect or its inadequacy. In this
paper, we contribute to this on-going debate by proposing to systematically apply several
WTP statistical distribution assumptions to test for scope eﬀects and check its plausibility,
following Whitehead's (2016) recent recommendations. We perform this approach using data
from a Swiss case study assessing the WTP for an increased surface of forest reserves. We ﬁnd
that both mean WTP and scope eﬀects are sensitive to the statistical distribution assumption.
Regarding plausibility, scope elasticities provide mixed result and also depend on the assumed
statistical distribution of WTP. For small sample size CV studies, a non-parametric analysis,
a spike model or an open-ended format can thus be better suited to reveal scope eﬀects than
the classical parametric dichotomous choice analysis. We thus recommend to systematically
apply several statistical distribution assumptions of WTP to test for scope eﬀects and their
plausibility.
Keywords: Contingent valuation, Scope eﬀects; Forests; Scope elasticities; Plausibility
JEL classiﬁcation: Q23 - Q57
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1.1 Introduction
The supposed insensitivity of the willingness to pay (WTP) to the scope of the assessed
good in stated preferences methods, and all the more in contingent valuation (CV)
studies, is a hot controversy in the literature. Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) were the
ﬁrst to ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact of scope in their CV study, thus casting fundamental
doubts on this valuation method. Indeed, if Kahneman and Knetsch (1992, p.1) were
right in assuming that contingent valuation responses reﬂect the WTP for the moral
satisfaction of contributing to public goods, not the economic value of these goods, then
the CV method would be fundamentally ﬂawed and could not be used in valuation
studies. However, Carson and Mitchell (1993a) reviewed Kahneman and Knetsch's
(1992) study, as well as other CV studies, and observed that the median is always
higher for the WTP related to the bigger scope. Also, several studies (e.g. Smith and
Osborne, 1996; Carson, 1997; Bandara and Tisdell, 2005) have indicated that a scope
eﬀect is detected when correcting WTP for the diﬀerence in sub-samples characteristics
and applying the appropriate signiﬁcance test, even with inexpensive survey methods
such as face-to-face interviews (Whitehead et al., 1998). Meta-analyses have also shown
that the scope of the assessed good has an impact on WTP (Richardson and Loomis,
2009; Ojea and Loureiro, 2011; Hjerpe et al., 2015). Recently, Bishop et al. (2017b)
included two scopes of avoided injuries and found evidence of responsiveness to scope in
WTP studies to avoid oil spills like the 2010 Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico.
However, the WTP diﬀerence is quite small relative to the hypothetical change in scope
and their results are discussed as well (Baron, 2017; Bishop et al., 2017a).
Since the NOAA panel guidelines (Arrow et al., 1993), testing scope eﬀects should
be part of the standard validity tests for a contingent valuation survey. However,
the recent debate between Chapman et al. (2016) and Desvousges et al. (2016), the
contribution of Whitehead (2016) in Ecological Economics and Hausman (2012), clearly
demonstrate that scholars have not yet reached a consensus on the issue of adequate
scope responsiveness. Moreover, the general suspicion that the CV method simply does
not pass the classical scope test still casts doubt on the very CV method (Hausman,
2012). Indeed, studies that do not robustly detect scope eﬀects are not rare (see e.g.
Boyle et al. (1994), McFadden (1994), Veisten et al. (2004), Desvousges et al. (2012)
and Frontuto et al. (2017)) and the lack of systematic scope tests may also induce
distrust for stated preferences methods in general (see Heberlein et al. 2005).
Although, as recommended in the literature the tests of adequacy or plausibility are
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legitimate, in this Chapter we maintain that one should ﬁrstly address the basic issue of
statistically signiﬁcant scope responsiveness. We thus deal with the following question:
Does the assumed statistical distribution of WTP matter to detect scope eﬀects? We
argue that, while sensitivity of mean WTP estimates to distributional assumption is
acknowledged (Bengochea-Morancho et al., 2005), split-sample comparisons, identiﬁca-
tion of scope eﬀects and the result of plausibility tests can also be aﬀected. Because
of the lower number of degrees of freedom and the higher variability, this is even more
pronounced in small samples and valuing complex environmental amenities (Veisten
et al., 2004).11
We apply a split-sample CV survey to measure the scope eﬀects on the WTP and its
plausibility, for a program aiming at increasing the surface of forests reserves in Switzer-
land to protect fauna and ﬂora. Since the program implies some access restriction to
recreationists, we fundamentally assess non-use values of these reserves. We analyze
this issue using diﬀerent econometric approaches and ad-hoc external scope tests: (i)
we begin by calculating mean WTP estimates, accounting for sub-samples diﬀerences
in characteristics with several parametric models and hence diﬀerent WTP statistical
distribution assumptions; (ii) we then add information regarding real zeros and carry
out a parametric spike model (Kriström, 1997) with an asymmetric distribution; (iii)
afterwards, we compute a non-parametric estimation, free of WTP distribution assump-
tion; and ﬁnally (iv) we analyze the answers of an open-ended follow-up question. To
test the plausibility of the responsiveness to scope, we follow Whitehead's (2016) recent
recommendation and thus calculate the scope arc elasticities.
Our results show that individuals are, on average, willing to pay more for larger size
(Swiss) forests than for smaller (Geneva) forests. However, the signiﬁcance level of this
diﬀerence is largely aﬀected by the assumed statistical distribution regarding WTP.
Indeed, parametric estimations from the dichotomous choice elicitation format, such as
log-logistic and log-normal, fail to detect statistically signiﬁcant scope eﬀects; results
are mixed with the logistic distribution and depend on the inclusion of covariates; and
ﬁnally non-parametric models, spike models and open-ended estimates robustly reveal
signiﬁcant scope eﬀects. The test of plausibility proposed by Whitehead (2016) does
not rule out nor does it conﬁrm the appropriateness of our scope responsiveness, but
the outcome of the test is also largely aﬀected by the assumed statistical distribution
11Small samples are not rare in the CV literature. In the meta-analysis of Meshreky et al. (2014),
39 out of the 105 estimates elicited with the CV method and dichotomous choice are drawn from less
than 300 observations. For these studies, scope eﬀects would be even harder to detect.
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of WTP. We thus suggest that CV studies have to test for scope eﬀects and their
plausibility using several distribution assumptions of WTP, especially in small samples
studies.
We introduce the CV method and our questionnaire in Section 1.2. The empirical
approach and descriptive statistics are provided in Section 1.3. Section 1.4.1 presents
the results from diﬀerent parametric distributions for the dichotomous choice format
and diﬀerent tests for scope eﬀects. Section 1.4.2 analyzes the results from the Turnbull
non-parametric estimation, while Section 1.4.3 uses the open-ended follow-up question
to provide WTP estimates. We estimate scope elasticities in Section 1.4.4. Section 1.5
discusses and concludes.
1.2 Survey design
The CV questionnaire is composed of three parts. The ﬁrst aims at understanding
preferences on, knowledge of and behavior in forests. The second part is the contingent
valuation of the proposed increase in forest reserves. The third part gathers individuals'
socioeconomic characteristics.12 It is worth noting that, in general, Swiss forests are
in good health and growing. However, in some regions human activities are in conﬂict
with biodiversity.
We base the scenario for the contingent valuation on an actual federal program, part of
the Swiss Forest Policy 2020 (FOEN, 2013b), as recommended in Arrow et al. (1993).
This program aims principally at fostering endangered biodiversity by increasing the
surface of protected forests, from 5% to 10% of the total forest surface13. Transforming
productive forests in forest reserves involves opportunity costs for the forest industry,
as well as some access restrictions to recreationists.
To analyze the existence of a scope eﬀect, we use the split-sample approach as in
Berrens et al. (2000): To a sub-sample (the Swiss forest sub-sample, CH) composed
of 228 individuals randomly picked in the whole population, we ask if the respondent's
12A travel cost analysis and other information about the survey results are available in Baranzini
et al. (2015). The full questionnaire is available upon request.
13The use of absolute instead of relative changes could have improved the understanding of the
contingent question, which might have led to a more robust scope eﬀect identiﬁcation (Ojea and
Loureiro, 2011). However, the use of relative changes is not rare in CV and can be better suited to
value complex environmental amenities. The federal policy is also expressed in relative terms.
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household would be willing to pay an amount of CHF X to increase the surface of
protected forests in Switzerland.
We then administer to another sub-sample from the same population (the Geneva forest
sub-sample, GE) exactly the same question, but referring to Geneva forests only. To
avoid part-whole bias (Whitehead et al., 1998), an issue emerging when individuals
believe that the program will apply to a larger scale, we remind the Geneva forest
sub-sample that the program will apply to Geneva forests only. It is worth noting
that Geneva forests account for about 0.2% of total forest surface in Switzerland, so
that the diﬀerence in scope between the two versions of the program is substantial.
Geneva being part of Switzerland, we consider the two program versions to be perfectly
embedded, as recommended in Kahneman and Knetsch (1992). The Geneva program is
indeed geographically nested in the Swiss program.14 However, this assumption can be
discussed. Indeed, our programs would not be perfectly embedded if individuals do not
believe that their money will be used the same way in Geneva and in Switzerland and if
they have a diﬀerent perception of cantonal vs. federal taxes. However, a Greek study
(Remoundou et al., 2012) has found a non-signiﬁcant impact of the providing institution
on the WTP, even with low and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent trust levels. In addition, in
Switzerland, trust in the institutions is relatively high at the cantonal and federal
level15, and thus this issue should not be very relevant.
We build the question as an advisory referendum, specifying that the results would be
used to implement the policy. To reduce the hypothetical bias (Hausman, 2012), we
follow an ex ante approach (Loomis, 2011) and thus insist on consequentiality of the sur-
vey (Carson and Groves, 2007), with a reminder that the respondent might concretely
contribute to the program. We also follow Mitchell and Carson (2013) and Kotchen and
Reiling (1999) and add an income constraint reminder to make the respondent aware
of the opportunity costs she faces.
WTP is thus elicited through the Single-Bounded-Dichotomous-Choice (SBDC) ap-
proach, as is recommended by the NOAA panel (Arrow et al., 1993) and by most
recent studies (Carson and Groves, 2007; Mueller, 2014; Bishop et al., 2017b), because
of its incentive compatibility, its ability to avoid non-response and outliers and its lower
cognitive burden (Bateman et al., 2002). Indeed, by asking if the respondent is willing
14It is worth noting that, given the small size of Switzerland, each inhabitant lives relatively close
to a forest and that all Swiss regions contain wide forest areas.
15According to the World Value survey, 65.1% of the Swiss inhabitants trust the government in
2009 (WVS, 2017).
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to purchase the service at a given price, this format allows mimicking a market-type
situation and is thus relatively simple to understand. Furthermore, as Swiss people are
often consulted for referenda, this type of question seems particularly appropriate in
our context.
We use a federal or cantonal lump-sum tax as payment vehicle, because of forests public
good characteristics: as the beneﬁts of forest reserves are non-rival, the appropriate
payment vehicle must request contribution from everyone. The oﬀ-site survey also
requires a payment vehicle that includes forests non-users. In a CV survey on tropical
forests, Baranzini et al. (2010) indeed show that a tax provides a higher WTP than a
voluntary payment in a forest fund, the latter being subject to free-riding.
With the SBDC approach, a selection of tax amounts (bids) is randomly assigned
between respondents. As Haab and McConnell (2002) mention, the selection of bids is
of particular importance. A carefully selected bid vector can considerably improve the
eﬃciency of WTP estimates. However, the optimal bid vector can only be designed if
the true WTP distribution is known. But, obviously, if true mean WTP is known, there
is no reason to derive an optimal bid vector (Haab and McConnell, 2002, p. 129). An
exhaustive literature review and a meta-analysis of 47 CV studies on forest in developed
countries published between 1993 and 2014 (Meshreky et al., 2014) revealed that the
mean WTP for forest programs ranges from USD (2011, PPP) 0 to 650 per household,
per year, with a mean at 100 and a median at 68. We therefore select our 6 bids (CHF
10, 60, 100, 250, 500 and 1000)16 accordingly and conﬁrm them by a preliminary open-
ended qualitative questionnaire discussed in focus groups, as recommended in Kanninen
(1993) and Haab and McConnell (2002).
After the referendum question, we administer an open-ended follow-up question, which
consists of asking maximum WTP for the program, as Garcia et al. (2007). We use this
approach to compute an open-ended estimate of WTP. This estimate, however, suﬀers
from the incentive incompatibility issue (Carson and Groves, 2007). Indeed, because
of the public good nature of the program, respondents usually tend to strategically
understate their true WTP with open-ended questions. The bid proposed in the refer-
endum question also creates anchoring, which pushes the maximum WTP towards the
proposed bid.
We design a second follow-up question to distinguish protest bids (Jorgensen and Syme,
2000) from real zeros. If the answer to the previous question is zero, then the respon-
16On December 31st 2014, CHF 1=EUR 1.20=USD 0.98
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dent has to state the reason in a closed-ended question. We identify protesters if the
reason for not contributing is unrelated to the value of forest17. Other reasons are
considered real zeros.
1.3 Empirical approach and descriptive statistics
Based on the Random Utility Model (McFadden, 1973), ﬁrst applied by Hanemann
(1984) for CV, the individual's probability to answer Yes to the bid can be modeled
by the bid itself, a vector of explanatory variables and an error term, and estimated
with a binary model. However, before estimating the model, the statistical distribution
of WTP still has to be assumed. This assumption can be made using diﬀerent plain
parametric models (Bishop and Heberlein, 1979), such as probit, logit, log-logit, log-
normal or mixture models such as the spike model (Kriström, 1997). This choice is
not necessary when using non-parametric models, since the latter do not require to
assume any particular WTP distribution (Kriström, 1990). The logit model is the most
frequently used model, because the calculation of mean WTP is easier (Bateman et al.,
2002) and it is often conﬁrmed with a non-parametric approach. For example, Bishop
et al. (2017b), use a probit model and conﬁrm the estimations by a non-parametric
model.
We test diﬀerent distribution assumptions, by using several parametric and non-parametric
models, either including covariates or not. Adding independent variables to the models
should not change mean WTP as the latter is evaluated at covariates mean. How-
ever, it allows to control for heterogeneous characteristics of split-samples, which may,
in our case, have a diﬀerent eﬀect on mean WTP. The inclusion of covariates in the
model thus allows to better extrapolate the WTP from one sample to another, which
enables estimating what respondents from one sub-sample would be willing to pay for
the program proposed to the other sub-sample. Covariates may also help decreasing
unobserved heterogeneity, thus decreasing the variance. The ﬁnal model choice is thus
based on diﬀerences in split-samples characteristics and intuition regarding the eﬀect of
17I would like more information on this topic before accepting paying this amount, I do not trust
the state. I have no guarantee that the money will indeed be used to ﬁnance the program., I already
pay enough taxes, Forest is a public good, so it is not reasonable to ask me to pay for it and The
state, the forests owners or forest users should pay, not me..
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variables on bid acceptance.18 The sample is composed of 419 independent observations
from which the sub-sample GE has 191 and CH 228 observations. The ﬁnal matrix of
explanatory variables is described in Subsection A, in the Appendix.
As Table 1.1 shows, each bid has been proposed to 16 persons minimum. The acceptance
rates, unsurprisingly, decrease with the bid amount in both sub-samples and, while the
acceptance rate of the Geneva program falls to 6% for a cost of CHF 1000, it reaches
18% for the Swiss program for the same cost. This may indicate that the range of the
bid vector could have been wider for the Swiss program. We observe a non-monotonous
decrease in the acceptance rates in both sub-samples, which is not a particularly rare
result with small sample sizes (Kriström, 1990; Bateman et al., 2002).
Table 1.1: Structure of the answers to bids
10 60 100 250 500 1000 Total
CH
Yes 26 22 18 12 6 6 90
No 16 12 24 29 29 28 138
(incl. protester) (9) (7) (10) (12) (2) (5) (45)
(incl. real zeros) (7) (4) (8) (9) (11) (10) (49)
N 42 34 42 41 35 34 228
Acceptance rate 0.62 0.65 0.43 0.29 0.17 0.18 0.39
Protest rate 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.29 0.06 0.15 0.20
Follow-up max. WTPa 23.44 54.07 87.81 124.48 171.67 303.10 126.84
(Std. dev.) (34.60) (27.63) (110.85) (115.22) (226.11) (386.98) (212.07)
GE
Yes 34 25 19 3 3 1 85
No 6 15 20 37 13 15 106
(incl. protester) (3) (7) (6) (12) (6) (5) (39)
(incl. real zeros) (3) (7) (9) (8) (2) (1) (30)
N 40 40 39 40 16 16 191
Acceptance rate 0.85 0.63 0.49 0.08 0.19 0.06 0.45
Protest rate 0.08 0.18 0.15 0.30 0.38 0.31 0.29
Follow-up max. WTPa 46.24 40.50 60.40 84.68 203.00 141.82 79.30
(Std. dev.) (54.87) (34.10) (54.88) (83.02) (216.75) (136.59) (101.90)
a Mean of the follow-up open-ended question about maximum WTP, excluding protest answers
Protest rates are stable across bids19 and are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across sub-
samples.20 It is interesting, but not surprising, to observe that the mean maximum
18Because the low response rate for the income question drastically reduces the number of obser-
vations, we do not include any income variable in the ﬁnal model. For information, we provide the
descriptive statistics of income in both sub-samples in Table a.1 in the Appendix. While income and
its distribution could be drivers of WTP (Baumgärtner et al., 2017), there is no reason to think that
it may impact scope. Indeed, mean income and income distribution in both sub-samples are not
statistically diﬀerent.
19With the exception of the relatively low protest rate of the 500 bid in CH and the 10 bid in GE.
20Protest bids should not be removed unless the sub-sample of protest bidders reveals the same
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WTP elicited with the open-ended follow-up question usually increases with the bid
proposed for the Swiss program, revealing an anchoring eﬀect.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Parametric estimations
The use of parametric modeling techniques implies to impose a statistical distribution
of WTP. Normal and logistic distributions are often used because of their relative ease
to handle. However, these distributions suﬀer from an important drawback: since they
are deﬁned symmetrically over ] − ∞ : +∞[, they include the possibility of negative
or inﬁnite willingness to pay. As Bateman et al. (2002) mention, if an individual does
not value the improvement in the provision of the good, we expect a zero WTP. A
negative WTP is acceptable only if the program can be considered as a deterioration
(see Boman and Bostedt (1999) and the wolves example). In addition, an individual's
WTP shall not be higher than her income and WTP should thus lie in the interval [0 : y]
(with y the income) in most cases. Asymmetric distributions such as the log-normal or
log-logistic can take care of the negative WTP issue but cannot rule out inﬁnite WTP.
Mixture models such as spike models or truncated models could also be used and are
recommended in Bateman et al. (2002).21
Since there is no consensus on the statistical distribution and given that we are more
interested in testing the scope eﬀects and its robustness across distributions, rather
than in the value of WTP, we decide to run diﬀerent parametric models (logistic, log-
normal, log-logistic) on our split-samples and apply diﬀerent tests for scope eﬀects such
as the Z-test, the non-overlapping conﬁdence intervals test (Park et al., 1991), and
the Complete Combinatorial (CC, Poe et al., 2005) test. Since logistic and normal
characteristics as other respondents (Halstead et al., 1992). In the CH sub-sample, protesters are on
average signiﬁcantly older, they are less likely to be members of environmental associations, live in
a more urban environment and go less often to forests than non-protesters. In the GE sub-sample,
protesters are more often men and live in a more urban environment. Protesters characteristics are
apparently diﬀerent from non-protesters and dropping those observations may hence bias our estimates
because of self-selection. However, considering them as real zeros would create a downward bias. There
is no universally acknowledged simple method to deal with protest bids (see Strazzera et al. (2003)).
In the following analysis we hence exclude protesters but, in terms of scope eﬀects, results are similar
when protesters are included as real zeros. Results including protesters are available upon request.
21In this Chapter, we do not artiﬁcially truncate the parametric distributions. However, results
regarding scope eﬀects are similar with a truncation point above CHF 1000.
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distributions usually give similar results, we rule out the normal distribution thanks to
the prediction accuracy. The logistic distribution is modeled by a logit, the log-normal
and log-logistic distributions are, as usual, computed with probit and logit models
respectively and applying the logarithm on the Bid variable.
Full estimation results are presented in Table a.2 in the Appendix. We observe that the
coeﬃcients associated with the Bid variables are always signiﬁcantly negative, which
was expected. Ceteris paribus, the probability of accepting the bid thus signiﬁcantly
decreases with its amount in both sub-samples. Eﬀects of covariates are commented in
Subsection A, in the Appendix.
Before calculating WTP estimates, we check whether both sub-samples respond diﬀer-
ently to the bid proposed and if coeﬃcients are similar across sub-samples. We therefore
run pooled models on top of models on split-samples and test for poolability using the
Likelihood Ratio test (LR) as in Berrens et al. (2000) or Veisten et al. (2004). We ﬁnd
that sub-samples should not be pooled, which conﬁrms our split-sample methodology22.
As Poe et al. (1994) stress, if mean WTP does not reveal any scope eﬀects, one should
anyway check if statistical distributions are diﬀerent. An analysis of mean, median and
WTP distribution is therefore necessary to analyze scope eﬀects. The calculation of
WTP central tendency (mean and median) depends on the distributional assumption
(see Aizaki et al., 2014).
Mean and median WTP resulting from parametric estimations are presented in Table
1.2.
As expected, estimates are very sensitive to the distributional assumption and range
from CHF 277 to 2064 for the Swiss program and CHF 183 to 335 for the Geneva
program. WTP arising from log-distributions are higher, because of the asymmetry and
the right skewness of these distributions. This is a standard result, as acknowledged in
Bengochea-Morancho et al. (2005).
According to these parametric approaches, we ﬁnd that respondents from our sample are
willing to pay on average more for new protected areas in Swiss forests than for the same
program, but applied to Geneva forests only. However, using Z-tests, the diﬀerence is
22 The LR test is written as LR = −2[lnLPooled − (lnLCH + lnLGE)] ∼ χ2(10), where lnLPooled
is the log-likelihood from the pooled model, lnLCH the log-likelihood from the CH model, lnLGE the
log-likelihood from the GE model. The test statistic follows a χ2 with 10 degrees of freedom, the
number of equality restrictions.
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statistically signiﬁcant for the logit model with covariates only. The diﬀerence in median
WTP values for log-distributions do not reach the signiﬁcance level either.
Similarly, the non-overlapping conﬁdence interval method (Park et al., 1991) using
Krinsky and Robb (1986) conﬁdence intervals at 95% does not reveal any signiﬁcant
scope eﬀect, since the major part of the intervals overlap for each WTP distribution.
A complete combinatorial approach, as proposed in Poe et al. (2005) aims at testing
the diﬀerence between two distributions. This methodology requires Krinsky-Robb
simulation technique. We simulate 1000 replications of WTP for both sub-samples and
subtract each possible combination of these WTP. The proportion of positive diﬀerences
can be interpreted as the p-value for H0: WTPCH = WTPGE. This test rejects H0
with 90% conﬁdence for the log-normal models with and without covariates. In all other
models H0 is not rejected, and the test concludes that no scope eﬀects are observed.
To check if diﬀerences in samples characteristics play a role in the determination of
scope eﬀects, we follow Carson and Mitchell (1993b)'s procedure and evaluate WTP
for the Geneva program at CH sub-sample covariates mean (C¯H), to get an estimate
of what respondents from the CH sub-sample would be willing to pay for the Geneva
program. The results are shown in rows GE at C¯H. When diﬀerences in sub-samples
characteristics are taken into account, estimates display similar results as if this diﬀer-
ence was not corrected for. Thus, no signiﬁcant scope eﬀects can be observed in this
case either, except for the logistic distribution. We can therefore conclude that the
correction for sub-samples diﬀerences in characteristics does not help revealing scope
eﬀect and that these diﬀerences do not play any signiﬁcant role in its determination in
this case.
Kriström (1997) proposes a spike model that split real-zeros and positive WTP in two
groups. This distribution thus has two parts: a spike at zeros to account for excess
real-zeros and an asymmetric distribution for strictly positive bidders. The advantage
of this model is that, by allowing a distributional break at 0, it may better ﬁt the real
distribution and therefore better reveal scope eﬀect, assuming there is one. Coeﬃcients
from the log-normal model applied on positive bidders are presented in Table a.3 in the
Appendix23. They will allow to calculate a mean WTP conditioned on positive WTP.
We obtain the unconditional mean WTP by multiplying the conditional mean by the
proportion of positive bidders. WTP resulting from the spike log-normal model are
presented in Table 1.3 and show an important diﬀerence between the mean WTP for
23Spike models also reject the null hypothesis for poolability given by the LR test.
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the programs. When adding covariates, this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant for conditional and
unconditional WTP estimates. Furthermore, the CC approach rejects the hypothesis of
same distribution with and without covariates. By giving more information, the spike
model with log-normal distribution on positive bidders thus reveals scope eﬀects, even
with a lower number of observations, contrary to the plain log-normal model. This
shows that one should test more sophisticated parametric models and try to better ﬁt
the real WTP distribution, particularly with small samples.
Table 1.3: WTP estimates from the spike log-normal distribution
CH GE CH GE
Cond. mean WTP 832.56 294.88 746.96 234.75
(Std. Err.) (342.37) (82.57) (259.32) (27.69)
CIa [462; 3025] [206; 714] [432; 2742] [209; 407]
∆CH-GE 538.12 512.21**
Uncond. mean WTP 609.63 236.68 546.95 188.42
(Std. Err.) (250.70) (66.28) (171.87) (22.23)
∆CH-GE 372.95 358.53**
Cond. med. WTP 336.66 198.49 388.64 202.85
(Std. Err.) (65.57) (32.18) (77.46) (21.23)
∆CH-GE 138.17* 185.79**
Covariates No No Yes Yes
Observations 134 122 134 120
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Std. Err. computed with the Delta Method
a Krinsky and Robb CI at 95%, computed with 1000 replications
Figure 1.1 represents the acceptance rate for each bid (excluding protesters) and the
estimated survival function of the assumed WTP distributions. We observe that none
of the assumed statistical distributions perfectly ﬁts the data and that the choice of
one statistical distribution over the others is impossible. This fact further highlights
the importance of testing diﬀerent statistical distributions of WTP in this context.
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Figure 1.1: Acceptance rate and assumed WTP distributions (estimated with covari-
ates)
1.4.2 Non-parametric estimation
We follow the Turnbull non-parametric approach for binary data, also known as the
Ayer estimator (Ayer et al., 1955), which has been developed in Kriström (1990) for the
CV method. The advantage of this approach is that a speciﬁc distribution assumption
for WTP is not necessary. The only assumptions are that the probability of accepting
a bid at CHF 0 is 100%, which rules out negative WTP and that the probability of
accepting some high bid, the truncation point, is 0. The truncation point should be
chosen according to respondents' preferences or income constraints, information that is
usually missing. The relative strength or weakness of these assumptions depend on the
program being valued.
We build the survival function of bid acceptance for discrete choice WTP data as in
Bateman et al. (2002). The estimated points of the survival function are thus calculated
as:
Sˆ(Bidj) =
nj
Nj
(1.1)
where Bidj is the bid level (j = 1...6), Nj is the number of persons to whom the bid
has been proposed, nj the number of persons who said Yes to the given bid and Sˆ the
16
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estimated survival function.
A valid survival function, from well-behaved preferences, has to be monotonously de-
creasing. As this is not the case for some bid levels, we correct for this issue using the
Pooled Adjacent Violators Algorithm (PAVA) method, proposed by Robertson et al.
(1988) and also called Turnbull Self Consistency Algorithm.24 This method, presented
in Haab and McConnell (2002), pools the Bidj with Bidj−1 if the acceptance rate for
Bidj is higher than for Bidj−1.
As for the parametric estimation, we do not include protesters. Following Kriström
(1990), we interpolate linearly between bids, but a step function, as proposed in Bate-
man et al. (2002) is also applicable. We arbitrarily truncate our survival function at
120025, which is likely to underestimate the true WTP, because the last bid and the
truncation point are close. However, this applies to both sub-samples estimations and
should therefore not aﬀect scope eﬀects. The resulting survival functions are illustrated
in Figure 1.2, which shows that the survival function for the Swiss forest sub-sample
(plain line) is usually higher than the Geneva forest sub-sample's survival function
(dashed line). It is interesting to see that the survival functions are close at low bids
and seem to diverge only after a certain threshold.
To compare the survival functions in Figure 1.2 and test for diﬀerences between these
two functions, we use the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS). This test
does not reveal any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between CH and GE distributions as a whole.
However, a KS test concludes that the survival functions between the bids 250 and
1000 are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 5% conﬁdence level. In our bid design, since
the bids are not equidistant, there may be troubles with the KS test as all points
of the estimated survival function have the same weight, while the highest bids have
the strongest impact on WTP estimates. To correct for that issue, we interpolate Sˆ
with 6 hypothetical equidistant bids and test again for signiﬁcant diﬀerence in survival
function. This manipulation does not distort respondents' preferences. Indeed, if the
individual accepts to pay 250, she should also accept to pay 166.66. This procedure
allows to reject the hypothesis of same WTP distributions for both sub-samples at
24For the sake of replication ease, the data used to estimate the non-parametric model are available
in Table a.4, in the Appendix.
25The maximumWTP, as stated in the open-ended follow-up question, indicates that no respondent
is willing to pay more than 1000. Since the acceptance rate of the 1000 bid is still high (18% and 6% for
CH and GE respectively) and given the incentive incompatibility of the open-ended format, it would
be unrealistic to truncate at 1000. We thus choose 1200 to stay conservative. The estimations with a
truncation at 1000 display the same results in terms of mean WTP scope responsiveness.
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the 95% conﬁdence level, revealing that WTP distribution is, on average, statistically
higher for the Swiss program than for the Geneva program.
Bid
Su
rv
iva
l
10 100 250 500 1000 1200
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Su
rv
iva
l
PAVA survival CH
S^CH
PAVA survival GE
S^GE
Figure 1.2: PAVA survival function of WTP
Using the Turnbull approach, the median WTP for the Swiss forest sub-sample on
graph 1.2 corresponds to the point where the function hits 0.5 on the Y axis. Mean
WTP can be calculated as the area under the survival function.
Table 1.4 presents the WTP central tendency estimates of the non-parametric approach.
CH mean WTP is again larger than GE. Furthermore, a Z-test reveals that the CH
mean WTP is signiﬁcantly higher than GE WTP at the 99% conﬁdence level. Hence,
where parametric estimates fail to reveal scope eﬀects by lack of eﬃciency, the Turnbull
estimator and the associated tests manage to distinguish the WTP diﬀerence in both
sub-samples.
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Table 1.4: Non-parametric WTP estimates
CH GE
Mean WTP 341.52*** 243.96***
Std. Err. (27.32) (26.54)
∆CH-GE 97.56***
Median WTP 163.04*** 127.20***
Std. Err. (28.21) (23.40)
∆CH-GE 35.85
Observations 183 152
* p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
1.4.3 Using the anchored open-ended follow-up
As mentioned earlier, our survey has a follow-up open-ended question asking the maxi-
mum WTP for the program. While the ﬁrst aim of this question was to identify protest
bids, the answers also give information about (stated) maximum WTP in an anchored
context26. Protests bids were again excluded from the sample to avoid the protest bias.
As highlighted in Desvousges et al. (1987), although the preceding dichotomous choice
question should moderate this issue, open-ended questions may also suﬀer from outliers.
This seems not to be the case in our sample, since the stated maximum WTP never
overcomes CHF 1000, which corresponds to the highest bid proposed and to a little
fraction of respondents' mean stated income.
As our bids are the same in both sub-samples, we assume that each anchor (each bid) has
the same eﬀect on the maximum stated WTP in both sub-samples. There are no clear
evidence to support this assumption in the literature. However, there is no theoretical
reason to believe that the anchoring eﬀect would be diﬀerent either. Therefore, we run
a simple analysis of weighted means to test for scope eﬀects. The weights are computed
to keep the exact same proportion of each bids in both sub-samples, to ensure the same
anchoring eﬀect. As shown in Table 1.5, we again ﬁnd a larger mean WTP for the
Swiss forest sub-sample. Applying a Welch test, the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 90%
conﬁdence level. More eﬃcient estimates produced by the open-ended format are thus
better able to reveal scope eﬀects in our case.
26In addition to the anchoring bias, these answers suﬀer from incentive incompatibility (Carson,
2012) and may thus be aﬀected by a strategic bias. Indeed the open-ended format does not give
the incentive to respondents to truthfully reveal their preferences. Yet, we assume that this bias is
similar in both sub-samples. Therefore, the strategic biases should cancel out when looking at WTP
diﬀerences.
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Table 1.5: Weighted average maximum WTP from the open-ended follow-up
CH GE
Mean WTP 126.84 97.36
Std. dev. (212.07) (48.83)
∆CH-GE 29.47*
Observations 182 119
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
1.4.4 Plausibility of the scope responsiveness
As noted by the NOAA panel, ﬁndings from CV must show adequate responsiveness to
scope to be considered reliable (Desvousges et al., 2012), an issue that needs to be tested
with an adding-up test (Diamond and Hausman, 1994). Unfortunately, as the Geneva
and Swiss programs are not deﬁned incrementally27, we cannot discuss the adequacy of
the scope responsiveness with this method. Very recently, Whitehead (2016) proposed
to calculate the scope elasticity of WTP as an indicator of economic signiﬁcance or
plausibility, rather than only statistical signiﬁcance. Scope elasticities (εQ) are deﬁned
for an inﬁnitesimal change in quantity (the scope: Q) such that εQ = dWTPdQ
Q
WTP
. Hence
a continuous WTP-scope function is necessary. Our split sample methodology does not
allow to derive a continuous WTP-scope function since only two WTP points were
estimated. We therefore calculate the variation of WTP in terms of arc elasticity
such that: εQ = ∆WTP∆Q
Q¯
WTP
(Whitehead, 2016, p. 20), with Q¯ and ¯WTP the mean
values of Q and WTP respectively. Arc elasticities thus represent an average elasticity
between two distant points. For our case:
εQ =
(WTPCH −WTPGE)
(QCH −QGE)
(QCH +QGE)
(WTPCH +WTPGE)
(1.2)
With WTPCH the mean WTP for the Swiss program, WTPGE the mean WTP for
the Geneva program, QCH the scope of the Swiss program and QGE the scope of the
Geneva program (in hectares). QCH is equal to 10% of the Swiss forest surface and QGE
equals 10% of Geneva forest surface (i.e. 126'040 hectares and 301 hectares respectively
in 2014 (FSO, 2016a)). Elasticities whose conﬁdence intervals fall into the [0; 1] range
are considered plausible, according to Whitehead (2016), since they would respect the
positive but decreasing marginal utility theory.
27The adding-up test requires to value 3 scopes such that A=B+C (Whitehead, 2016). We only
have information about one part (B) and the whole (A) but lack C to implement the adding-up test.
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Table 1.6: Arc scope elasticities
Statistical distribution WTP central measure Covariates εQ IC95%
Logistic Mean No 0.20 [-0.08 ; 0.49]
Logistic Mean Yes 0.25** [0.0010 ; 0.50]
Log-normal Mean No 0.72*** [0.23 ; 1.22]
Log-normal Median No 0.088 [-0.20 ; 0.38]
Log-normal Mean Yes 0.70*** [0.23 ; 1.17]
Log-normal Median Yes 0.16 [-0.11 ; 0.43]
Log-logistic Median No 0.098 [-0.18 ; 0.38]
Log-logistic Median Yes 0.16 [-0.12 ; 0.43]
Spike Conditional mean No 0.48** [0.10 ; 0.86]
Spike Unconditional mean No 0.44** [0.049 ; 0.84]
Spike Conditional median No 0.26** [0.027 ; 0.49]
Spike Conditional mean Yes 0.52*** [0.28 ; 0.76]
Spike Unconditional mean Yes 0.49*** [0.24 ; 0.74]
Spike Conditional median Yes 0.32*** [0.12 ; 0.52]
Non-parametric Mean No 0.12
Non-parametric Median No 0.12
Open-ended Weighted mean No 0.13
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Conﬁdence intervals computed with the Delta Method
The resulting arc scope elasticities and their conﬁdence intervals at 95% are presented
in Table 1.6. Conﬁdence intervals of the logistic with covariates, log-normal and spike
model are strictly positive. However, elasticities from the log-normal model may exceed
1, which would contradict the decreasing marginal utility theory. These elasticities,
according to Whitehead (2016), tend to show that WTP elicited through plain models
do not robustly show plausible responsiveness to scope, with the exception of the logit
model with covariates. However, elasticities from the spike distributions fall in the
plausible range. Hence, by adding more information on the WTP distribution and thus
reducing the variance, the spike model results in more plausible scope responsiveness
in our case.
The arc scope elasticities conﬁrm that the responsiveness to scope is sensitive to the
distribution assumption of WTP. Moreover, not only the statistical signiﬁcance, but also
the plausibility, is aﬀected by this assumption. Similarly to the statistical signiﬁcance,
the logit model with covariates and the spike models are better able to reveal plausible
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responsiveness to scope.
1.5 Conclusion
We test for scope eﬀects and evaluate their plausibility applying several WTP statistical
distribution assumptions: parametric estimations, a non-parametric estimation and an
estimation based on the open-ended format. We apply this approach on data from a CV
survey assessing the WTP for a program aiming at increasing the surface of protected
Swiss and Geneva forests. While the sensitivity of mean WTP to the statistical distri-
bution assumption is acknowledged, we note that it also has an impact on split-samples
comparison and on the ability to detect scope eﬀects. Non-parametric models such as
the Turnbull model, which assume no a priori WTP statistical distribution, are better
able to reveal scope eﬀects than plain parametric models (logit, log-logit, log-normal).
More sophisticated models such as the spike model, by giving more information about
individuals' WTP distribution, are also more powerful in revealing statistically sig-
niﬁcant and plausible scope eﬀects. Open-ended formats, despite biases, could also
reasonably be used for this purpose. For small sample sizes, a non-parametric analysis,
a spike model or an open-ended format can therefore constitute better options than
the classical parametric analysis for comparing two WTP estimations, in particular for
complex non-market goods. Since the results will depend on the real WTP distribution,
we suggest that CV studies have to systematically apply various statistical distributions
of WTP, and diﬀerent ad-hoc statistical tests, paying particular attention to both dif-
ferences in point estimates such as the mean and the median, but also to diﬀerences in
statistical distributions.
Since the NOAA panel guidelines (Arrow et al., 1993), testing scope eﬀects should be
part of the standard validity tests for a contingent valuation survey. However, some
studies do not successfully detect scope eﬀects and argue that the very CV method
may be unreliable. The debate has recently gone further in Ecological Economics with
Whitehead (2016), Chapman et al. (2016) and Desvousges et al. (2016) about adequacy,
rather than the very existence of the scope responsiveness. We argue that the debate on
the existence of scope eﬀects is not closed yet and that studies with mixed conclusions
will continue to appear also with Whitehead's (2016) new plausibility test. We therefore
recommend to pay particular attention to the assumed statistical distribution of WTP,
since it has a major incidence on the detection of scope eﬀects.
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Chapter 2
Are there enough forest reserves in
Switzerland? A contingent valuation
Written with A. Baranzini and D. Maradan and published in French as "Y a-t-il assez de
réserves forestières en Suisse? Une évaluation contingente" in Economie Rurale (Borzykowski
et al., 2017b). We are grateful to the anonymous referees of Economie Rurale for their com-
ments, which helped improving the paper signiﬁcantly. We thank the participants to the
Workshop on valuation of forest ecosystem services, held in 2016 at HEG-Geneva for their
contributions.
Abstract
We run a contingent valuation on a representative sample of the population to estimate the
willingness to pay (WTP) for a program aiming at creating new forest reserves in Switzerland.
Since the scenario includes access restrictions to the forest zones, the analysis focuses on non-
use values, in particular existence values. The parametric and non-parametric analyses of the
single-bounded-dichotomous-choice answers indicate a mean WTP of about CHF 470 to 500
(about EUR 390 to 415) per year and household. We study the selection bias caused by protest
bidders and ﬁnd that it does not statistically aﬀect the WTP. The analysis of WTP acceptance
determinants reveals that income has a positive but bounded impact and that city-dwellers
are more prone to accept paying for the program.
Keywords: Contingent valuation; Switzerland; Forest reserves; Willingness to pay
JEL Classiﬁcation: D61 - H41 - O13 - Q23 - Q57
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2.1 Introduction
The Swiss Federal Council adopted the Forest Policy 2020 in 2011 to harmonize can-
tonal forest policies, optimize wood exploitation, assure forest multifonctionality and
protect them against climate change. Indeed, while the Swiss forest surface grows,
the biodiversity and the global forest health are under pressure because of housing de-
velopment around urban areas and climate change, particularly in the Alps (Fischer
et al., 2015). A measure proposed by the government is to increase the surface of forest
reserves to 10% of the total forest surface up to 2030 (Gattlen, 2012). The intermedi-
ary goal of 5% has been reached in 2015, although some critical voices rise about the
non-representativity of these forest areas (FOEN, 2014d).
The Swiss Confederation deﬁnes forest reserves as large areas durably protected, [...]
and secured by a contract between the Canton and the forest owner (in general for 50
years time and sometimes for 99 years). [...] In these areas, the priority is given to the
biodiversity over all other forest-linked interests. (FOEN, 2015b)
This policy implies some costs, in particular opportunity costs. Indeed, when a forest
area is protected, the economic exploitation is slowed down (Bolkesjø et al. 2005, Lep-
pänen et al. 2005): wood production is reduced and the area can not be used to other
purposes such as agriculture, housing, etc. In a Swiss case study, Krähenbühl (2016)
shows that a hectare of biodiversity forest is not economically proﬁtable for the forest
owner, contrarily to a productive hectare of forest. Therefore, the transformation from
a productive forest to a forest reserve implies some economic shortfalls for the forest
industry.
In return, new forest reserves foster biodiversity (Parviainen et al. 2000, Küﬀer and
Senn-Irlet 2005) and, to a lower extent, allow forests to better sequestrate carbon, ﬁl-
trate water and protect against natural hazards. Since the status of forest reserve is only
given to existing forests, and given the restrictive application of the Swiss Law on Forest
(LFo, 2013)28, one only observes a marginal improvement of forest functions that are
not linked with biodiversity. Some reserves are also open to the public, who can observe
fauna and ﬂora's diversity, even though some non-secured areas can be dangerous for
hikers, in particular because of dead trees (Borzykowski and Kacprzak, 2017). However,
access restrictions to some other areas can also decrease the recreational opportunities.
28The goal of the Swiss law on Forests is to insure that forests can accomplish their role, in
particular their protective, social and economic role. (LFo, 2013, art. 1 al. 1 letter c) by forbidding
clear cuts, for example (LFo, 2013, art. 22).
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The Confederation compensates forests owners for the creation of new forests reserves.
This compensation amounts CHF 6029 per year and hectare on the Midland area, be-
tween CHF 20 and 60 in the Jura region and CHF 20 in the Alps (OFEV 2014f; 2015b).
These transfers amount CHF 1.6 millions per year (own estimations for 2012) and should
rise up to CHF 3.4 millions per year in 2030. These voluntary agreements can be con-
sidered as some kind of payment for ecosystem services (Tacconi, 2012), similarly to
those of the Natura 2000 policy in the European Union (Hily et al., 2015).
Are beneﬁts associated with the creation of new forest reserves comparable to the costs?
We answer this question with a Contingent Valuation (CV) from a phone survey and
analyze the impact of diﬀerent variables on the acceptability to bear the costs of such
a program.
The CV is a stated preferences method, which consists in asking the Willingness to
Pay (WTP) for a hypothetical program. It has become very successful after its usage
in calculating the compensation amount of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska (see
Carson et al. 1992). Despite the biases highlighted in the literature (Alberini and
Kahn, 2006), the approach allows to estimate non-use values, which is not possible
with revealed preferences methods. As the scenario of our contingent valuation plans
to restrict access in the forest reserves, the recreational uses in such zones are not
possible. Hence, the estimation of non-use values, such as the existence value (Krutilla,
1967) is meaningful and justiﬁes the use of the CV method in our case. There are several
studies analyzing recreational beneﬁts of forest reserves.30 In Switzerland, Baranzini
and Rochette (2008) use the travel cost method to assess the value of recreational
services in the Pfyn/Finges pine forest reserve in Wallis (Switzerland). Other studies
assess the recreational activities, using the CV method, like Scarpa et al. (2000) in
the case of the creation of new forest reserves. These studies run on-site surveys and
thus only focus on forest users. This methodology, in addition to implying endogenous
stratiﬁcation (Shaw, 1988), does not (or imperfectly) consider the non-use values.
There are several contingent valuation studies on forests conservation (see Barrio and
Loureiro 2010 for a meta-analysis). For example, Kniivilä et al. (2002) estimate the
beneﬁts for a forest conservation program in Northern Finland. These authors conclude
that conservation programs are justiﬁed by a cost-beneﬁt analysis at the national and
regional levels but their results are less clear cut at the local level. Indeed, the exploita-
29In December 2014, CHF 1=EUR 0.83 (Swiss National Bank, 2015).
30See the meta-analysis of Zandersen and Tol (2009) for examples. It includes 26 studies that use
the travel cost method to assess the recreational beneﬁts of European forests.
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tion restrictions can aﬀect close inhabitants more strongly than those living further
away. These results highlight the importance of non-use values compared to use-values
or market values, in particular in a national level context. In the same spirit, Pouta
et al. (2000) ﬁnd that WTP for the Natura 2000 program increases with income and
if the individual lives in an urban environment. Lehtonen et al. (2003) analyze the
WTP for a conservation program in Finland with a choice experiment, another stated
preferences method, and a contingent valuation and Lindhjem and Navrud (2011) pro-
pose a similar program for Norway. While these studies indeed use stated preferences
methods, the resulting WTPs include use and non-use values.
In Switzerland, to the best of our knowledge, there are no analysis on the existence
value of forest reserves. Only a few studies assess forest biodiversity but include use
and non-use values as well. Jäggin (1999) runs a contingent valuation study with the
inhabitants of Basel City, to assess the biodiversity in the Jura region, including its
forests. In 1998, the Basel-dwellers were willing to pay between CHF 324 and 1536 per
year and household for a biodiversity conservation program in the Jura. With a choice
experiment, Bade et al. (2011) ﬁnd a WTP for the promotion of forest biodiversity in
Swiss forests between CHF 40 and 80 per year and household.
Our study diﬀers from these contributions by the assessment of forest reserves non-
use values. The main goal of our program being the protection of biodiversity, which
would imply access restriction in our case, we only assess the existence value of forest
biodiversity. We ﬁnd that the Swiss inhabitants' WTP for such a program is relatively
high (even slightly higher than WTP from other European studies, which include use
and non-use values). This result probably reﬂects the high income level in Switzerland
and people's strong preferences towards forest conservation.
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 present the ques-
tionnaire and the survey, Section 2.3 explains the econometric methods, Section 2.4
presents the data, while results are presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 discusses and
concludes.
2.2 The survey
We ran the survey in December 2014, at any time of the day and any day of the week,
on a sample of 1200 adult inhabitants of Switzerland. The survey is administered by
phone, which comes with some disadvantages, as it is impossible to use visual mediums.
26
2.2. THE SURVEY
This can indeed be restrictive when presenting the contingent scenario. However, be-
fore the phone call, we sent a letter with some information about Swiss forests and the
study. A phone survey can also cause some sample selection, since elderly people are
generally easier to survey than young and single managers. This is more and more the
case, as the latter have less ﬁx phones. Nevertheless, an internet or face-to-face survey
also comes with the same kind of sample selection. To minimize this issue, the sam-
ple is chosen with the random quota method and is thus roughly representative of the
Swiss population. We nevertheless observe some over-representation of the inhabitants
of Tessin (the Italian speakers) and of elderly people31. The questionnaire32, whose ad-
ministration lasts about 15 minutes, is composed of 28 questions. It has been translated
from French to German and Italian, the other two national languages in Switzerland33.
After some ﬁlter questions, the ﬁrst part is designed to assess the recreational use of
forest in general, with the aim of applying the travel cost method (see Chapter 3). The
second part allows to evaluate the concerns about Swiss forest's health and the respon-
dent's membership to environmental friendly associations or her proximity to the forest
industry. Finally, before the socio-demographics, the third part of the questionnaire
submits a hypothetical scenario to apply the contingent valuation method. The ques-
tionnaire has been pre-tested at a small scale and with focus-groups (see Baranzini et al.
2015), as recommended in the literature. We also ran some validity tests by comparing
our questionnaire with WaMos2 (FOEN, 2013a) and running a scope test (Carson and
Mitchell, 1993a). Results of the latter are available in Chapter 1.
The contingent scenario is worded as follows:
A third of the Swiss territory is covered by forests, including 5% of protected forests.
Those host a rich and diverse ecosystem, allow to mitigate the eﬀects of climate change
and protect against some natural hazards (avalanches, land slides, erosion...). To pre-
serve and durably develop the Swiss forest and its multiple functions, the Confederation
considers doubling the surface of protected forest reserves up to 2030. The creation of
new forest reserves has the following advantages:
• A better protection of biodiversity
• A lower number of natural hazards (avalanches, land slides)
• A stronger climate change mitigation
31Table b.1, in the Appendix compares some socio-demographics of our sample with those of the
Swiss population. The rejection rate is 49%.
32The complete questionnaire is available in the Appendix, in French.
33These versions are available upon request.
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However, this program would also engender costs:
• Higher logistic costs to implement the program
• Economic shortfalls for the wood industry
• Access restriction to the protected zones
The Confederation considers ﬁnancing these costs with a speciﬁc tax
and needs to know the population's opinion on this topic, to orient its
environmental policy and study how this program could be implemented.
You could concretely contribute to this program. Hence, it is important that
your answer really reﬂects your willingness to contribute to the creation of
new forest reserves. Therefore, before answering, think about your income
constraints, and the other causes that you might be willing to contribute
to. Be aware, however, that the success of the program principally hangs
on its ﬁnancing.
Then, the respondent is asked if she would be willing to pay a federal tax, whose amount
(bid) is randomly and uniformly chosen among CHF 12, 60, 120, 240, 480, 780 and
1000. These amounts were selected after a comprehensive literature review and a meta-
analysis (Meshreky et al., 2014). They were ﬁrst conﬁrmed by an open-ended question
in focus-groups and by a pilot study on a sample of 300 Geneva inhabitants (Chapter
1). This procedure is recommended by Kanninen (1993).
The binary elicitation format, which is called referendum format or Single-Bounded-
Dichotomous-Choice (SBDC), is the most reliable format according to the literature.
It is also recommended by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA,
Arrow et al. 1993). Indeed, with this format, there are no incentive to answer strate-
gically, which is a common issue in the valuation of public goods (Carson and Groves,
2007). In addition, the cognitive burden is lighter, in comparison with an open-ended
elicitation format (Bateman et al., 2002). The Double-Bounded-Dichotomous-Choice
approach is now more and more used for its ability to increase the statistical eﬃciency,
at the expense of the incentive compatibility (Alberini, 1995) and of the anchoring ef-
fect. Therefore, since the number of observations is relatively high in our case, we prefer
the SBDC format. Moreover, Swiss people are used to referenda, which increases the
credibility of our scenario. We opt for a yearly instead of single payment because the
program runs over the long term. Also, with a single payment format, future beneﬁts
should be discounted by the respondents, which would involve a higher cognitive bur-
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den. The annuality indeed implies that the costs and beneﬁts discounting cancel out
(Egan et al., 2015).
We pay a particular attention to the reduction of the contingent valuation biases: We try
to reduce the hypothetical bias by adding a cheap talk (Cummings and Taylor, 1999),
reminding income constraints and insisting on the respondent's answer consequentiality
(Herriges et al., 2010). As payment vehicle, we opt for a federal tax, rather than a
voluntary payment, to reduce the free-riding issue (cf. Baranzini et al. 2010). To identify
protest answers (Jorgensen and Syme, 2000), if the individual rejects the referendum, we
administer an open-ended follow-up question asking the respondent's maximumWTP34.
If this is 0, another question asks the reason why. All answers that have no direct link
with the respondent's income constraint or her lack of interest in forests is considered
as a protest answer35. We ﬁrst analyze the protest answers' characteristics and then
use a version of Heckman (1979) selection model, composed of two simultaneous probit
models, to correct for the selection bias caused by protest answers.
2.3 Empirical approach
Two types of econometric approaches exist to analyze answers of a SBDC contingent
valuation: the parametric approach, as proposed in the seminal paper of Bishop and
Heberlein (1979) and the non-parametric approach proposed by Kriström (1990). The
former requires an a priori assumption regarding the statistical distribution of WTP,
while the latter does not impose any restriction with this respect.
Based on the Random Utility Model (RUM; McFadden 1973), it is generally acknowl-
edged that the respondent will accept the bid (A) proposed in the referendum if her
WTP is higher:
Prob(”yes”) = Prob(WTP ≥ A) = Prob(WTP − A ≥ 0) = F (∆u(.)) (2.1)
With F the assumed statistical distribution function and ∆u the diﬀerence between
the contingent program utility and the bid utility.
The mean WTP then corresponds to the surface under the distribution function such
that:
34It is worth noting that answers to this question are subject to anchoring, since the question follows
the bid proposition. Therefore, we do not analyze the results of the maximum WTP in this paper.
35For example: It is not my duty to pay for such a program, I already pay enough taxes, I do
not trust the government.
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E(WTP ) =
∫ ∞
0
F [∆u(.)]dA−
∫ 0
−∞
1− F [∆u(.)]dA (2.2)
With a linear utility such that ∆U = α− βA and F a symmetric distribution (logistic
or normal)36, the log-likelihood function is:
lnL =
∑
yes
ln(F (A)) +
∑
no
ln(1− F (A)) (2.3)
With the maximum likelihood method, the mean WTP is equal to its median for a
symmetric statistical distribution:
E(WTP ) =
α
β
= med(WTP ) (2.4)
The parametric estimation of WTP is thus equivalent to estimating the following binary
model:
P (Y = 1|A) = F (Aβ1) (2.5)
With Y the binary answer to the bid A and β1 the coeﬃcient resulting from the esti-
mation.
This approach also allows to add some explanatory variables Z (for example socio-
demographics), such that the model becomes:
P (Y = 1|A, z) = F (Aβ1 + Z ′β2) (2.6)
And the mean and median WTP:
E(WTP ) =
α + β2Z¯
β1
= med(WTP ) (2.7)
With α the constant resulting from the estimation and Z¯ a vector of mean values of Z.
The explanatory variables do not aﬀect mean WTP but allow to study factors, which
can impact the bid acceptance.
36Another statistical distribution assumption is also possible: log-normal, log-logistic, Weibull or
Gamma are also used in the literature (Bateman et al., 2002). We opt for a statistical distribution
that is deﬁned over ]−∞;∞[ because access restrictions could engender negative WTP.
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With respect to the non-parametric estimation, also called Turnbull estimator, one
builds a monotonously decreasing survival function with the help of the yes propor-
tions for each bid and the Pooled Adjacent Violator Algorithm (PAVA), developed by
Ayer et al. (1955)37. The mean WTP is then calculated as the surface under the survival
function.
2.4 Descriptive statistics
The sample is composed of 1200 individuals, including 46, who did not want or could not
answer the dichotomous question. These observations thus had to be dropped, as well
as 19 other non-complete observations. In addition, we identify 194 protest answers,
corresponding to 17% of the sample. This proportion is similar to other studies in the
literature (see Halstead et al. 1992).
Table 2.1 presents the answer to the dichotomous choice. We observe that the yes
proportions decrease monotonously with the bid increase, such that the Ayer et al.
(1955) algorithm in the non-parametric analysis is useless. This fact is probably due to
the relatively high number of observations for each bid.
Table 2.1: Answers to the dichotomous choice
Bid (A) Noa Yes % of  yes  Total % of total Protests Total
12 12 99 89.2 111 11.8 17 128
30 23 106 82.2 129 13.7 21 150
60 22 78 78.0 100 10.6 24 124
120 36 85 70.2 121 12.9 28 149
240 55 63 53.4 118 12.5 26 144
480 82 50 37.9 132 14.0 32 164
780 83 38 31.4 121 12.9 18 139
1000 80 29 26.6 109 11.6 28 137
Total 393 548 58.3 941 100 194 1135
aWithout protest bids
2.4.1 Explanatory variables
We introduce explanatory variables in the parametric model, to better understand the
factors that inﬂuence the bid acceptance and correct for the sample selection bias,
37This algorithm allows to make the survival function monotonously decreasing for the non-
parametric estimation.
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which arises from dropping the protest answers. As usual, the included variables are
chosen according to their economic interest and thanks to the Pseudo−R2 and Akaike
(AIC) and Bayes (BIC) information criteria. The indicators provided by the Stata12
command fitstat also helped discriminating between available explanatory variables.
Since some individuals did not answer some questions of the questionnaire, the inclusion
of explanatory variables causes some observations loss. From the 1200 observation,
dropping the non-response, the ﬁnal sample contains 987 observations including protest
answers and 808 excluding them.
The income question, in particular, decreased the number of observations, since 14% of
the respondents did not want to answer it. However, the socio-demographic character-
istics and the answers to the dichotomous choice do not diﬀer for the individuals who
did not answer the income question. We therefore rule out any self-selection bias.
Table 2.2 presents the explanatory variables included in the parametric model, for non-
protests and protests.
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
Non-protests Protests
Variable Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.)
R35 0.082 (0.274) 0.112 (0.316)
R35_50 0.165 (0.371) 0.173 (0.379)
R50_80 0.241 (0.428) 0.257 (0.438)
R80_120 0.318 (0.466) 0.279 (0.450)
R120_160 0.109 (0.312) 0.095 (0.294)
R160_200 0.051 (0.220) 0.045 (0.207)
R200 0.035 (0.183) 0.039 (0.194)
FR* 0.287 (0.453) 0.346 (0.477)
IT 0.160 (0.367) 0.179 (0.384)
Age* 50.38 (15.014) 53.71 (14.94)
Female* 0.512 (0.500) 0.380 (0.487)
Jura 0.024 (0.152) 0.028 (0.165)
Rural 0.293 (0.456) 0.313 (0.465)
Often* 0.527 (0.500) 0.631 (0.484)
Member 0.397 (0.485) 0.335 (0.473)
Swiss Wood 0.535 (0.499) 0.598 (0.492)
Reserve* 0.658 (0.475) 0.503 (0.501)
Number of Children 0.756 (1.051) 0.821 (1.071)
Observations 808 179
* Statistically diﬀerent characteristics between both groups
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Variables R are binary variables that take the value 1 if the gross household's income
lays in the proposed interval. For example, if R35 = 1, the household's gross income
is less than CHF 35,000 per year; if R35_50 = 1 the household earns between CHF
35,000 and CHF 50,000 per year.
Variables FR and IT indicate the language in which the questionnaire was administered
(French and Italian respectively). It is also a relatively precise indication of the region
where the respondent lives, since French speakers live on the Western side, and Italian
speakers on the Southern side. Age indicates the age of the respondents, Female if
the respondent is a woman, Jura if the individual lives in the Canton of Jura, Rural
if the individual lives in a rural environment. Often takes the value 1 if the individual
often visits forests, in opposition to sometimes or never. This variable is thus a
respondent's subjective indication of forest visit frequency. Member is a binary variable,
which equals 1 if the individual is member of or donates to one or several environment
friendly associations. We use the latter as a proxy for environmental preferences.
Swiss Wood equals 1 if the individuals prefers the Swiss wood, which is more expensive,
rather than imported wood. Two hypotheses regarding this variable can be considered:
on the one side, the individual could consider that the wood production is important
for the economy and thus favor the interest of the Swiss forest industry. In this case,
as the creation of new reserves implies restriction in the wood harvest, the individual
would have a lower propensity to accept the bid, all things being otherwise equal and
thus, the coeﬃcient associated with the Swiss Wood variable would be negative. On
the other side, the local production of wood could be preferred for its higher environ-
mental sustainability. In this case, the individual could have a preference for forest
multifonctionality, which would come with a positive sign of the coeﬃcient associated
with this variable.
Reserve is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the individual agrees to restrict
the access in protected forests to protect fauna and ﬂora. Given the access restrictions
proposed in our program, an individual who agrees with this kind of measure would be
more prone to accept the bid, all things being otherwise equal.
Number of Children indicates the number of children in the household. This variable
could have two diﬀerent eﬀects: on the one hand, a household with children should have
a higher bequest value (Krutilla, 1967), which should increase the probability to accept
the bid. On the other hand, the number of children reduces the household's income
per capita. In this case, if the income has a positive impact on the bid acceptance, the
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coeﬃcient associated with this variable should take a negative sign.
We ﬁrst describe the non-protests sample. Like the general population, the household's
income is skewed to the right: only 4% of the sample earns more than CHF 200,000
per year, while 9% have less than CHF 35,000. The mode is between CHF 80,000 and
120,000. About 55% of the respondents often visit forests and 55% favor Swiss wood,
rather than cheaper imported wood. 37% are members of or donate to environment
friendly associations and 63% of the respondents would agree to restrict access to forests
to protect fauna and ﬂora. Finally, the households have, on average 0.8 children.
Protest individuals are statistically more French speaking, less members of green
associations, older, more males and visit forests more often than non-protests38. As
highlighted by Garcia et al. (2009) and Meyerhoﬀ et al. (2014), dropping protest answers
can lead to a selection bias if these individuals have diﬀerent characteristics from others
and if these characteristics have an impact on the WTP. These statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences are also found with a probit model (hereafter binary selection model), which
analyzes the probability of being a protest bidder. Results of this model are presented
in Table b.2 in the Appendix.
Given these diﬀerences in characteristics, a variant of Heckman (1979) selection model
for probit models (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981) can be necessary. We hence
ﬁrst include the inverse of the Mills ratio (λ)39 from the binary selection model in the
main binary model. If the coeﬃcient of λ is signiﬁcant, the estimation is aﬀected by
a selection bias (Strazzera et al., 2003) and, hence, using Van de Ven and Van Praag
(1981) model is justiﬁed. An application of this econometric approach is available in
Whitehead et al. (1993) or Petrolia et al. (2010) in the case of contingent valuations for
Kentucky wetlands or the use of ethanol in gas, respectively.
38Protests in Strazzera et al. (2003) have similar characteristics. An explanation given by these
authors is that individuals, who often use forests are less willing to accept paying for a service that
they could get for free. In our case, with the access restrictions, this is even more understandable.
39The inverse of the Mills ratio is calculated as λ = φ(Z ′iβi)/Φ(Zi′βi) with φ the density function
and Φ the cumulative density function of a standard normal distribution.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Parametric analysis
In Table 2.3, we present the results of the parametric estimates from the maximum
likelihood method for the probit model40 without explanatory variable (column 1),
with explanatory variables (column 2) and with λ, the inverse of the Mills ratio from
the binary selection model (column 3). The latter model allows to test the utility of
Heckman's selection model proposed by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) for our case.
Since the coeﬃcient associated with λ is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the
90% conﬁdence level, it is possible that a selection bias aﬀects the estimated WTP. To
correct for this, we estimate Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) model41, combining
the selection model and the main model. Results of this estimations are displayed in
Table 2.4. We observe that this model's results are very similar to those from Table 2.3.
Moreover, the Wald test of independent equations42 indicates that the null hypothesis
of independence between the selection model and the main model cannot be rejected
(p-value=0.59). Hence, the use of a simultaneous model does not seem indispensable
(Whitehead et al. 1993, Strazzera et al. 2003), which is why we prefer model (2) from
Table 2.3. However, results from the other models are not statistically diﬀerent.
Coeﬃcients of the explanatory variables have the expected signs. As predicted by eco-
nomic theory, the coeﬃcient associated with the bid variable is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant (p-value<0.01) in each model.
We observe that the impact of the income is not linear. Indeed, comparing with the
80-120 class (the mode of the income distribution), lower classes accept signiﬁcantly less
often the bid. This eﬀect is particularly strong for the lowest class. Contrarily, higher
classes do not accept the bid more often. One can thus observe a threshold eﬀect:
after a certain level, the income does not have any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
probability of acceptance. This result is in line with the literature, which often ﬁnds
that income has a decreasing inﬂuence on WTP for environmental goods (see Kriström
and Riera 1996b).
With respect to linguistic regions and associated cultural diﬀerences, the French speak-
ers are more prone to refuse to pay the proposed bid than German speakers, while
40We trade-oﬀ between probit and logit with the help of diﬀerent R2 values.
41This model can be estimated with Stata12 using the heckprob command.
42This test is similar to the likelihood ratio test on the null hypothesis rho=0.
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Italian speakers are not statistically diﬀerent. In contrast, the inhabitants of the Jura
region - the densest region in terms of protected forests - accept more often the bid
than inhabitants of other Swiss regions.
Living in a rural environment is associated with a more frequent rejection of the bid.
Hence, proximity to forests seems to play a negative role in the bid acceptance. This
can be explained by the additional constraint incurred by the new forest status for
close inhabitants (access restriction, loss of economic opportunities). This result con-
tradicts the distance decay hypothesis (Bateman et al., 2006), which predicts that
WTP decreases with distance and is generally conﬁrmed for use values. In contrast,
the hypothesis of decreasing marginal utility with proximity, which is more coherent in
the case of non-use values, can be proposed: an individual who lives close to a forest
(i.e. the rural inhabitants) beneﬁts from a lower marginal utility of new forest reserves
than the individual living further away (i.e. the urban inhabitants).
All other things being equal, we observe that frequent forest visitors accept more often
the bid than others. Respondents who prefer Swiss wood and green members accept
it more often as well, similarly to individuals who agree to restrict access to forest to
protect fauna and ﬂora. Hence, individuals with greener preferences have a higher
probability to accept the bid than others. In addition, the positive coeﬃcient associated
with the Swiss Wood variable may indicate that the preference towards local wood
is tied to the sustainable nature of the Swiss forest management and not to purely
economic considerations.
The number of children in the household has a negative eﬀect on the acceptance prob-
ability of the bid. We assume that a higher number of children could reduce the per
capita income, which is why respondents agree less often the bid, despite a potentially
higher bequest value.
We present diﬀerent mean WTP estimates from the parametric analysis in Table 2.5.
Column (1) presents the mean WTP estimated without explanatory variable (equation
2.4). The mean WTP in column (2a) corresponds to equation 2.7 excluding protests,
while column (2b) includes the protests characteristics in Z¯43. Finally, column (3)
presents the mean WTP from the Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) model.
While estimates (1) and (2a) are naturally close, since the bids were randomly at-
tributed, we observe that (2a) and (2b) are not statistically diﬀerent. Similarly, while
43To calculate E(WTP ) in column (2a), we use the statistics of the non-protests sample from Table
2.2, while E(WTP ) in column (2b) uses statistics for the whole sample in Z¯.
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Table 2.3: Estimation results of the parametric models (probit)
(1) (2) (3)
Without explanatory variables With explanatory variables With explanatory variables and λ
Bid (A) -0.00170*** -0.00195*** -0.00164***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
R35 -0.616*** -0.530***
(0.188) (0.181)
R35_50 -0.327** -0.270**
(0.156) (0.136)
R50_80 -0.358*** -0.313***
(0.132) (0.118)
R120_160 -0.0120 -0.0874
(0.176) (0.154)
R160_200 -0.291 -0.303
(0.230) (0.212)
R200 0.231 0.274
(0.330) (0.249)
FR -0.313*** -0.207**
(0.119) (0.113)
IT -0.212 -0.118
(0.143) (0.136)
Jura 0.658* 0.463
(0.337) (0.297)
Rural -0.223** -0.148
(0.112) (0.0991)
Often 0.242** 0.189*
(0.101) (0.104)
Member 0.200* 0.157*
(0.104) (0.0940)
Swiss Wood 0.197* 0.083
(0.101) (0.0892)
Reserve 0.446*** 0.372***
(0.107) (0.130)
Number of Children -0.131*** -0.106**
(0.046) (0.043)
λ -1.029*
(0.595)
Constant 0.804*** 0.801*** 0.776***
(0.063) (0.154) (0.229)
Observations 941 808 987
Pseudo−R2 0.144 0.218 0.168
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.4: Estimation results of the probit model with selection
Selection (protest : yes/no) Valuation (Bid : yes/no)
Bid (A) -0.0019***
(0.0002)
R35 -0.251 -0.594***
(0.189) (0.193)
R35_50 -0.106 -0.319**
(0.150) (0.156)
R50_80 -0.114 -0.350***
(0.131) (0.132)
R120_160 0.0006 -0.011
(0.176) (0.175)
R160_200 -0.069 -0.283
(0.240) (0.230)
R200 0.0428 0.230
(0.247) (0.329)
FR -0.198* -0.297**
(0.111) (0.121)
IT -0.211 -0.195
(0.136) (0.146)
Jura 0.078 0.649*
(0.328) (0.336)
Rural -0.001 -0.221**
(0.109) (0.112)
Often -0.200 0.255**
(0.100) (0.103)
Member 0.137 0.191*
(0.103) (0.105)
Swiss Wood -0.151 0.206**
(0.100) (0.102)
Reserve 0.363*** 0.417***
(0.100) (0.118)
Number of Children -0.103 -0.128***
(0.051) (0.047)
Age -0.010*** 0.844***
(0.004) (0.169)
Female 0.266**
(0.103)
Constant 1.502***
(0.253)
athrho -0.172
(0.323)
rho -0.171
Observations 987
Non-selected observations 179
Selected observations 808
Wald test of independent equations (rho=0) : chi2(1) = 0.28 Prob > chi2 = 0.59
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0138
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WTP in (3) is higher44, it does not diﬀer, statistically speaking, from the other models.
This means that the selection bias caused by dropping the protests is not statistically
signiﬁcant in our case. The parametric estimation thus indicates that Swiss households
are willing to pay between CHF 470 and 500 per year to create new forest reserves
(these estimates are between CHF 394 and 615 with 95% conﬁdence).
Table 2.5: WTP per year and household (parametric estimates)
(1) (2a) (2b) (3)
Without explanatory variables With explanatory variables With explanatory variables With explanatory variables
and protests characteristics and correction for selection
E(DAP ) 474.31 479.42 470.37 497.98
(27.59) (27.98) (27.90) (57.55)
IC95% [422 ; 532] [421 ; 524] [421 ; 524] [394 ; 615]
Observations 941 808 987 987
IC95% calculated with Krinsky and Robb (1986) procedure with 1000 replications
Standard errors calculated with the Delta method in parenthesis
2.5.2 Non-parametric analysis
For the non-parametric analysis, we build the survival function as in Figure 2.1 with
the yes to the dichotomous choice proportion (cf. 4th column of Table 2.1), without
protests. We opt for a linear interpolation between point estimates as in Kriström
(1990) and to truncate at CHF 1200. This decision is justiﬁed for conservative reasons.
Indeed, observing the slope of the distribution between bids CHF 780 and 1000, one can
consider that our truncation point is relatively low, which will tend to underestimate
the mean WTP.
It is also possible to create a step survival function, as in Bateman et al. (2002). With
a truncation point at 1000, this function can be used to estimate a lower bound for the
mean WTP. We calculate mean and median WTP for both estimators and present the
results in Table 2.6.
44This is coherent with the sign of rho presented in Table 2.4 (see Strazzera et al. 2003).
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Table 2.6: WTP per year and household (non-parametric estimates)
Kriström (1990) Bateman et al. (2002)
Mean 473.32 398.77
(13.38) (12.44)
Median 292.45 277.23
Observations 941 941
Standard error in parenthesis
Figure 2.1: Survival function
Results of the non-parametric estimations conﬁrm those from the parametric estima-
tions. While the lower bound, the Bateman et al. (2002) estimator, is around CHF 400,
the Kriström (1990) estimator conﬁrms the parametric estimates with a mean WTP of
CHF 473 per year and household. Since median WTP associated with these approaches
are lower than their means, it seems that the WTP distribution is non-symmetric and
skewed to the right.
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2.6 Discussion and conclusion
We estimate Swiss households' willingness to pay for the creation of new forest reserves,
thanks to the contingent valuation method. Since the scenario is designed to promote
biodiversity and plans to restrict access to forests, our analysis mainly reveals forest's
biodiversity non-use values. The dichotomous choice analysis reveals that parametric
and non-parametric estimates of mean WTP are between CHF 470 and 500 per year
and household45. The lower bound Bateman et al. (2002) non-parametric estimate
conﬁrms this result with a mean WTP of CHF 400 per year and household. These
estimates are somewhat higher than those of the international literature about forest
conservation. For example, Lehtonen et al. (2003) ﬁnd that a WTP between EUR 60
and 22346 per year for Finnish households. More recently, Lindhjem and Navrud (2011)
obtain a mean WTP between EUR 196 and 22747 per year and household for a program
that implies the creation of new forest reserves in Norway. These diﬀerences probably
reﬂect the high income level and the strong preferences in favor of forest conservation
in Switzerland.
With respect to explanatory variables, individuals who live in an urban environment
accept more often to create new forest reserves. This indicates that the distance between
the residence and the forest has a positive impact on WTP. Indeed, a direct proximity
with an access-restricted forest could limit economic or recreational activities (Kniivilä
et al., 2002). Income has a non-linear inﬂuence on WTP: for lower class income levels,
the WTP is statistically lower than WTP of the modal class. Inversely, we do not
observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence with higher income levels.
Extrapolated to the whole population, the amount revealed by our contingent valuation
would reach 1.66 to 1.77 billion CHF per year, which is much higher than the amount
compensating forests owners for the creation of new forest reserves. Nevertheless, this
estimation should be interpreted carefully, since it is subject to some biases. In par-
ticular, the questionnaire did not explicitly mention the duration of the tax payment.
While it was hinted that the tax would be permanent, respondents could have inter-
preted as a tax on a deﬁned duration, which would overestimate their annual WTP.
Moreover, as in every contingent valuation, the hypothetical bias could not be com-
pletely removed, which generates a higher WTP than in the case where the program
45USD 366 to 389 in 2014 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) (Source: World Bank (2017a))
46USD 73 to 279 in 2014 PPP (Source: World Bank (2017a))
47USD 161 to 187 in 2014 PPP (Source: World Bank (2017a))
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would really be implemented. However, the large diﬀerence between the costs and the
beneﬁts revealed by our survey indicates that, the program of the Forest Policy 2020,
which aims at doubling the surface of forest reserves in Switzerland is most probably
justiﬁed in terms of cost-beneﬁt analysis.
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Chapter 3
A travel cost assessment of the
demand for recreation in Swiss forests
Written with A. Baranzini and D. Maradan and published in the Review of Agricultural,
Food and Environmental studies (Borzykowski et al., 2017a). We would like to thank the
anonymous referees of the Review of Agricultural, Food and Environment studies for their
valuable suggestions.
Abstract
This chapter analyzes the demand for recreation in Swiss forests using the individual travel
cost method. We apply a two-step approach, i.e. a hurdle zero-truncated negative binomial
model, that allows accounting for a large number of non-visitors caused by the oﬀ-site phone
survey and over-dispersion. Given the national scale of the survey, we group forest zones to
assess consumer surpluses and travel cost elasticities for relatively homogeneous forest types.
We ﬁnd that forest recreation activities are travel cost inelastic and show that recreation in
Swiss forests provides large beneﬁts to the population. The most populated area is associ-
ated with greater consumer surpluses, but the lack of recreational infrastructure may cause a
lower recreational beneﬁt in some zones. For these zones, recreational beneﬁts may be lower
than costs caused by maintenance. More eﬃcient management would require either improv-
ing recreational infrastructure, thus increasing beneﬁts, or switching the forest status from
recreational to biodiversity forest, hence decreasing management costs.
Keywords: Travel cost method; Hurdle Zero-Truncated-Negative-Binomial; Forest recre-
ation; Switzerland
JEL classiﬁcation: H41 - Q26 - Q57
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3.1 Introduction
Recreation is one of the many forest functions: population practices sports, observes
fauna and ﬂora, picnics, beneﬁts from fresh air and collects valuable resources such
as mushrooms, fruits and wild game in forests. Swiss forests cover about 30% of the
country's surface and the Swiss Civil Code ensures the general right to freely enjoy its
recreation function. With the exception of the use of special infrastructures (tree climb-
ing, campings...), recreation in Swiss forests is thus free. In recent decades, amenities
aiming at attracting people have been installed and the development of forest leisure
infrastructure continues.
Due to its public good characteristics and the absence of related markets, forest recre-
ation is a non-market service and its demand is hence not directly observable. There-
fore, economic valuation techniques have been developed to assess the demand for this
particular environmental service. Revealed preferences methods and in particular the
travel cost method (TCM) are particularly appropriate for the valuation of recreational
sites or activities. First mentioned by Harold Hotelling in the 1940's, TCM aims at
deriving the demand for a given activity using the travel costs that individuals must
incur as the price and the visit frequency as the quantity. The TCM assumes that these
costs are lower or equal to the beneﬁts of a recreational site's visit, so the journey is
worth it.
Based on Hotelling's idea, the TCM was developed by Clawson and Knetsch in the 60's
(Clawson, 1959; Clawson and Knetsch, 1963). Since then, a large number of studies
have used this method to assess the demands for non-marketed goods or services such
as recreation (see Zandersen and Tol (2009) for a meta-analysis on forest recreation and
Phaneuf and Smith (2005) for a historical review). Two diﬀerent approaches have been
used in the literature: zonal travel costs (Bowes and Loomis, 1980) or individual travel
costs (Willis and Garrod, 1991). The latter, based on micro-data, is more precise, but
requires more resources to obtain individual travel cost information.
In this Chapter, we derive the implicit demand for recreation in Swiss forests using
the individual TCM. Because our interview is done by phone, and thus oﬀ-site, we do
not assess the use of a speciﬁc forest, but rather recreation in Swiss forests in general.
Our estimates are thus forest function-speciﬁc at the regional level rather than forest-
speciﬁc. Only a few studies analyze the demand for recreation on a regional scale
(Bartczak et al., 2008; Garcia and Jacob, 2010; Bestard and Font, 2010), probably
because of the forest heterogeneity. Applying TCM to value recreation at the national
46
3.2. SURVEY
level indeed requires some caution. Following Garcia and Jacob (2010) methodology,
we treat this issue by splitting Swiss forests into four coherent categories referring to
Swiss geographical areas (i.e Midland/Central Plain; Jura; Prealps/Alps/Southern Alps
grouped into a single Alpine zone: Alps) and urban forests. Those categories correspond
to Swiss forest zones as deﬁned by the Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce. This approach
allows counting visits in each forest zone and thus assessing a separate value for each
of them. It is indeed likely that each forest zone attracts individuals with diﬀerent
preferences. Also, as respondents usually go to the closest forests and less frequently
to those located further away, asking only one general question may underestimate the
average travel costs and hence the beneﬁts. Indeed, respondents could rather describe
their habits regarding the forest they visited last and forget about the further away
forests they visited longer ago.
Our oﬀ-site phone survey also implies to deal with a large number of non-visitors.
We therefore use a two-step methodology as developed by Creel and Loomis (1990)
accounting for this kind of individuals. We then calculate travel cost elasticities and
consumer surpluses for recreation in the Swiss forests zones.
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the ques-
tionnaire and Section 3.3 the empirical approach. We provide descriptive statistics in
Section 3.4 and results in Section 3.5. We discuss them in Section 3.6 and conclude in
Section 3.7.
3.2 Survey
We surveyed by phone 1200 adults living in Switzerland in November and December
2014. The sample is chosen with the method of random quotas for gender, age and
geographic areas and is thus roughly representative of the Swiss population. Five days
before the phone call, interviewees received a letter, which includes the map of Swiss
forest zones as in Figure c.1 and gives information about Swiss forests, forests regions
and the project in general. The interview lasts about 15 minutes and is composed
of four parts.48 The ﬁrst one analyzes the perceptions and behaviors of the Swiss
population regarding its forests and is designed to apply the individual TCM. The
second part investigates the potential conﬂicts between the diﬀerent forest functions
from the population point of view. The third part submits an hypothetical scenario
48The full questionnaire is available in the Appendix of Chapter 2, in French.
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to apply the contingent valuation method and assess the willingness to pay for the
creation of new forests reserves in Switzerland (Chapter 2). The ﬁnal part collects the
usual socio-demographic characteristics. The questionnaire has been previously tested
on a smaller scale and with focus-groups (cf. Baranzini et al. (2015) and Chapter 1) as
recommended by the literature (Phaneuf and Smith, 2005).
Table c.1 presents the characteristics of Swiss forest zones. The Alpine zone (Alps,
Prealps and South) accounts for about 63% of Swiss forests surface and is the largest
forest zone in Switzerland. The Midland area is more densely populated and thus has
a smaller forest coverage and a lower surface of forest per inhabitant, compared to the
other areas. Interestingly, the proportion of private owners in the Midland is higher
than in the other areas, maybe because of the ease of access and the potential higher
economic returns of Midlands forests. Indeed, Alpine and Jura forests are more prone to
be protective rather than productive forests and their exploitation is thus more costly.
This is conﬁrmed by the wood production intensity index (m3 of harvested wood per
hectare) that is much lower in the Alps and the Jura. The types of forest are deﬁned,
among other characteristics, according to their ﬂora composition. The percentage of
conifers, which impacts the type of fauna and ﬂora, is an important decision element
for individuals who would like to observe nature. Conifers can be found especially in
Alpine forests, because they are located at a higher altitude.
To apply TCM, we ask how often the respondent visited each forest zone during the last
twelve months. If the answer is not zero, the interview continues asking distance, means
of transport, number of accompanying persons and duration of the visit. A controversy
of TCM is the multi-purpose, or incidental trips issue (Parsons and Wilson, 1997;
Loomis, 2006), which can be diﬃcult to handle. Indeed, such trips must be treated
with caution, by correctly disentangling travel costs by visited sites. If the entire
travel costs are attributed to the assessed site, the value of the given site would be
overestimated. To deal with this issue, we require the respondent to state the distance
from the very point of departure to the entrance of the forest. We provide respondents
with the following example to ensure that side or incidental trips are correctly taken
into account: If I go to Zermatt for holidays and that, among other things, I walk in
a forest, I must indicate the distance from Zermatt to the entrance of the forest, not
from my residence.
As we deal with Swiss forests in general, it is not possible to account for substitution
possibilities between forests as recommended in Parsons (2003). In addition, poten-
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tial substitutes (all leisure activities) are very varied and controlling for them in an
appropriate way is not practically feasible.
3.3 Empirical approach
Given that the dependent variable, the annual visit frequency, is a non-negative integer,
deﬁned on N∗+ only, the use of OLS is inappropriate. Indeed, OLS would allow predicting
negative and/or non-integer frequency. Therefore, the literature usually considers count
models such as Poisson or Negative Binomial (NB). NB is often preferred for its ability
to deal with over-dispersion, a common issue with survey data and all the more with
TCM data.
Simple count models allow zero frequency. However, non-visitors do not incur any travel
cost, as they do not travel to forests. For them, the travel cost variable thus takes the
value 0. On the one hand, the inclusion of this type of individual pushes the estimation
towards the corner (0;0), thus artiﬁcially decreasing estimates. On the other hand,
excluding zero values is a form of sample selection, which causes non-representativity.
Therefore, it is sometimes necessary to allow non-visitors to have diﬀerent motivations
and behavior and to include them in a ﬁrst step model of participation. For example,
as mentioned by Haab and McConnell (2002), non-visitors could have no interest in the
site for reasons such as health and age, and hence would not be responsive to prices.
The whole sample must hence pass into a ﬁrst step (a hurdle, H), where only visitors are
selected. The behavior of the selected individuals is then modeled with Zero Truncated
Poisson (ZTP) or NB (ZTNB) models. This is the very purpose of the two-step models,
the so-called hurdle models. While Zero-Inﬂated models (ZI) (Lambert, 1992; Greene,
1994) look appealing, they allow for a zero frequency, even when the hurdle is crossed.
In other words, and using the example on which ZI models are based, people may choose
to participate in ﬁshing, but still catch zero ﬁsh. For forest recreation, this situation is
not possible, since people who choose to participate in forest recreation must go at least
once in a given forest. The Hurdle Zero-Truncated models (HZT) (Creel and Loomis,
1990) composed by any binary choice model and a conditional truncated count model
are therefore the most appropriate empirical approach in our case. It is intuitively
similar to a Heckman (1979) sample selection model except for the discrete nature
of the statistical distribution. The possibility to distinguish the participation from the
integer level at which this participation takes place and the ability to correctly deal with
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over-dispersion makes a case in favor of the Hurdle-Zero-Truncated-Negative-Binomial
model (HZTNB). Our analysis will thus be based on this model, following Bilgic and
Florkowski (2007) and Shrestha et al. (2002). This choice will be conﬁrmed by the
ad-hoc statistical tests reported in Section 3.5.
Our model is thus composed of: i) a binary choice model (equation 3.1) explaining the
probability of participation in forest recreation (pii) and ii) a truncated count model for
the forest visit conditional frequency (NVi|NVi > 0) (equation 3.2).
Pr(NVi > 0) = pii = F (X1i) (3.1)
WhereNVi is the number of visits of individual i; X1 the matrix of independent variables
explaining the probability of participation in forest recreation; and F the assumed
probability law.
NVi = f(TCi;X2i) for NVi > 0 (3.2)
With TC the travel cost variable; X2 the independent variables explaining the frequency
of forest visits; and f the second step model distribution law.
NB count models are deﬁned with mean E(NVi|X2i) = λi and variance V ar(NVi|X2i) =
λi(1 + αλi) (α a parameter) and assume that ln(λi) = TC ′iβTC + X
′
2iβX2 to introduce
the explanatory variables TCi and X2i and regression coeﬃcients βTC and βX2 .
After the ﬁrst step, ZTNB models the annual number of visits NVi conditioned on the
participation. It is written as follows:
Pr(NVi = nv|X2i) =
(1− pii) if NVi = 0piiqi [ 11−(1+αλi)−1/α] if NVi ≥ nv; nv = 1, 2, ... (3.3)
With qi the usual density of the Negative Binomial law49 and pii the probability of
participation derived from the ﬁrst step binary choice model.
Since we value four types of forests, our design does not exactly correspond to the single-
site TCM as presented in Parsons (2003). We hence ﬁrst estimate a pooled model with
interaction variables between the travel cost variables and a dummy for the forest zones,
following Garcia and Jacob (2010). Since we observe the individuals' visiting behavior
for each of the forest zones and thus have four observations per individual, we handle the
pooled data as a panel. However, individuals might possess quite diﬀerent preferences
49qi = Pr(NVi = nv) =
Γ(nv+ 1α )
Γ(nv+1)Γ( 1α )
(
1
α
1
α+λi
) 1
α
(
λi
1
α+λi
)nv
, nv = 1, 2, 3...
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over the forest types and thus the number of visits to each forest zone may respond
diﬀerently to the covariates. In addition, creating interaction variables for all covariates
would require to present the coeﬃcients of 32 independent variables in the ﬁrst step
and 32 other independent variables in the second step. We thus prefer the estimation
of four separate models for each four valued forest zone, as in Cho et al. (2014) and
present a simpliﬁed pooled model in the Appendix, to conﬁrm our results.
3.4 Data description
3.4.1 First step: participation hurdle
The dependent variables for the ﬁrst step are the binary variables Visits: s, which are
equal to 1 when the individual visits a given forest zone s. We model the probability
of participating to forest recreation according to diﬀerent covariates that may or may
not be included in the second step. Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the ﬁrst
step. From the 1200 individuals that compose our full sample, we drop 50 individuals
who work in forests, as their behavior is not related to recreation. An additional 22
individuals are excluded because their answers do not make sense or were badly coded.50
Some non-responses also slightly reduce the number of observations.
94% of our sample go to forest at least once a year. The forest zone that is the most
visited is the Alps: 40% of the sample visit it at least once a year. It is followed by the
Midland zone (34%). This is not surprising, since these zones are the most extensive
forests in Switzerland. Although the Alpine zone is the least densely populated area, its
special forests might attract more people than the Midland, the most populated zone.
28% live in the French-speaking part of Switzerland (French), while 17% live in the
Italian-speaking part (Italian). 40% of the households have children (Children) and
37% are member of or donate to an environmentfriendly association (Member). The
average age of our respondents is 51 (Age), 14% of the sample has a secondary residence
in Switzerland (Secondary residence) and 34% answered correctly to a question on
forest growth in Switzerland and is thus well informed (Well informed).
As we do not observe the distance for non-visitors, our ﬁrst step may suﬀer from omitted
variable bias. We try to correct this missing variable with the binary variableResidence:
50For example, an individual claims that she travels 500km to go to an Urban forest 360 times per
year.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for the ﬁrst step
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Visits: all zones 0.94 (0.23) 0 1 1'075
Visits: Urban 0.17 (0.37) 0 1 1'038
Visits: Midland 0.34 (0.47) 0 1 1'010
Visits: Jura 0.16 (0.36) 0 1 1'034
Visits: Alps 0.40 (0.49) 0 1 973
French 0.28 (0.45) 0 1 1'075
Italian 0.17 (0.38) 0 1 1'075
Children 0.40 (0.49) 0 1 1'075
Member 0.37 (0.48) 0 1 1'075
Age 50.71 (15.37) 18 94 1'075
Secondary residence 0.14 (0.35) 0 1 1'075
Well informed 0.34 (0.48) 0 1 1'075
Residence: Urban 0.70 (0.46) 0 1 1'038
Residence: Midland 0.49 (0.50) 0 1 1'010
Residence: Jura 0.29 (0.46) 0 1 1'034
Residence: Alps 0.34 (0.47) 0 1 973
s accounting for the region of residence. Used as a proxy for distance, these variables
are equal to 1 if the individual lives in the same zone s as the visited forest.51
3.4.2 Travel costs and second step variables
Travel costs supported by each individual have two components: i) the eﬀective travel
costs (ETC) (out-of-the pocket costs) and ii) the opportunity costs of the time spent
(OCT ). We calculate ETCi diﬀerentiating for the type of vehicle used in as follows:
ETCi =

DiCPMV
Personsi
if i uses a private motor vehicle
DiCPTi if i uses public transports
0 if i walks or rides a bike
(3.4)
WithDi the distance in kilometers. A private motor vehicle can host several individuals,
thus costs must be divided by the number of persons who occupy the vehicle (Personsi).
51For some individuals, Residence is equal to 1 in more than one zone. Indeed for city-dwellers
(urban residents) Residence: Urban equals to 1 along with another Residence variable, as cities nec-
essarily belong to a larger forest zone. Also, we were unfortunately unable to disentangle individuals
living in the Jura from those on the Midland for the Cantons of Vaud, Aargau, Neuchâtel, Solothurn
and some individuals in the Canton of Bern, so that the sum of the Residence variables is bigger than
1.
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CPMV includes all costs linked with the ownership and use of a private motor vehicle:
depreciation, amortization, repairs, tire wear, gasoline and insurance. It amounts to
0.73 CHF/km52 for an average car according to the biggest Swiss car-drivers association
(TCS). The costs of public transport corresponds to the price of the ticket. To calculate
CPT , we use the per kilometer base price of public transport published every year by
the Swiss public transport association (VOEV, 2014). Price of public transport is
decreasing with distance. According to the Swiss railway company (SBB, 2015), 29%
of the Swiss population has a Half-Fare travel card and we therefore uniformly reduce
CPTi by 14.5% to keep consistency across means of transport.53 We ﬁnally assume that
individuals who walk or ride a bike do not bear any eﬀective cost. Of course, bikes
and shoes do depreciate with time and usage and energy is needed to walk and ride.
However, we consider that these costs are marginal and that they are best estimated
with 0.
Some issues regarding the calculation of travel costs still do not raise consensus. The
main one, largely discussed in the literature, is whether to include and to what extent
the opportunity cost of time (OCT) spent on-site and during the journey (see Smith
et al. 1983). A usual underlying assumption of TCM is that individuals are travel
time-neutral. That is, they do not get utility from the time of their journey, i.e. they
do not beneﬁt from the travel time to admire the landscape or enjoy a nice discussion.
Cesario and Knetsch (1976) ﬁrst recommended to use a fraction of wage as OCT but this
calculation supposes that individuals are relatively free to substitute leisure and work
time. Feather and Shaw (1999) have developed a model to control for the imperfect
leisure-work substitutability, but it comes with much complication in the empirical
approach. Hence, most scholars choose to use a fraction of wage (from 25% to 100%)
(Parsons, 2003) or lower (Amoako-Tuﬀour and Martínez-Espiñeira, 2012). A relatively
new approach is to estimate the cost of time through a stated preferences approach
(Ovaskainen et al., 2012). The time spent on-site is also a subject of controversy: most
scholars consider that excluding OCT on-site leads to downward biasing the estimates
(McConnell, 1992) but others (Bockstael et al., 1987) advise not to include it, because
time spent on-site is an endogenous decision.
We deﬁne the OCT as the product of the travel time Tti in minutes and the individual
opportunity cost of time Cti per minute. In equation 3.5, we calculate Cti as a third
52Approximately at the time, EUR 1=CHF 1.2, USD 1=CHF 1
53The Half-Fare travel card can be purchased by any individual, irrespective of age or employment
status and oﬀers a 50% reduction on the normal fare.
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of the individual's income, which is what is done in Cesario and Knetsch (1976)'s
seminal paper. More recently Fezzi et al. (2014) have found that 3/4 of the wage is a
more reasonable approximation for the OCT. Our estimates can thus be considered as
conservative.
Cti =
1
3
Incomei
Adultsi
1
1585 · 60 (3.5)
Incomei corresponds to the middle point of the yearly household income class declared
in the survey, Adults is the number of adults in the household and 1585 is the average
number of hours worked per year in Switzerland (OECD, 2015). Including the time
spent on-site in the OCTi decreases the goodness of ﬁt and signiﬁcance levels of our
model. We thus decide not to include any variable accounting for the time spent on-site,
as in Cho et al. (2014).
Diﬀerent other speciﬁcations for the travel cost variable have also been tested. In partic-
ular, instead of the declared income variable, which reduces the available observations
and sometimes lacks reliability, we tried a ﬁxed amount of CHF 10 in equation 3.5,
which approximately corresponds to a third of the median hourly wage in Switzerland,
as done in Ott et al. (2005). We also tested diﬀerent fractions of income as Amoako-
Tuﬀour and Martínez-Espiñeira (2012), instead of 1/3. We ﬁnally retain the model
in equation 3.5, whose coeﬃcients were statistically signiﬁcant and with the highest
Pseudo−R2.
From equations 3.4 and 3.5, TCi is then deﬁned as:
TCi = 2(ETCi + CtiTti) (3.6)
Where Tti is the travel time and CtiTti = OCTi. Note that the right-hand-side of the
equation is multiplied by 2 because individuals return after visiting the forest.
Table 3.2 describes the dependent variable NVi, the TCi variable and other explana-
tory variables used in the second step of the separated models.54 Relaxes, Does sport,
Observes nature and Collects resource are categorical variables identifying whether the
individual relaxes, does sport, observes fauna and ﬂora or collects resources such as
wood, mushrooms, berries or hunting wild game in the forest, respectively. These
activities are not mutually exclusive. Economic interest takes the value of 1 if the in-
dividual has an economic link with the forest industry and Bad memories is a variable
equal to 1 if the individual has bad memories or has had bad experiences in relation
with forests.
54We provide the same descriptive statistics for the pooled data in Table c.2 in the Appendix.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for the second step
Zone Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
U
rb
an
NV 51.94 80.75 2 365 173
TC 6.54 10.15 0.14 78.11 173
Relaxes 0.93 0.25 0 1 173
Does sport 0.58 0.50 0 1 173
Observes nature 0.69 0.46 0 1 173
Collects resource 0.33 0.47 0 1 173
Age 49.58 15.95 19 90 173
Bad memories 0.02 0.13 0 1 173
Economic interest 0.20 0.40 0 1 173
M
id
la
nd
NV 46.99 64.08 1 365 343
TC 9.04 17.91 0.11 150.21 343
Relaxes 0.93 0.26 0 1 343
Does sport 0.59 0.49 0 1 343
Observes nature 0.68 0.47 0 1 343
Collects resource 0.35 0.48 0 1 343
Age 49.48 14.61 18 93 343
Bad memories 0.02 0.14 0 1 343
Economic interest 0.25 0.43 0 1 343
Ju
ra
NV 40.18 72.65 1 400 163
TC 19.81 25.84 0.15 127.58 163
Relaxes 0.91 0.28 0 1 163
Does sport 0.61 0.49 0 1 163
Observes nature 0.76 0.43 0 1 163
Collects resource 0.36 0.48 0 1 163
Age 52.77 14.29 19 91 163
Bad memories 0.06 0.23 0 1 163
Economic interest 0.22 0.42 0 1 163
A
lp
s
NV 43.1 70.35 1 365 394
TC 27.07 47.24 0.11 352.57 394
Relaxes 0.94 0.23 0 1 394
Does sport 0.62 0.49 0 1 394
Observes nature 0.73 0.45 0 1 394
Collects resource 0.44 0.50 0 1 394
Age 50.34 13.74 18 86 394
Bad memories 0.03 0.16 0 1 394
Economic interest 0.28 0.45 0 1 394
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Urban forests are the most frequently visited forest zone, closely followed by Midland
forests, Alpine forests and Jura forests. Again, this is not surprising, since the popu-
lation density is higher in urban areas and in Midland than in Jura or the Alps. It is
interesting to notice that the number of visits, conditioned to the participation (Table
3.2), is very diﬀerent from the probability to visit a given forest zone (Table 3.1). In par-
ticular, people do not necessarily visit Urban forests (only 17% do), but when they do,
they visit them more often than people who visit the Alpine forests (52 times per year
against 43). On the contrary, a large proportion of people visits Alpine forests (40%),
but when they do, they visit them less often than those who visit Urban forests. This
could be linked with population density and travel costs. On average, Urban forests are
those with the signiﬁcantly lowest travel costs. They are followed by Midland forests,
Jura forests and Alpine forests. It is important to notice that all travel costs variables
are prone to high skewness to the right, with many individuals whose costs are low and
a few whose costs are very high. The median consumer surplus may therefore be an
interesting information regarding the distribution.
In the pretest of this study, Baranzini et al. (2015) applied TCM to a sample of Geneva
population and assessed the average and median recreation travel costs. They ﬁnd
that costs incurred for recreation in forests vary between CHF 247 to 583 per year and
per person, when excluding and including the opportunity cost of time spent on site
respectively. A similar result is found by von Grünigen and Montanari (2014) who
estimated the average travel costs to recreate in Swiss forests between CHF 290 and
589. These estimates can be considered as consumer surplus lower bounds, as recreation
travel costs are necessarily lower or equal to recreation beneﬁts, which are inferred from
the estimated demand. In our case, for comparison, we can calculate annual travel costs
including non-visitors in the following way:
AnnualTCis = NVis · TCis · V isitsis (3.7)
This calculation results in CHF 58 for Urban forests, CHF 144 for Midland forests,
CHF 127 for Jura forests and CHF 478 for Alpine forests. These estimates are thus
slightly smaller than what is found in the recent studies on Swiss forests (von Grünigen
and Montanari, 2014; Baranzini et al., 2015). We note however that existing studies
consider Swiss forests as a whole, without controls for their heterogeneity.
Almost all visitors go to forest to relax independently of the type of forest (91% to
94%). A high proportion of people who visit Jura forests observes fauna and ﬂora (76%
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and 73% respectively) and practice sport activities (61% and 62% respectively). This
conﬁrms the presence of a larger biodiversity and number of sports activities in these
forests, compared to Urban or Midland forest. Collection of resource is an activity that
is more often undertaken in the Alps.
Only a few visitors (2% to 6%) have had bad experiences with forests55 and 20% to 30%
have an economic interest in the forest industry with a signiﬁcantly lower proportion
for the Urban forests visitors. The latter proportion is surprisingly high as we dropped
individuals whose jobs are in forests and only 3% of the Swiss population works in the
primary sector (FSO, 2017).
3.5 Results
We specify the ﬁrst step participation model as the following probit model.
Pr(NVis > 0|X1is) = Pr(V isitsis = 1|X1is) = Φ(αs + βX1sX1is + εis) (3.8)
With X1is the explanatory variables described in Section 3.4; V isitsis a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the individual visits the forest zone s; Φ the standard normal distribution;
αs a constant; βX1s the coeﬃcients associated with X1s and εis an error term.
The second step estimation explains the annual visit frequency, given that the individual
visits forest at least once a year and hence passed the ﬁrst step hurdle. Since forest
types are very diﬀerent, it is likely that individual preferences vary in a substantive
manner. We therefore estimate distinct models for each forest zone, speciﬁed as follows
for the second step56:
ln(λsi) = E[NVsi] = as + βTCsTCis + βX2sX2is + uis (3.9)
With as a constant; βTCs the coeﬃcient associated with the TCs variable; X2s the ex-
planatory variables described in Section 3.4.2; βX2s the vector of associated coeﬃcients
and uis an error term. The models speciﬁcation is based on the signiﬁcance levels of
covariates coeﬃcients, the joint signiﬁcance Wald-χ2 tests, the AIC and diﬀerent R2
measures.
55This proportion is signiﬁcantly higher for Jura forests visitors.
56A pooled model is presented in the Appendix.
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For all estimations, the ﬁrst and second steps are estimated simultaneously, following
Long and Freese (2014). Coeﬃcients of the second step can be interpreted as semi-
elasticities.
Estimation results of the separated models are presented in Table 3.3. We observe
that, as expected, living in a given zone increases the probability of visiting the forests
of this zone. People living in the French-speaking part of Switzerland are less likely
to visit a Midland forest, compared to people living in the German-speaking part and
the opposite is true in Jura and Alps forest. This could be explained by geographical
reasons: a larger part of the Midland area is situated in the German-speaking region,
while almost all Jura region is in the French part. This is not the case for Alpine forests
however. People living in the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland are less prone to visit
an Urban, Midland or Jura forest, compared to people living in the German-speaking
part. This is not surprising since the Italian-speaking part is situated in the Alps, and
is further away from Midland and Jura forests.
Having a child increases the probability to visit a forest zone, except for the Alps,
probably because Alpine forests are steeper and less accessible. Membership in an
environment friendly organization is associated with a greater participation in all forest
zones, except Midland forests. Interestingly, as shown by the Age and Age2 variables,
the age ﬁrst increases and then decreases the probability of visiting Alpine forests,
while we observe the opposite in Urban forests. A signiﬁcant quadratic eﬀect of age
is also found in von Grünigen and Montanari (2014). Ease of access is probably the
main explanation. Indeed Urban forests are usually closer by and more accessible, but
interest in visiting an Urban forest might only grow after a certain age. Alpine forests
usually require a certain ability to do sports or move which might be lower after a
threshold. This result may also be due to a change in preferences with age.
Having a secondary residence increases the probability to visit an Alpine forest, but has
no eﬀect on other forest zones. We expected this result, since most secondary residences
are located in the Alps.
Finally, being well informed increases the participation in Alpine forests. This may be
due to reverse causality as those who visit Alpine forests are more likely to notice a
forest growth, because this forest zone has grown the most.
According to the second step estimation, all travel cost variables have the expected
negative sign, but the eﬀect of travel cost is not statistically signiﬁcant for Urban
forests. The latter result is unsurprising, given that the travel cost to visit Urban
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Table 3.3: Results of the HZTNB estimation
Urban Midland Jura Alps
V isitss (Participation)
Residences 0.67*** 0.54*** 1.22*** 1.13***
(0.12) (0.095) (0.12) (0.13)
French -0.13 -0.33*** 0.60*** 0.19*
(0.11) (0.099) (0.12) (0.11)
Italian -0.31** -0.85*** -0.58** -0.13
(0.14) (0.15) (0.29) (0.15)
Children 0.19* 0.20** 0.41*** -0.20*
(0.11) (0.099) (0.13) (0.10)
Member 0.21** -0.0056 0.36*** 0.14
(0.099) (0.089) (0.11) (0.093)
Age -0.027* 0.013 0.019 0.059***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.016)
Age2 0.00025* -0.00015 -0.000071 -0.00064***
(0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00020) (0.00016)
Secondary Residence -0.12 -0.16 -0.15 0.54***
(0.15) (0.13) (0.18) (0.13)
Well informed -0.037 -0.040 0.20* 0.42***
(0.10) (0.091) (0.12) (0.093)
Constant -0.86** -0.76** -2.86*** -2.06***
(0.38) (0.37) (0.52) (0.39)
NVs (Frequency)
TC -0.0089 -0.0089** -0.040*** -0.014***
(0.016) (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0019)
Relaxes 0.58* 0.18 -0.53 0.31
(0.31) (0.23) (0.50) (0.28)
Does sport 0.45* 0.48*** 0.26 0.33*
(0.27) (0.17) (0.28) (0.17)
Observes nature -0.0048 0.027 0.30 0.44**
(0.23) (0.17) (0.26) (0.18)
Collects resource -0.14 0.28* 0.15 0.25
(0.24) (0.15) (0.23) (0.16)
Age 0.022*** 0.014** 0.0026 0.0021
(0.0076) (0.0061) (0.0077) (0.0057)
Economic Interest 0.060 0.18 0.48** 0.37**
(0.30) (0.17) (0.24) (0.16)
Bad Memories -1.66*** 0.33 0.20 0.25
(0.23) (0.54) (0.53) (0.52)
Constant 2.05*** 2.49*** 3.68*** 2.68***
(0.56) (0.41) (0.78) (0.46)
Observations (total) 1038 1010 1034 973
Non-zero observations 173 343 163 394
ln(α) 0.60*** 0.40*** 0.54*** 0.57***
Vuong stat. for ZTNB over ZINB 0.55 -0.41 -5.26*** -2.46***
Accuracy 70% 46% 75% 41%
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
59
CHAPTER 3. A TRAVEL COST ASSESSMENT OF THE DEMAND...
forests is generally low and relatively homogeneous among individuals. In addition,
in the urban environment, individuals have many other leisure opportunities, which
explains the statistically insigniﬁcant TC coeﬃcient (Bertram and Larondelle, 2017).
The coeﬃcients associated with the activities undertaken in forests show the type of
forests preferred for given activities. Urban forests are more visited for relaxation and
doing sports, Midland forests for collection of resources and sport and Alpine forests are
used for sports or observation of nature. These results show the importance of Urban
forests to escape the city stress and the importance of Alpine forests for sports activities
such as hiking and skiing. Recent surveys have shown that 44% of the Swiss population
hikes and 36% skis in the mountains (Lamprecht et al., 2014), which can explain the
positive impact of Does sport on the number of visits in Alpine forests. The productive
role of Midland forests is also conﬁrmed by the positive coeﬃcient associated with the
Collects resource variable.
Conditioned on participation, age has a positive impact on the number of visits for
Urban and Midland forests. Having bad memories linked with forests decreases the
number of visits in Urban forests, but there are very few individuals in this case. Finally,
having economic interests in the forest industry, as expected, increases the number of
visits to forests in the Jura and the Alps.
The statistically signiﬁcant ln(α), which measures the likelihood-ratio test for over-
dispersion, give clear evidence in favor of the use of the Negative Binomial models
over the Poisson models. Vuong tests also conﬁrm the choice to use a hurdle model,
rather than a simple NB model.57 To conﬁrm our choice of ZTNB over ZINB58, we run
another Vuong test, as suggested in Long and Freese (2014, pp. 549-551) and ﬁnd that
it does not provide any evidence that the ZTNB ﬁts better than the ZINB for Urban
and Midland forests. However, it does for Jura and Alps forests. The choice of the
HZTNB is therefore justiﬁed.
The computation of the Vuong test also requires to calculate the accuracy of predicted
probabilities, which ranges between 41% and 70% depending of the forest zone.
We provide the estimation results of a pooled model in Table c.3 in the Appendix. For
this model, the coeﬃcients associated with the dummies Urban, Midland and Jura,
which indicate the location of the forest, have a negative impact on the probability to
participate in forest recreation, compared to the Alps forests. This is not surprising
57This test is provided with the ZINB estimation using the vuong option on Stata14.
58The ZINB results are available in Table c.6, in the Appendix.
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since the Alps forests are the most visited forests. The statistical signiﬁcance of these
variables is a conﬁrmation that preferences are diﬀerent across forest zones and is a
justiﬁcation to use the separate models. Indeed, while this pooled model has more
statistical power thanks to the higher number of observations, coeﬃcients represent an
average eﬀect of the covariates across forest zones. A likelihood-ratio test on the ﬁrst
step also rejects the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are the same across forest zones
(LR stat.(24)=312.3, p-value<0.01). The separated models are thus able to take into
account more heterogeneity. In addition, the predicted probabilities accuracy scores
higher for some separate estimations (53% for the pooled model against 41 to 70%
for the separated models). We therefore prefer the separated models and hereafter
present their cost-elasticities and consumer surplus. It is worth noting, however, that
coeﬃcients of the second step of the pooled model are similar to those resulting from the
separated models and that the Vuong test on the pooled model also provides evidence
that the ZTNB ﬁts better than the ZINB.
3.5.1 Mean travel costs and elasticities
Cost elasticities (εTCs ) represent changes in visit frequencies (in percent) for a percent
change in travel costs, everything else kept constant. To get elasticities, we calculate
the average marginal eﬀects with the prediction function from the estimates.59 Cost
elasticities from the separated models are shown in Table 3.4.60
Table 3.4: Travel costs elasticities
Urban Midland Jura Alps
εTCs -0.58 -0.08** -0.80*** -0.38***
(0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05)
Mean TCs 6.5 9.0 19.8 27.1
Observations 173 343 163 394
Standard errors calculated with the Delta method in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Jura forests are the most sensitive to an increase in travel cost, while Urban forests
are not sensitive since the eﬀect of TC on NV is not signiﬁcant. A cost increase of
59These elasticities can be easily obtained using the margins,eyex command in Stata14.
60Cost elasticities from the pooled model are presented in Table c.4 in the Appendix. We observe
that this model provides slightly lower elasticities estimates. In particular, the Jura and Alpine forests
are less sensitive to a travel cost increase with this approach.
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1% would decrease visit frequency to Jura forests by 0.8%, this impact being 10 times
lower in Midland forests. However, travel costs associated with Midland forest are on
average lower than those associated with Jura forests: mean TC is CHF 9 per visit in
Midland against CHF 20 in Jura. In absolute terms, a 1% increase in travel costs for
Midland corresponds on average to CHF 0.09 which would decrease annual frequency
by 0.04 time. For Jura forests, a 1% increase in travel costs is equal to a CHF 0.19
increase which would decrease frequency by 0.32 time. In the Alps, a CHF 0.20 increase
is linked with a 0.16 time decrease in frequency.
3.5.2 Consumer surplus
Marshallian Consumer Surplus (CS) is the area between the demand curve and the
price. The average unconditional individual annual CS for forest zone s is hence :
CSis = −piis λis
βTCs
(3.10)
From (3.9), as in Creel and Loomis (1990), the surplus per visit becomes :
CSis
piisλis
= − 1
βTCs
(3.11)
With piis the probability of visiting a given forest, λis the parameter of the NB law and
βTCs the coeﬃcient of the travel cost variables.
We calculate the mean conditional annual CS by multiplying the CS per visit by
the average annual frequency. This annual CS is then multiplied by the proportion
of visitors to obtain the annual unconditional CS. The consumer surpluses from the
separated models are presented in Table 3.5.61
61For the pooled model, consumer surpluses, presented in Table c.5, in the Appendix, are similar
to the CS from the separated models.
62
3.5. RESULTS
Table 3.5: Individual Consumer Surpluses (CS )
Urban Midland Jura Alps
CS per visit 112.8 112.7** 24.7*** 71.6***
[-284 ; 510] [4 ; 222] [19 ; 30] [53 ; 90]
Conditional annual CS 5859 5293** 994*** 3084***
[-14771 ; 26489] [166 ; 10420] [772 ; 1215] [2273 ; 3896]
Median conditional annual CS 2256 2704** 297*** 1431***
[-5688 ; 10201] [85 ; 5322] [231 ; 363] [1055 ; 1808]
Unconditional annual CS 977 1798** 157*** 1249***
[-2462 ; 4415] [57 ; 3539] [122 ; 192] [920 ; 1577]
Median unconditional annual CS 376 918 47 580
[-948 ; 1700] [29 ; 1808] [36 ; 57] [427 ; 732]
Mean density (CS/100ha) n.a. 0.80** 0.067*** 0.16***
Observations 173 343 163 394
95% conﬁdence intervals in brackets
Standard deviations in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
n.a. : Statistics about Urban forests size is not available.
The mean conditional annual CS corresponds to the mean recreational beneﬁts from
forests obtained by visitors only, while the mean unconditional annual CS refers to
mean beneﬁts extrapolated to the whole population according to the proportion of
visitors.
Midland forests is the most valued forest zone. The CS per visit in this zone scores
higher than in Alpine forests, but the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. The eﬀect
of secondary residences may reduce travel cost per visit and hence the CS. However, the
choice of the secondary residence may also be driven by the forest proximity. Annual
unconditional CS is on average CHF 1798 in Midland forests and CHF 1249 in Alpine
forests. On the contrary, Jura forests are signiﬁcantly less valued for their recreational
activities (CHF 157 per year). In terms of recreational density (unconditional annual
consumer surplus per 100ha), Midland forests are much more intensively valued, which
reﬂects the population density and the high CS per visit in this zone. Jura forests are
again less attractive than other forest zones for recreation purposes. This may be due
to preferences, but could also be explained by a lower density of infrastructures and
roads network or a lower number of incidental activities opportunities.
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3.6 Discussion
Baranzini and Rochette (2008) assessed the annual average beneﬁt from the Pfyn pine
forest in Switzerland between CHF 1135 and 1540 per individual. This single-site
valuation survey has the particularity of dealing with a relatively homogeneous forest
in our Alpine region. However, the on-site nature of the survey only selects visitors.
In addition, more frequent visitors are likely to be over-represented in the sample, as
the probability to survey them is higher than for one-time visitors. This type of survey
thus suﬀers from both truncation and endogenous stratiﬁcation. An OLS estimation
cannot be legitimate in this case either. Their estimates could however be compared
with the conditional consumer surplus in Alpine forests. We observe that our estimates
are higher. However, Baranzini and Rochette (2008) calculated the opportunity cost of
time as a fourth of annual income (against a third here) and consider that the Swiss
work 2000 hours a year (against 1585 here). Also, our estimates represent the consumer
surplus for the entire forest zone, from which the Pfyn pine forest only represents a tiny
part.
While consumer surpluses per trip in Switzerland lie between CHF 25 and 11362, the
meta-analysis of Zandersen and Tol (2009) ﬁnds a consumer surplus between EUR 0.66
and 11263 per trip in European forests, with a median of 4.5264, GDP per capita and
population density playing a signiﬁcant role. Because Switzerland is one of the richest
European countries in terms of GDP per capita and is very densely populated, it is
not surprising that our CS are higher than those of the international literature. We
have also seen that Midland forests, the most densely populated area are highly valued,
which conﬁrms this intuition.
Costs related to recreation in forests depend on the intensity of recreational activities.
Road maintenance and securing forests imply higher costs and economic shortfalls for
the forest industry. According to Bernasconi et al. (2003), in the Canton of Bern,65
these costs amounted from CHF 190 to CHF 3970 per inhabitant, per year depending
on the forest's importance in terms of recreation and CHF 418 on average. We observe
that estimated CS exceed the average costs, except for Jura forests, whose costs induced
by recreational activities are higher. In Jura, forest management based on cost-beneﬁt
analyses for recreation would require either improving recreational infrastructure to
62USD 19 to 88 in 2014 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).
63USD 0.82 to 139 in 2014 PPP
64USD 5.62 in 2014 PPP
65The Canton of Bern contains all types of forest we analyzed.
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increase the associated beneﬁts in some forests, or switching some forests status from
recreational to biodiversity forest, which would decrease the cost associated with recre-
ation infrastructure. For example, some recreational forests may be turned into natural
reserves, in which access could be limited. This change would foster biodiversity and
hence increase the non-use or option values of these forests (see Borzykowski et al.,
2017b). In addition, costs of forest management would decrease.
3.7 Conclusion
We model the demand for recreation in Swiss forests using the individual TCM for
diﬀerent forest zones in Switzerland and derive travel costs elasticities and consumer
surpluses. Our methodology takes into account a large number of non-visitors inherent
from our oﬀ-site national phone survey, as well as over-dispersion thanks to the hurdle
zero-truncated-negative-binomial model. Our results are in line with the recent TCM
literature in Switzerland and Europe and show that recreation in Swiss forests provides
large beneﬁts to the population. Recreation in forest is travel cost inelastic, but its
value diﬀers across forest zones. We ﬁnd that the most populated area is associated
with greater consumer surpluses and observe that beneﬁts from recreation in Jura
forests are on average lower than management costs. For this zone, some forests could
be turned from recreational forests to forest reserves, to foster biodiversity. In addition
to reducing the costs of forest management, this policy would increase the non-use and
option values of these forests.
Our methodology leads to a probable overestimation of consumer surplus because we
were not able to account for close substitutes nor did we include recreational activities
in bordering forests. In addition, the oﬀ-site nature of the survey could introduce some
uncertainty: because observations are based on declarations regarding past visits and
not actual visits, respondents may be subject to strategic issues or unable to remember.
However, on-site surveys also ask this type of questions and hence suﬀer from this kind
of uncertainty as well. As we also run a contingent valuation in the same survey, an
extension of this Chapter would be to analyze diﬀerences across valuation methods for
the same individuals.
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Carbon oﬀsets out of the wood?
Acceptability of domestic vs.
international reforestation
programmes in the lab
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Abstract
Following the entry into force of the Paris Agreement in November 2016, governments around the world are
now expected to turn their nationally determined contributions into concrete climate policies. Given the
global public good nature of climate change mitigation and the important cross-country diﬀerences in marginal
abatement costs, distributing mitigation eﬀorts across countries could substantially lower the overall cost of
implementing climate policy. However, abating emissions abroad instead of domestically may face important
political and popular resistance. We ran a lab experiment with more than 300 participants and asked them to
choose between a domestic and an international reforestation project. We tested the eﬀect of three informational
treatments on the allocation of participants' endowment between the domestic and the international project.
The treatments consisted in: (1) making more salient the cost-eﬀectiveness gains associated with oﬀsetting
carbon abroad; (2) providing guarantees on the reliability of reforestation programmes; (3) stressing local
ancillary beneﬁts associated with domestic oﬀset projects. We found that stressing the cost-eﬀectiveness of the
reforestation programme abroad did increase its support, the economic argument in favour of oﬀsetting abroad
being otherwise overlooked by participants. We relate this ﬁnding to the recent literature on the drivers of
public support for climate policies, generally pointing to a gap between people's preferences and economists'
prescriptions.
Keywords: Forest policy; Climate policy; Carbon oﬀsets; Reforestation; Acceptability
JEL classiﬁcation: Q23, Q54, Q58
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4.1 Introduction
Following the 2016 entry into force of the Paris Agreement, governments are now ex-
pected to turn their greenhouse gas emissions pledges into concrete climate policies.
These policies need not only to be suﬃciently eﬀective to reach the emissions abate-
ment objectives, but also to be as inexpensive as possible to leave some economic and
political room for further policy tightening, in particular when it will come to set new
ambitions in 2023. Only in this way, the long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement
can be met. Since greenhouse gases mix uniformly in the atmosphere, and given the
important diﬀerences in cross-country marginal abatement costs, distributing abate-
ment eﬀorts across countries could substantially lower the overall cost of implementing
a global climate policy (Morris et al. 2012; Kriegler et al. 2014).
The choice of the policy instrument is crucial to ensure that the abatement objectives
can be reached at a reasonable cost. Economists contend that carbon pricing repres-
ents the central pillar of the policy package necessary to transform emissions targets
into eﬀective abatements (Goulder and Parry 2008; Aldy and Stavins 2012). How-
ever, important political resistance opposes the use of carbon pricing, which explains
the limited diﬀusion of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programmes around the world
(Baranzini and Carattini 2014; World Bank 2017b). The same resistance also applies to
the use of carbon oﬀsets resulting from activities or projects implemented abroad, but
used to compensate domestic emissions, as well as, more generally, to the mechanisms
permitting the compensation of emissions among countries (Monbiot 2007; Schneider
2009). For instance, the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme capped un-
til 2013 the amount of carbon credits that ﬁrms could buy from emissions abatement
projects taking place outside the EU. Since 2013, international credits are no longer
accepted. Similarly, the use of international oﬀsets is currently capped in the Cali-
fornia cap-and-trade scheme, and international oﬀsets may disappear altogether from
this scheme as it enters the third compliance period in 2018. In the case of Califor-
nia, strong resistance to the use of oﬀsets comes in particular from local environmental
justice groups, which claim that ﬁrms should reduce their emissions locally, and provide
co-beneﬁts to local communities (Schatzki and Stavins 2009; Pastor et al. 2013). The
2009 Waxman-Markey bill also included a cap for the use of carbon oﬀsets, related to
the location of the abatement eﬀorts. Domestic and international oﬀset programmes
were each capped at 1 billion metric tons, with the possibility for the US Environmental
Protection Agency to shift part of the domestic cap to international oﬀsets only if it
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could be determined that the domestic supply was insuﬃcient. The room for abating
greenhouse gas emissions abroad is also limited by law in other contexts. In Switzer-
land, for instance, a minimum of 30% of the total emissions reduction must be achieved
domestically. Stronger requirements may apply for some industries. For instance, fossil-
thermal power plants are required to oﬀset all of their emissions, 50% of which must
be compensated domestically.
At the same time, some countries, such as Norway, Finland, Sweden or Costa Rica, plan
to become carbon neutral over the next decades, an objective that potentially implies a
large use of oﬀsetting practices. While Costa Rica plans to undertake local measures to
oﬀset emissions through reforestation, reaching this objective in Scandinavian countries
would very likely require the purchase of a substantial amount of carbon oﬀsets from
foreign countries. Sweden, for instance, plans to cut its domestic emissions by 85%,
while oﬀsetting the remaining amount. This paper is motivated by the conﬂict between
the large potential cost savings associated with abating emissions through projects
implemented abroad and the possible political resistance to such practice.
Some evidence already suggests that the public may not always favour the most eﬃciency-
enhancing solution in climate policy, even when pay-oﬀs are transparent (Cherry et al.
2012). People may not even pay attention to the provided quantity of public good, if
their motivation is impurely altruistic and driven by the moral satisfaction of contrib-
uting (cf. Andreoni 1990). For instance, using stated preferences methods, Kahneman
and Knetsch (1992) ﬁnd that the willingness to pay for a public good may not be in-
ﬂuenced by the quantity provided: Individuals may not necessarily understand that
diﬀerent quantities of public good can be provided with the same contribution. This
diﬀerence can however be very large, especially for environmental goods such as carbon
oﬀsets, whose costs can vary greatly depending on location.
In addition, practical reservations have been raised to the purchase of international
carbon oﬀsets. Evidence of abuses in the additionality condition have clearly contrib-
uted to reduce the credibility of the UNFCCC's mechanisms to facilitate international
emissions trading, such as the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implement-
ation (see Schneider and Kollmuss 2015; Tirole 2012). In the light of these critiques,
the preference that the general public seems to give to local projects, and to standards
certifying projects generating emissions oﬀsets abroad, should not be a surprise (see
Blasch and Farsi 2014). However, beyond this, little is known on how to overcome
these obstacles and increase the popularity of international carbon oﬀsets.
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A new literature analysing this question empirically is thus needed. Torres et al. (2015)
use a choice experiment to test the eﬀect of distance to the mitigation site on the
propensity to support mitigation activities. This stated preference study ﬁnds a prefer-
ence for local mitigation, which provides local co-beneﬁts. All potential mitigation sites
are however located in Mexico, where the survey takes place. The international dimen-
sion, and the related heterogeneity in abatement costs, is thus left for future research.
Two other studies shed more light on the question of domestic versus international
abatements. Anderson and Bernauer (2016) recruit participants on an online labour
market and analyse the eﬀect of diﬀerent informational treatments on stated support for
domestic versus international oﬀsets. People seem to express higher support for inter-
national abatements when the argument of eﬃciency (versus e.g. ethicality) is raised,
even though no real carbon oﬀsets are proposed and no real monetary consequences
are present. Diederich and Goeschl (2017) recruit German participants on an online
survey platform to participate in an experiment in which, depending on the treatment,
they may be oﬀered the purchase of local (EU-based) versus developing country oﬀsets.
Inference is this time based on revealed preferences. In the local treatment, participants
are reminded that it is in Germany, where they live, that they are generating emissions.
In the developing country treatment, participants are informed that the oﬀset projects
are certiﬁed Gold Standard and will be realised in an environmentally-friendly way
while providing beneﬁts to the local population (such as jobs). The demand for these
two oﬀset options is compared to a neutrally-framed treatment (the control group),
where the location of the abatement is also explicit (the EU), but no attempts to stim-
ulate guilt or aﬀect decisions are made. Diederich and Goeschl (2017) analyse the
demand for carbon oﬀsets across treatments and ﬁnd that location does not matter. If
anything, their informational treatments increase overall contributions with respect to
the neutral framing. Note however that in all treatments, including the neutral fram-
ing, participants are informed that the climate is indiﬀerent about where mitigation is
carried out (that is, location does not matter).
Our paper also uses experimental methods, inferring from revealed preferences. We
contribute to this nascent literature by focusing speciﬁcally on the allocation decision
that determines how demand for domestic versus international oﬀsets changes depend-
ing on the information provided. Our approach thus exploits a real situation, in which
there is a real diﬀerence in location and abatement costs between two otherwise similar
oﬀsetting projects. In this setting, we analysed the role of informational treatments
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in conjunction with the real diﬀerence in the oﬀset price tag. In short, our experi-
ment went as follows. We gathered about 300 students in the lab and observed how
they allocated their endowment between two reforestation projects, one taking place
domestically and one abroad. We provided three randomized informational treatments.
The treatments mimicked the role of a political campaign trying to foster (or hamper)
the political support for generating carbon oﬀsets from reforestation projects imple-
mented in a foreign country, instead of domestically. Two treatments played in favour
of carbon oﬀsets generated abroad by (1) emphasizing the cost-eﬀectiveness related to
international projects and (2) giving guarantees on the reliability of the reforestation
programmes. The third treatment stressed the local ancillary beneﬁts from domestic
carbon oﬀset projects in terms of biodiversity, recreational activities, protection from
natural disasters and local employment. We compared these three treatment groups
with a control group, subject to a neutrally-framed treatment.
We found that stressing the cost-eﬀectiveness of the international reforestation pro-
gramme led to a signiﬁcant increase in contributions to the latter. That is, some
participants seemed to overlook the price diﬀerential, absent any speciﬁc treatment
leveraging it. We did not ﬁnd any eﬀect for the other treatments. Participants seemed
to already factor in the existence of local co-beneﬁts and seemed not to be questioning
the credibility of the selected reforestation programmes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces our hypo-
theses, the experimental design, and the econometric approach. Section 4.3 presents
our data and results. Section 5.7 concludes.
4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Economic background and hypotheses
In this paper, we focus on reforestation programmes. The potential for climate change
mitigation of forest projects is considered substantial (Bellassen and Luyssaert 2014),
given the generally low marginal costs of reforestation (van Kooten et al. 2004; Tavoni
et al. 2007; Nielsen et al. 2014). In addition, it is estimated that 20% of global green-
house gas emissions are caused by deforestation, twice as much as transportation (IPCC
2014). As a result, avoided deforestation and af-/re-forestation programmes may play
an important role in climate change mitigation. For instance, Potter et al. (2007) es-
timate that up to 20% of US emissions could be oﬀset through forests sinks. Forest
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oﬀsets are encouraged since the Kyoto Protocol within the LULUCF (Land Use, Land
Use Change, and Forestry) activities of the Clean Development Mechanism (UNFCCC
2007) and may also play an important role in the achievement of the recent agreement
that the International Civil Aviation Organization reached in October 2016 to limit the
growth of carbon emissions in the civil aviation sector. According to this voluntary
agreement, from 2020 any increase in airline carbon emissions should be compensated
through the purchase of carbon oﬀsets.
The abundance of opportunities for carbon sinks in forests is only one of the reasons
for focusing on forest oﬀsets. From an experimental perspective, forests provide two
additional beneﬁts. First, forest-based oﬀsets are cognitively easy to understand for
participants. Second, while trees and forests may diﬀer across countries in many char-
acteristics, they can still represent the ideal of a homogeneous good in terms of CO2
sequestration. Indeed, the eﬀect on climate change mitigation of one ton of abated
CO2 is the same irrespective of the abatement location. In our experiment, relatively
precise information on the CO2 sequestration ability of each tree is available for both
reforestation programmes in our study.
We are however aware of the concerns that have been raised about the limits of forest
sinks. Unlike decarbonisation processes, such as the development of renewable en-
ergy, forests sinks are aﬀected by the so-called permanence problem (Gren and Zeleke
2016). Indeed, uncertainties regarding climate change, the occurrence of wildﬁres or
future anthropogenic activities, provide no guarantee that all new forests (and thus the
stored carbon) will stand in the long run (Galik and Jackson 2009). Given that carbon
sequestration in forests is potentially reversible (Watson et al. 2000), some national
policies do not include international aﬀorestation programmes in their eligible oﬀset
programmes (e.g. Swiss Federal Council 2016).
On top of these forest-speciﬁc concerns, one may have general reservations regarding
the additionality, or ethical foundations, of oﬀset programmes in general (Anderson
2012; Tirole 2012; Schneider and Kollmuss 2015; Carattini and Tavoni 2016b). Prac-
tical reservations may be related to the (in)eﬀectiveness of carbon markets. Ethical
considerations may be related to the commodiﬁcation of nature, which is an argu-
ment often used by environmentalists to oppose the use of market-based solutions to
environmental externalities (Baron and Leshner 2000; Sandel 2012; Braaten et al. 2015).
In this paper, we analyse the demand for local and international forest oﬀsets despite
their potential weaknesses. While our main research question concerns the preference
74
4.2. METHODOLOGY
for domestic versus international carbon oﬀsets, in our experimental setting we also
consider the general demand for carbon oﬀsets and take care of potential concerns that
our participants may have towards them.
From an economic perspective, purchasing carbon oﬀsets is a real-life decision with a
private cost to the individual. Individuals may be willing to voluntarily contribute to a
public good such as climate change mitigation if, for instance, they derive some utility
from the public good being provided (in case of pure altruism) or if they derive some
utility from their contribution, due to warm glow (Andreoni 1990), or due to a positive
self-image (Nyborg et al. 2006). In the case of oﬀsets, individuals may also be willing to
engage in the private provision of a public good if this may allow compensating other
activities to which they contributed and that might have reduced the overall level of the
same public good (Kotchen 2009). Following the environmental psychology literature,
we would expect pro-environmental behaviour to depend positively on the following
two arguments. First, the feeling of responsibility to contribute to the environmental
public good at stake, the so-called ascription of responsibility. Second, the perception
of the environmental impact that behaving in a pro-environmental way would generate,
the so-called awareness of consequences (see e.g. Stern et al. 1999).
Concerning the preferences for domestic versus international carbon oﬀsets, we con-
sidered three main drivers. Cost-eﬀectiveness reasons justify international oﬀsetting.
However, experimental evidence from markets with externalities suggest that people
may overlook eﬃciency gains, even with salient pay-oﬀ structures. This problem is
particularly relevant for climate change mitigation. Kallbekken et al. (2011) show how
tax aversion can aﬀect Pigouvian taxes, hampering the implementation of instruments
that would increase eﬃciency in the experiment, and allow for pay-oﬀ maximization
(cf. also Kallbekken et al. 2010). When it comes to internalizing externalities, half
measures such as subsidies may be preferred to full measures such as carbon taxes.
That is, also in the lab, where the most cost-eﬀective solution can be relatively easily
identiﬁed, people may prefer sub-optimal solutions, even though these may imply lower
pay-oﬀs (Cherry et al. 2012).
People's ethical and practical reservations to the use of carbon oﬀsets, as described
above, may also be inﬂuenced by the location of the oﬀset project. We conjecture that
these reservations, of practical character in particular, may be stronger in the case of
projects undertaken in emerging economies. For instance, Gampfer et al. (2014) ﬁnd
that international climate transfers receive more public support if the donation is made
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to a trustworthy government. Blasch and Farsi (2014) ﬁnd that certiﬁcations by a
trusted government agency or a United Nations body increase the willingness to pay
for carbon oﬀsetting. People may also have genuine preferences for local oﬀsets. For
instance, people could expect substantial local co-beneﬁts from oﬀsetting, which would
increase the propensity to choose a domestic project (Torres et al. 2015).
Hence, we formulate the following hypotheses on the potential eﬀect of each type of
informational treatment applied in our experiment:
Eﬃciency hypothesis: Participants may pay attention to the amount allocated to
carbon oﬀsets, but not necessarily to the total quantity of emissions abated. Re-
minding them the cost diﬀerential between domestic and international reforesta-
tion programmes increases the amount allocated to foreign programmes and thus
the overall abatement of carbon emissions.
Conﬁdence hypothesis: Participants may not ﬁnd projects abroad trustworthy. Provid-
ing guarantees on the trustworthiness of reforestation project providers increases
the amount allocated to programmes abroad and thus overall abatement.
Local beneﬁts hypothesis: Given that the main focus of the considered reforesta-
tion programmes is on greenhouse gas emissions, participants may neglect their
local beneﬁts. Reminding them the beneﬁts of local forests increases the amount
allocated to domestic reforestation programmes.
Most of the recent literature has examined the demand for carbon oﬀsets relying on
stated preferences, while only a few papers attempted to provide evidence based on
revealed preferences by using lab and ﬁeld experiments.66 Since stated preferences
are subject to several well-known biases (see e.g. Alberini and Kahn 2006), in this
paper, we empirically address the acceptability of international carbon oﬀsets using an
experimental approach. Such an approach is arguably the best tool for inferring from
revealed preferences, testing the eﬀect of alternative policy designs that are not yet
observed in reality, and causally identifying the eﬀect of our treatments on people's
preferences (Falk and Heckman 2009). In addition, the type of behaviour observed in
the lab can be very similar to the one undertaken in a similar natural setting, and the
66Stated preference studies include Brouwer et al. (2008), MacKerron et al. (2009), Carlsson et al.
(2012), Blasch and Farsi (2014), Gampfer et al. (2014), Blasch and Ohndorf (2015) and Torres et al.
(2015). Ovchinnikova et al. (2009), Löfgren et al. (2012), Diederich and Goeschl (2014; 2017), and
Kesternich et al. (2016), are examples of revealed preference studies.
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behavioural responses of student and non-student participants in lab experiments are
often the same (cf. Alm et al. 2015). When it comes to analysing pro-social behaviour,
or preferences over policies, one may argue that the likelihood that behavior in the lab
diﬀers from a real-life situation increases. While this can be true, pro-social behaviour
in the lab remains strongly correlated with pro-social behaviour in the ﬁeld (Benz and
Meier 2008). That said, we are aware that each methodological decision involves a
trade-oﬀ and we devote a section, below, to the external validity of our results, and
how it may have implications for policy recommendations.
4.2.2 Experimental design
Following from the previous section, we selected two real reforestation programmes
providing the same abatement per tree in both the domestic (developed) and the for-
eign (developing) country, but with a much lower price in the latter. The programme
in the home country was located in Visp, Switzerland, while the programme in the
developing country was located in Limay, Nicaragua. In these programmes, a tree in
both Switzerland and Nicaragua captured 15 kg of CO2 per year, while its price was
10 Swiss francs (CHF) in the former and only 3 in the latter country.67 That is, given
the price diﬀerential, with the same budget (e.g. with the same ﬁscal revenues from a
carbon tax), emissions abatements could be three times larger in Nicaragua.
We ran the experiment in Geneva, Switzerland, in December 2015, with a sample of
more than 300 undergraduate students in business administration (management) in
their ﬁrst or second year, all enrolled in mandatory microeconomics classes at the
introductory or intermediate level68. The experiment was conducted during class time,
to prevent students self-selection. After entering the class, we brieﬂy presented the
experiment and instructed participants as per standard procedure in lab experiments.
The experiment was organized in two stages. A ﬁrst stage determined participants'
endowment, and their voluntary contribution to carbon oﬀset projects. The allocation
of this contribution between domestic and international projects was the focus of the
second stage.
In the ﬁrst stage, participants were randomly provided with 4 very general questions
about microeconomics, whose answers determined their monetary endowment, along
671CHF≈1USD at the time of the study.
68See the Appendix for the full questionnaire (translated from French).
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Table 4.1: Reforestation programmes
Programme 1 Programme 2
Place Visp, Switzerland Limay, Nicaragua
CO2 / tree / year 15 kg 15 kg
Cost / tree CHF 10 CHF 3
with a show-up fee of 2 Swiss francs. Each correct answer was rewarded with 2 francs,
and so participants had the possibility to earn up to 8 additional francs.
Once the endowment was determined, participants were given the option to donate a
share of it to the purchase of carbon oﬀsets through reforestation programmes. At this
stage, participants only decided how much money they wanted to spend on the purchase
of carbon oﬀsets and how much to keep for themselves, without further information on
the speciﬁcities of the reforestation programme. Participants were informed about some
basic facts of climate change; were introduced to the role of deforestation in increasing
the stock of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere; and were made aware of the
role of reducing deforestation or increasing aﬀorestation in helping mitigating climate
change. All participants had also been informed that a nominal reforestation certiﬁcate
could have been made available to all purchasers of carbon oﬀsets, if they were willing
to declare their identity once completed the experiment. This procedure might have
reassured participants that the purchase of carbon oﬀsets was really taking place, be-
sides providing some reputational eﬀects, which in general tend to have a signiﬁcant
positive impact on the contribution to a public good (Milinski et al. 2002).
In the second stage, once the amount dedicated to reforestation had been elicited, par-
ticipants were asked to split it between the two speciﬁc programmes. This decision
represented our outcome of interest, as it allowed understanding the preferences of
people towards generating carbon oﬀsets through a domestic or an international re-
forestation programme. Basic information about both reforestation programmes was
provided to all participants as done in Table 4.169.
Furthermore, additional information was randomly provided in the form of the follow-
ing three treatments. Treatment 1 (T1) stressed the price diﬀerential between a tree
in Nicaragua and in Switzerland, emphasizing that funding the least-cost programme
69Information on these reforestation programmes is available at
https://www.helvetia.com/ch/content/fr/qui-sommes-nous/engagement/foret-protectrice.html (last
accessed on November 26th, 2015) and http://http://www.tree-nation.com/plant (last accessed on
November 26th, 2015).
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would have resulted in higher emissions abatement, for a ﬁxed contribution. T1 had
thus been designed to test the eﬃciency hypothesis. Treatment 2 (T2) informed par-
ticipants that both programmes had been guaranteed by reputable and independent
institutions: the United Nations Environment Programme for the Nicaraguan project
and the local government for the domestic programme. Hence, this treatment had been
designed to test the conﬁdence hypothesis. Treatment 3 (T3) introduced the role of
local ancillary beneﬁts of reforestation. We recalled to participants the recreational
activities that the Swiss population uses to undertake in local forests, their importance
for the local biodiversity, their beneﬁts in terms of wood and non-wood products, as
well as their contribution to local jobs and economic growth. T3 had been designed to
test the local beneﬁts hypothesis, favouring the domestic reforestation programme. A
control group was assigned a very neutral messaging. Following the standard proced-
ure, we administered a short debrieﬁng survey to understand students' contributions
and collected the usual socio-economic characteristics.
4.2.3 Econometric approach
We analysed separately the data from the two stages of our experiment. The ﬁrst
stage determined participants' contributions to the purchase of carbon oﬀsets. The
second stage captured the allocation decision between the domestic and international
reforestation programmes. In the empirical analyses, the second stage addressed our
main research question. In the ﬁrst stage, given that our outcome variable, the ratio
of contribution to forest programmes over endowment, was continuous and bounded
between 0 and 1, we estimated both an ordinary least square (OLS) model and a
speciﬁc generalised linear model for fractional outcomes (GLM), as recommended by
Baum (2008).70
In the econometric analysis of the second stage, we tested whether the diﬀerences
among treatments were statistically signiﬁcant, conditional on covariates, and assessed
the magnitude of the treatment eﬀects. We tested the following speciﬁcation:
70A tobit model could also be a potential candidate for a non-linear ﬁt of our data. We thus followed
Papke and Wooldridge (1993) and applied a speciﬁcation link test to select the most appropriate model
between the fractional logit GLM, and a tobit model. The speciﬁcation test rejected the null hypothesis
of good link speciﬁcation for the tobit model (p-value<0.001), whereas it did not for the fractional
logit GLM (p-value>0.99). Based on the test outcome, we selected GLM as our preferred non-linear
speciﬁcation. All additional estimations are available by the authors upon request.
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Yi = α + β1T1 + β2T2 + β3T3 + γX
′
i + i (4.1)
in which our dependent variable Y is the percentage of participant i 's contribution
allocated to the reforestation programme implemented abroad, α a constant and βj the
treatment eﬀect for treatments j = 1, 2, 3. Xi is a vector of control variables and γ the
vector of associated coeﬃcients. Controls take into account the possible heterogeneity
across individuals, along with i, the heteroskedasticity-robust standard error.71 Since
the dependent variable was bounded between 0 and 1, we also estimated this model
with OLS and GLM.
We then checked whether the treatment eﬀects occurred on the intensive or extensive
margins. For each treatment, we could have observed the same proportion of parti-
cipants contributing to the international programme as in the control group, but these
could on average have been contributing a diﬀerent amount (intensive margin). Altern-
atively, we could have observed a diﬀerent proportion of participants contributing a
positive sum to the international programme, without necessarily providing a diﬀerent
contribution, on average, than the control group (extensive margin).
To isolate the role of the extensive margin, we assessed, with OLS and logit models,
the eﬀect of the treatments on the proportion of individuals contributing a strictly
positive amount to the international programme. We provided a further robustness test
exploiting a two-parts model à la Cragg, which is appropriate for limited dependent
variables and integrates both ﬁrst stage and second stage decisions into a single two-
parts model. Following Cragg (1971), we considered that the decisions to contribute and
the level of this contribution might have been two diﬀerent but simultaneous decisions,
potentially driven by diﬀerent factors. The ﬁrst part of the model thus explained
the probability to contribute to forest carbon oﬀsetting with a probit model, and the
second part explained the level of this contribution, conditional on strictly positive
contributions.72
71Due to the randomised allocation of the treatments, the inclusion of control variables did not
aﬀect the coeﬃcients of the observed treatment eﬀects, but it did increase the model's precision.
Descriptive statistics for these variables are available in Table d.3 in the Appendix. The number of
observations only slightly decreased when introducing control variables. The use of heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors was justiﬁed by standard heteroskedasticity tests such as modiﬁed Wald and
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg tests.
72The Cragg model is intuitively similar to the Heckman two-stage model. However, our data did
not suﬀer from a selection issue, as in Heckman (1979). In our experiment we indeed did not face
missing data, but a corner at 0 issue (see Wooldridge, 2010, chapter 16). That is, zeros were not
present because of non-observable responses but were rather the result of an optimal choice made by
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Contributors Non-contributors
Endowment 7.15 7.34
(1.90) (1.93)
Contribution 5.81 0
(2.59) (0)
Contribution (% of initial endowment) 0.83 0
(0.30) (0)
Observations 261 46
Standard deviations in parentheses.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics and ﬁrst stage
Table 4.2 provides information on the ﬁrst stage for the full sample. Descriptive statist-
ics of the explanatory variables are available in Table d.1 in the Appendix. On average,
participants contributed to climate change mitigation with about 6 francs each, i.e.
about 80% of the average endowment of about 7 francs. Yet, 15% of them were not
willing to contribute to reforestation at all.
In this stage, we analysed the propensity to contribute to a generic reforestation pro-
gramme generating carbon oﬀsets, relative to the initial endowment, and its determin-
ants. To measure ascription of responsibility, we used two variables. The ﬁrst variable
was the standard measure of climate concern from the Gallup survey (cf. Lee et al.
2015) and the World Value Survey (WVS). Individuals were asked to answer on a 5
Likert scale from I do not agree at all to I totally agree to the following statement:
I consider that climate warming is a serious threat for the future. We transformed
this variable into a binary measure (called climate concern) taking the value 1 if an
individual pretty much agrees or totally agrees, and 0 otherwise. As shown by the
descriptive statistics in Table d.1 in the Appendix, the variable for climate concern
scored particularly high, with 86% of the sample declaring to be concerned by climate
change. For comparison, in the 2007 wave of the World Values Survey climate concern
in Switzerland was about 89%. The second variable was a dummy taking value 1 if
the respondent. The Cragg model allows for two separate simultaneous decisions but does not correct
for selection. It was thus the most appropriate approach for our context. It also allowed to have the
same covariates in both parts of the model without risk of collinearity (Madden, 2008).
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participants felt morally obliged to contribute to climate change mitigation (we call
it moral obligation). This variable resulted from the pretty much agree and totally
agree answers to the following statement: I feel morally obliged to protect climate.
Compared to climate concern, a relatively lower proportion (67%) stated to feel morally
obliged to contribute to climate change mitigation.
To measure awareness of consequences, we used a variable capturing the belief that
even small contributions to climate change can be important, such as the ones under
examination in this study. This question was worded as follows: How do you agree
to the following statement? `In my opinion, even small contributions are useful to
protect the climate' . 85% of the sample considered that even small contributions can
be important.
We note that considering a public good as important is a necessary, but not suﬃcient,
condition for its voluntary provision (Nyborg et al. 2006). That is, people cannot con-
tribute to the provision of all public goods that they deem important. Whether an
individual is willing to contribute to a given good also depends on the descriptive norm
concerning the provision of such good, i.e. what others do. Much evidence has been
provided on conditional cooperation in local environments (cf. Fehr and Fischbacher
2003). However, conditional cooperation in the climate commons may appear less likely.
Yet, according to Ostrom (2009), managing global dilemmas requires as much trust as
managing local dilemmas does. Ostrom's claim relies on the observed existence of reci-
procity and trust at the local level, which may beneﬁt the provision of any social good,
regardless of its local or global characteristics. Supporting Ostrom's intuition, Carat-
tini et al. (2015) ﬁnd for instance a negative correlation between trust and greenhouse
gas emissions among European countries. Ostrom's element of trust reconciles with
the model of Nyborg et al. (2006): since the descriptive norm is not always salient,
individuals may form expectations on other people's contributions (see also Carattini
et al. 2017b). This case applied to our experiment since communication was strictly for-
bidden between players. Hence, to estimate the eﬀect of expected cooperation, we used
a measure of participants' belief of others' contribution. This variable was based on
the answers to the following question: In your opinion, what share of their endowment
other participants on average contributed to the reforestation programme?.
We also added to the model a few variables that were related to the speciﬁcity of
the public good under scrutiny. Since no details on the location of the reforestation
programmes were provided at this stage, it is plausible that some individuals, especially
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Table 4.3: Average marginal eﬀects on contributions
(1) (2)
OLS GLM
Climate concern 0.039 0.016
(0.08) (0.07)
Small contributions are important 0.13* 0.11*
(0.07) (0.06)
Green member -0.001 -0.008
(0.05) (0.06)
Moral obligation 0.0099 0.016
(0.05) (0.04)
Belief about others' contribution 0.71*** 0.68***
(0.06) (0.05)
Frequent forest user 0.071 0.070
(0.05) (0.05)
Practical reservations w.r.t. reforestation -0.069 -0.055
(0.05) (0.04)
Ethical reservations w.r.t. the commodiﬁcation of nature -0.024 -0.016
(0.04) (0.04)
Observations 299 299
Adjusted-R2 0.347
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
those who were used to visit local forests, might have been more likely to contribute
than others. Frequent usage is indeed a common determinant of contribution to the
provision of ecosystem services in general (Czajkowski et al. 2014). We thus asked how
often the participant used to visit forests, in general, and added to the model a dummy
variable to account for regular or frequent visits.
Since no guarantee on the quality of the project was given at the ﬁrst stage, we captured
possible practical reservations to the use of forest carbon oﬀsets. Our variable measured
the degree of agreement with the following statement: Reforestation is eﬀective in
reducing the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere in the long run. To capture general
ethical considerations related to the commodiﬁcation of nature, we exploited answers
to the following statement: I do not want to consider natural resources as a marketed
commodity.
Table 4.3 presents our estimates. Columns (1) and (2) show our coeﬃcients for OLS
and the average marginal eﬀect of a fractional logit GLM, respectively. Since all es-
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timates were statistically the same in both OLS and GLM models, and to allow for
straightforward interpretation, we comment in what follows the estimated eﬀects based
on OLS.
All the coeﬃcients had the expected sign, except the one associated with green mem-
bership, but the latter wasnot statistically signiﬁcant. Our results suggests that the
demand for carbon oﬀsets generated by reforestation programmes is dominated, stat-
istically speaking, by attitudinal variables, in particular, the belief that small contri-
butions do help to make a diﬀerence, as well as the belief about others' contributions.
Results about the belief of others' contributions match the recent evidence of Blasch
and Farsi (2014), Blasch and Ohndorf (2015) and Schwirplies and Ziegler (2016). All
these studies indeed ﬁnd a positive eﬀect on the demand for carbon oﬀsets for variables
very similar to our measure of beliefs about others' behaviour, namely, and respectively,
expected cooperation, expected share of oﬀset customers in society and expectation
of society. Along with related literature showing similar patterns for other climate-
friendly behaviours, this evidence can be used to support the existence of conditional
cooperation in the climate commons (Carattini et al. 2017b).
Not surprisingly for a lab experiment, even for those with a relatively large sample,
none of the other covariates reached the standard threshold for statistical signiﬁcance,
despite the expected sign. We note in particular that the frequent use of forests, or
having practical reservations related to forest oﬀsets, had no signiﬁcant impact on the
average contribution to reforestation programmes.
In the questionnaire, we also asked for participants' income. Given the non-negligible
decline in observations that the inclusion of the income variable implied, we did not
consider income diﬀerences in our model. Yet, we note that running additional estim-
ations with such variable did not statistically aﬀect the estimates of Table 4.3, while
the coeﬃcient for the income variable was found to be statistically insigniﬁcant. This
result was unsurprising in our context, also because the private demand for environ-
mental quality was likely to be only partially expressed, due to the (global) public good
characteristics of climate change mitigation (cf. Roca 2003).
4.3.2 Second stage
The second stage included only participants providing a strictly positive monetary con-
tribution to the generic reforestation programme. We examined the decision to allocate
such contribution between the domestic and the international reforestation programme.
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Table 4.4: Allocation of the monetary contributions to the programme abroad, per
treatment
T0 T1 T2 T3
Mean contribution to the international programme (% of total contribution) 0.63 0.73 0.64 0.59
(0.35) (0.36) (0.34) (0.33)
Frequency of contributions to the international programme > 0 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.86
(0.35) (0.33) (0.34) (0.35)
Observations 59 66 70 66
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the three treatments or the control
group, which resulted in 59 to 70 observations for each treatment. We created our
variable of interest as a ratio, with the participant's contribution to the reforestation
programme abroad as numerator, and her total contribution as denominator. We ex-
pected this ratio to be aﬀected by the informational treatments as discussed in Section
4.2.1. Table 4.4 shows some statistics for our dependent variable for each treatment
group. Interestingly, 86% of all contributors who faced the neutral treatment accep-
ted to contribute a positive amount to the international programme, with the average
contribution at 63%. This suggests that participants to the experiment might not have
opposed the principle of having emissions abatements taking place abroad. For com-
parison, Diederich and Goeschl (2017) ﬁnd that when the cost of abating at home or
abroad is (artiﬁcially) the same, people seem to have no preference for either one or
the other location. Hence, a large proportion of our participants seemed to pay some
attention to the price diﬀerential, even though they might have not fully internalized
its implications for cost-eﬀectiveness. A substantial part of the sample might have how-
ever been overlooking this diﬀerential, unless they had speciﬁc preferences or concerns
in favour of one project or another. As expected, we observed some variation across
treatments. In particular, contributions to the international reforestation programme
were the highest with the eﬃciency treatment, and the lowest with the local beneﬁts
treatment.
As shown by Table 4.5, the estimates for the variables of interest were robust across
OLS and GLM speciﬁcations. In what follows, we thus again interpret the results based
on the OLS estimates.73
73The estimates for the control variables are displayed in Table d.4 in the Appendix. All coeﬃcients
had the expected sign, but most variables were not statistically signiﬁcant. Declaring to be a frequent
visitor of forests did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the contribution to the local programme, nor did having
previous experience with the domestic forest mentioned in the experiment. General ethical reservations
such as being unwilling to consider natural resources as a marketed commodity, as well as other ethical
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Table 4.5: Average treatment eﬀects
(1) (2)
OLS GLM
Eﬃciency treatment (T1) 0.11* 0.12*
(0.06) (0.06)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2) 0.026 0.025
(0.06) (0.06)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3) -0.025 -0.024
(0.06) (0.05)
Covariates Yes Yes
Observations 256 256
Adjusted R2 0.15
AIC 148.5 1.08
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Compared to the control group, the reference in the regressions, we found that all
treatments have the expected sign. The informational treatment that reminded the
importance of eﬃciency reasons (T1) and the treatment that provided guarantees on
the quality of the oﬀset programmes (T2) had both a positive impact on the relative
allocation to the reforestation programme in Nicaragua. Likewise, the local beneﬁts
treatment (T3) increased the likelihood of funding the domestic programme. However,
only the eﬃciency treatment had a statistically signiﬁcant impact. This result suggested
that participants tended to not completely factor in the eﬃciency argument supporting
the use of international carbon oﬀsets. Our causal estimate suggested that the eﬃciency
treatment led to a 11 percentage point increase in the contribution to the programme
generating carbon oﬀsets abroad, compared to the neutral framing of the control group.
concerns related to international oﬀsets, such as opposition to carbon markets or concerns on the
fairness of oﬀsetting domestic emissions abroad, did not reach statistical signiﬁcance either. Given
the relatively low number of observations and low variability of these variables, these results were not
particularly surprising. Related to the previous discussion on conditional cooperation in the climate
commons, we found that expectations about others' behaviour also shaped the allocation decision.
Finally, a variable taking value 1 for second-year students was associated to higher contributions to
the international reforestation programme. This result seemed consistent with Braaten et al. (2015),
who maintain that students in economics are typically trained to focus on outcomes, i.e. on eﬃciency.
A relatively large strand of literature on the behavior of economists tends to conﬁrm this result. The
main reference is, arguably, Marwell and Ames (1981), who ﬁnd with lab experiments that graduate
students in economics are more likely to respond to economic incentives than other subpopulations, in
particular by free riding in the provision of public goods. Other notable studies on economists include
Frey and Meier (2003) and O'Roark and Wood (2011).
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The statistical insigniﬁcance of T2 suggested that a potential lack of credibility of the
international programme was not a major concern for the individuals in the sample.
Debrieﬁng questions reported that only 12% of participants did not trust the Nicara-
guan government for the implementation of the international reforestation programme,
while no participant stated distrust in the Swiss government. Furthermore, we note
that trust in the Nicaraguan government for the sub-sample having experienced T2
was not statistically diﬀerent than the reported average for the whole sample, support-
ing this explanation. Other reasons could contribute to this result. It could be that
the scepticism towards carbon oﬀsets aﬀected domestic and international reforestation
programmes in the same way.
In the same spirit, we found that participants accounted already to a large extent for
the potential beneﬁts derived by the local programme, including how it might have
supported the local biodiversity, which explained the limited eﬀectiveness of T3 in
boosting contributions to the local programme. It is worth noting that, in recent times,
Swiss forests have been growing in both standing wood volume and surface and that
their health is generally considered as good. The expectation of local co-beneﬁts might
thus have been limited in our context. In addition, in Switzerland the forestry sector
contributes to only 0.1% of total employment and 0.06% of GDP (FSO 2017).
Our results showed that the eﬃciency treatment increased the average contribution to
the international reforestation programme relative to the domestic reforestation pro-
gramme. This increased contribution could take two forms. In the eﬃciency treatment,
we could have either observed the same proportion of participants contributing to the
international programme as in the control group, but these would have been on average
be contributing more. On the other hand, we could have observed a higher proportion
of participants contributing a positive sum to the international programme, without ne-
cessarily having a diﬀerent average contribution. That is, the change in behaviour could
have taken place both on the intensive and extensive margins, respectively. To isolate
the eﬀect of the extensive margin, we looked at the treatment eﬀects on the proportion
of individuals contributing a positive amount to the international programme. In the
same spirit, we also looked at heterogeneous treatment eﬀects to determine whether
responses to this treatment varied based on some of the participants' characteristics.
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Table 4.6: Average treatment eﬀects on the probability to contribute to the programme
abroad (extensive margin)
(1) (2)
OLS Logit
Eﬃciency treatment (T1) 0.030 0.022
(0.058) (0.058)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2) 0.039 0.032
(0.059) (0.056)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3) 0.018 0.0048
(0.060) (0.055)
Covariates Yes Yes
Observations 256 256
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Intensive vs. extensive margin
Descriptive statistics in Table 4.4 show that the proportion of strictly positive contri-
butions to the international programme did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across treatments.
This is conﬁrmed by the OLS and logit models presented in Table 4.6, showing that
the eﬀect of the treatments on this outcome variable is not statistically signiﬁcant.74
As presented in Table d.6 in the Appendix, the Cragg model provided very similar
results to those in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. That is, it showed that T1 was not eﬀective
on the extensive margin, but it was on the intensive margin, and so increased average
contributions to the international programme by about 11 percentage points.
Hence, while T1 had a positive impact on the average contribution to the international
programme, this treatment did not aﬀect the proportion of individuals contributing a
positive amount to this programme, i.e. the extensive margin. That is, participants
that were already predisposed to contribute to the programme abroad were likely to
increase their contribution, whereas the remaining participants were likely to be unaf-
fected. Hence, in presence of strong preferences for the local programme, the eﬃciency
treatment may not be eﬀective.
74Results including covariates are presented in Table d.5 in the Appendix. Estimates from a probit
model would lead to the same conclusion.
88
4.3. RESULTS
Heterogeneous eﬀects
To disentangle the heterogeneous eﬀects of our most eﬀective treatment (T1) on diﬀerent
subgroups of the sample, we tested several extensions of equation (1), adding interaction
terms. We expected some sub-samples to be particularly aﬀected by the eﬃciency
treatment. We tested the interaction between the eﬃciency treatment and the following
dummy variables: oﬀsetting abroad is acceptable; ethical reservations with respect to the
commodiﬁcation of nature; and economic growth, rather than environmental protection,
is the priority. Similarly to the main model in the second stage, we estimated the
coeﬃcients with OLS. All the results were statistically the same if estimated with GLM.
Column (1) shows the heterogeneous eﬀect of T1 on individuals who think that it is
morally acceptable to compensate CO2 emissions abroad. Not surprisingly, as presen-
ted in Table 4.7, only those considering carbon oﬀsets generated abroad as acceptable
reacted to the informational treatment, whereas those expressing ethical concerns were
more likely to remain on their positions. This supported the evidence provided on the
treatment eﬀect on the extensive margin. Relatedly, column (2) shows that only the
participants that did not have ethical reservations related to the commodiﬁcation of
nature were aﬀected by the eﬃciency treatment. Finally, we looked at whether green
individuals were more or less responsive to the eﬃciency treatment than the rest of
the sample. We used as proxy for greenness the WVS question Economic growth and
creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suﬀers to some ex-
tent. Interestingly, we found that, on average, green participants tended to react
more than the average individual to the eﬃciency treatment. This suggested that,
absent any external intervention, people caring for the environment might have been
reticent to contribute in large proportions to the international programme, but stress-
ing the higher environmental impacts achieved abroad with the same amount of money
might have been eﬀective in spurring participation to the international reforestation
programme.
Discussion
We found that informational treatments emphasizing the cost-eﬀectiveness of interna-
tional oﬀset programs could increase the demand for the latter. Our lab experiment
suggested that there were information asymmetries, between our participants and eco-
nomists, on the beneﬁts of international abatements. In our context, an informational
treatment was suﬃcient to address part of these asymmetries. We consider that our
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Table 4.7: Heterogeneous treatment eﬀects
(1) (2) (3)
Oﬀsetting
abroad is
acceptable
Ethical reservations
w.r.t.
commodiﬁcation of
nature
Economic
growth is the
priority (vs. the
environment)
T1 x Oﬀset abroad 0.16*
(0.08)
T1 x NO oﬀset abroad 0.096
(0.07)
T1 x Ethical reservations 0.068
(0.08)
T1 x NO ethical reservations 0.15**
(0.08)
T1 x Economy the priority 0.055
(0.13)
T1 x Economy NOT the
priority
0.12*
(0.06)
Conﬁdence treatment 0.024 0.023 0.025
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Local beneﬁts treatment -0.022 -0.023 -0.022
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 0.44*** 0.422*** 0.44***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 256 256 256
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19
Adjusted-R2 0.15 0.15 0.15
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. T1 represents the eﬃciency treatment.
In all speciﬁcations we controlled for beliefs about others' contribution and frequent forest users,
experience with the domestic site, acceptability of oﬀsets abroad, ethical reservations against the
commodiﬁcation of nature, climate concern, green membership and economic growth as the priority (vs.
the environment).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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ﬁndings can have important implications for policy makers, with a caveat, related to
their external validity. In what follows, we ﬁrst discuss the policy implications, and
then address the caveat.
Following the recent scandals related to Joint Implementation projects, most attention
has been given to re-establishing the credibility of international oﬀset programmes. Ef-
forts in this direction are welcome, but our results seem to imply that credibility may
not be the main concern for the general public. While for economists it is obvious
that eﬃciency reasons would play in favour of abating emissions where it is cheapest,
assuming that this is obvious also for lay people may be misleading. Information should
thus be provided to make people understand why it is so important to undertake emis-
sions abatements in developing countries. Other valid arguments oppose the use of
international carbon abatements, but our results suggest that stressing the importance
of providing a higher environmental beneﬁt could lead an important share of contribu-
tions to switch from the local to the international programme. Even though our paper
diﬀers in perspective and results, we join Diederich and Goeschl (2017, p. 17) in their
conclusion: locational preferences need not stand in the way of realizing the gains from
comparative advantage in climate change mitigation. Our policy implications may also
extend to linked carbon markets, an option that is currently receiving serious consider-
ation in many jurisdictions having implemented emissions trading schemes. Besides the
issue of reliability, linking carbon markets between developed and emerging countries
would also require suﬃcient political support in the former, backing the purchase of
carbon allowances from low- and middle-income countries. Therefore, reducing oppos-
ition to abatements taking place abroad may be highly beneﬁcial for the prospect of
future climate policy.
These policy implications depend on whether our ﬁndings can be applied to a broader
context. Proving the external validity of our results is beyond the scope of this exper-
imental investigation, hence the caveat. While the evidence covered in Section 4.2.1
supports the external validity of lab experiments, one can always argue that preferences
for policy are context-speciﬁc. To put our results into perspective, we refer to the grow-
ing literature on public support for environmental policies, to which our paper is closely
related. This literature has provided a set of recurrent ﬁndings, regardless of whether
the methods used consisted in experimental approaches with students (e.g. Cherry
et al. 2012, 2014; Kallbekken et al. 2011), qualitative surveys and focus groups (e.g.
Dresner et al. 2006; Kallbekken and Aasen 2010), quantitative surveys and choice exper-
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iments (e.g. Bristow et al. 2010; Sælen and Kallbekken 2011; Baranzini and Carattini
2017), survey panels in a quasi-experimental setting (Schuitema et al. 2010; Carattini
et al. 2016a), or surveys combined with the observation of real ballots (Thalmann 2004;
Carattini et al. 2017a). All these studies provide evidence of a gap between people's
perceptions and economists' prescriptions, which contributes to explain an important
part of the resistance to cost-eﬀective environmental policies, such as carbon taxes.
This gap is very similar to that observed in our lab experiment. Hence, one could
extrapolate to our context and support the external validity of our results. Further-
more, given that the participants in our study have some knowledge of economics, our
experimental results are likely to provide lower-bound estimates. That is, if anything,
asymmetries of information are likely to be larger with a fully representative sample.
In our opinion, however, the main contribution of our paper relies on its novelty, rather
than on its generalisability. We provide original ﬁndings and put forward a set of po-
tential policy implications, whose relevance for other contexts may be investigated in
future studies. Our paper, along with the concurrent studies by Anderson and Bernauer
(2016) and Diederich and Goeschl (2017), represents indeed an initial investigation into
a new research area on people's preferences for local and international abatements.
Several avenues for future research follow from our paper. While we consider reforest-
ation programmes, the same research question applies also to other oﬀset programmes,
for which the diﬀerence in cost-eﬀectiveness between programmes in developed and de-
veloping countries may be even larger. In addition, future research may include more
than two countries, with varying costs and institutional features. Methodologically
speaking, such analyses may not only be possible in the lab. Choice experiments, for
instance, would be particularly suited to analyse the demand for carbon oﬀsets, in-
cluding location as one of many attributes and split designs to allow for randomized
treatments. Researchers could also partner with companies oﬀering carbon oﬀsets, as in
Kesternich et al. (2016), and analyse this question directly in the ﬁeld. The larger and
more representative the sample, with choice-experiment surveys or ﬁeld experiments,
the stronger the external validity. Qualitative studies could also oﬀer a complementary
perspective to this emerging literature, providing valuable information on how people's
backgrounds and knowledge about eﬃciency and international carbon oﬀsets may aﬀect
their preferences. Qualitative studies could also involve policy-makers, to understand
the political economy of climate policies that restrict the use of international carbon
oﬀsets. Finally, further research could also extend the analysis to the role of local pol-
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lution. The more international carbon oﬀsets can be used, the lower the beneﬁts of
climate policy in terms of local air pollution and health. Especially in the presence of
carbon trading schemes, and potential hot spots (cf. Fowlie et al. 2012), each additional
unit of abatement that takes place abroad can have negative implications for the local
population because of the co-generation of local and global pollutants.
4.4 Conclusion
Turning the Paris Agreement's Nationally Determined Contributions into operational
policies is the next challenge for policy makers. However, many political obstacles
hamper the realisation of pledges in a cost-eﬀective way. One of these is public res-
istance to the use of carbon credits and carbon oﬀsets associated with greenhouse gas
abatements in foreign countries. We addressed this issue in an experimental framework,
in which participants were requested to allocate funding between a domestic and an
international reforestation programme, the latter taking place in a developing country,
where reforestation is cheaper.
We applied several informational treatments and found that the allocation decision was
responsive to the provision of information on the cost-eﬀectiveness of the reforestation
programme implemented abroad. On the contrary, the decision wass not particularly
responsive to guarantees addressing a potential lack of credibility of the reforestation
programme in the developing country and to information on the local beneﬁts associated
with the domestic programme. Our results suggest that stressing the potential for higher
abatements in foreign countries is eﬀective in changing participants' priors in favour of
international carbon oﬀsets. Hence, individuals may be willing to increase their support
for the use of international carbon oﬀsets and related carbon markets, provided that
they are in position to appreciate their environmental beneﬁts.
Our novel ﬁndings contribute to the literature on the acceptability of climate policy
instruments and on the emerging literature on carbon oﬀsets. They suggest that some
of the potential resistance to the use of carbon credits and carbon oﬀsets generated
in foreign countries may be, to some extent, spurious. Eﬀective communication from
policy makers could then address, and partly overcome, as in our experiment, such
resistance. As policy-makers take their time to implement the required policies, the
level of stringency requested to meet the climate targets increases. International carbon
oﬀsets could represent an important solution to ensure that the current pledges are met,
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thus supporting the Paris Agreement's ratchet mechanism, and the durability of the
whole agreement.
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The Swiss construction wood market:
CO2 net emissions and actors
responsiveness
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Abstract
Given the importance of wood products in CO2 sequestration, an increase in the use of local
wood in construction may help reduce the building sector's net emissions. Yet, the Swiss forest
industry suﬀers from the low price of wood and is unwilling to produce more timber, despite
the important potential of wood mobilization in Switzerland. Financial incentives may help to
meet the goals of both environmental and economic sustainability, if actors respond to price
changes. I thus use a rich yearly time series data set to estimate demand and supply price-
and cross-elasticities on the market for roundwood in Switzerland, over the period 1949-2013.
I consider both short term and long term relationships, thanks to a lagged adjustment model
and correct for the price endogeneity using a supply-demand equations system estimated with
the 3 Stage Least Squares approach. I ﬁnd that both demand and supply are sensitive to price
changes in the long and short run but that the simultaneous increasing demand for energy
wood may have counterproductive impacts on the construction wood production.
Keywords: Roundwood; Simultaneous equations; Time series; Structural breaks; Construc-
tion
JEL classiﬁcation: Q02, Q21, Q23, C31
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5.1 Introduction
Wood is an important resource for the building industry. Indeed, although steel, con-
crete and cement have substituted timber to a large extent in the last century, the
environmental advantage of wood in construction still makes a case in favor of the lat-
ter material. Wood sequesters carbon and, if used in buildings, prevents CO2 to spill
in the atmosphere (Lippke et al., 2010). Also, the production of timber requires less
energy and wooden buildings are, on average, as energy-eﬃcient as concrete buildings.
Wooden buildings hence cause less emissions throughout their life than buildings made
out of other materials such as cement or concrete (Gustavsson et al., 2006). As illus-
trated in Figure 5.1, walls in solid wood have a negative CO2 emissions balance. One
m2 of solid wood wall is indeed able to sequester 200 kg of CO2, while its production
emits 10 kg of CO2 only. In comparison, the production of one m2 of concrete wall
emits 60 kg of CO2 and has no carbon storage ability. A more intensive use of wood in
construction can therefore be useful as an additional tool to mitigate climate change.
It is estimated that substitution of non-wood products by wood products could save
up to 110 million tons of CO2 up to the year 2096 in Switzerland (FOEN, 2007), which
corresponds approximately to what Switzerland emits for two years as of today.
To encourage the use of wood and reach this goal, the Swiss government allows ﬁrms to
domestically oﬀset their CO2 emissions through wood products (Swiss Federal Council,
2016). Also, since 2015, norms regarding ﬁres prevention do not limit the use of wood
in buildings anymore. These changes engender a renewed interest for the use of wood
by the construction sector.
Swiss forests grow both in volume and surface since the 19th century. However, trees
get older, which limit their ability to serve as carbon sinks. Given the relative environ-
mental friendliness of wood, the sustainable aspect of an increase in wood production
(Borzykowski and Kacprzak, 2017) and the potential of wood mobilization, the Swiss
government decided to promote the use of this material within the framework of the
Forest Policy 2020 (FOEN, 2013c) and the wood resource policy (FOEN, 2008). Yet,
the Swiss forest industry has suﬀered from the low price of wood for decades and stake-
holders claim that the current price does not give any incentive for more mobilization
(FSO, 2017). Given the goal of the Swiss government and the ﬁnancial bad health of
the forest sector, understanding whether the Swiss forest industry responds to price
changes is of particular importance. Indeed some doubts emerge regarding the respon-
siveness of wood market actors to ﬁnancial incentives. With micro-data at the ﬁrm
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level, Farsi and Krähenbühl (2015) have shown that the Swiss wood supply may not be
proﬁt driven but rather only target a given revenue. This result supports the view that
ﬁnancial incentives may be ineﬀective in increasing the wood production.
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Figure 5.1: CO2 emissions and sequestration in kg of CO2 equivalent/m2 of wall (Source:
KBOB, 2009)
I use a rich yearly time series data set to estimate demand and supply price- and
cross-elasticities on the market for roundwood in Switzerland. The analysis covers the
period 1949-2013 and considers both short term and long term relationships, thanks to
the Lagged Adjustment model (LAM) (Koyck, 1954). I present an approach that also
corrects for the price endogeneity using a supply-demand equations system estimated
with 3 Stage Least Squares (3SLS) and deal with structural breaks.
Section 5.2 presents the economic speciﬁcities of the Swiss wood market and Section
5.3 reviews the related literature in developed countries. Section 5.4 presents our data
set and Section 5.5 explains our econometric approach. Results are available in Section
5.6. I discuss them and conclude in Section 5.7.
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5.2 Economic context
The Swiss wood market is composed of a multitude of small decentralized actors such
as forest owners, logging companies for the harvest, sawmills for the transformation and
end-users, which can be institutional actors, private ﬁrms or households and hence re-
spond to diﬀerent factors. Represented by the two-way arrow in Figure 5.2, our interest
market is comprised between forest owners and wood traders on the supply side and
sawmills on the demand side. The demand for roundwood is therefore indirectly driven
by the construction sector and marginally by the demand for other wood products.
With the exception of Brännlund (1989), scholars usually consider that markets are
competitive (Toppinen and Kuuluvainen, 2010), and so do we. However, one needs to
acknowledge that this is a strong simplifying assumption in Switzerland. In particular,
wood markets are not completely integrated, given the substantial transportation costs.
If they were, the Law of One Price (Richardson, 1978) should hold but some evidence
reject it at the world level (Hänninen, 1998), acknowledging the lack of global competi-
tion (Kallio, 2001; Olsson, 2009). Anecdotal evidence also suggest that the Swiss wood
market is far from the ideal perfect competition as prices are usually bargained over
the counter on a case-by-base basis.
From raw wood, a large panel of products can be produced. Diﬀerences in the wood
quality, assortment or essence increase the heterogeneity, which comes with heteroge-
neous prices (Kostadinov et al., 2014). In addition, there exists some complementarity
and substitutability in the supply of wood products. Indeed, from a particular har-
vested tree, both energy wood and timber can be produced and wood waste from sawn
wood can also be turned into valuable energy. Prices of energy wood may therefore
have an impact on the production of construction wood. This eﬀect may be positive, if
energy wood is a complement to construction wood on the production side, or negative
if producers substitute construction wood with energy wood. Indeed, the production
of construction wood comes with a higher marginal cost than energy wood75 and the
proﬁt may be higher with the production of energy wood rather than roundwood.
Another interesting speciﬁcity is the substantial externalities associated with the wood
supply. Indeed, the exploitation of wood impacts the diﬀerent forests functions such
as recreation, protection against landslides, water and air puriﬁcation and habitat for
75At the exit of the forest, costs of energy wood do not include the costs of processing the wood.
Also, transportation of energy wood is cheaper since it does not require as large trucks as construction
wood.
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Figure 5.2: Swiss wood markets in a nutshell (Adapted from Kostadinov et al. 2014)
biodiversity. On the one hand, a reasonable forest exploitation has positive eﬀects as
it secures forest zones and gives more room to particular fauna and ﬂora species. On
the other hand, a too intensive exploitation reduces forest's ability to provide its other
services. Given these external eﬀects and the important deﬁcit of forestry since the
90's, forest exploitation is usually subsidized or public owned in Switzerland.
Finally, wood is a storable good (Hendel and Nevo, 2004). Entrepreneurs may either
choose not to harvest at time t and let the tree standing until t + 1 or cut it at time
t and store the wood until t + 1 before the sales. Consumers may also choose to buy
at time t and store it until the next period. This may impact the short vs. long term
elasticities. However, since adaptation becomes easier with time, entrepreneurs and
consumers reactions to a change in price (or in any other factor) should be higher in
the long term than in the short term, and hence short term price-elasticities should be
lower than long term price-elasticities. This is the Le Chatelier principle, ﬁrst outlined
by Samuelson (1948), which has been conﬁrmed for US forestry markets (Daigneault
et al., 2016).
5.3 Literature review
Time series analysis of wood markets may help to understand the reaction of the demand
and supply to particular factors along time. Buongiorno (1979; 1996), Buongiorno et al.
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(1988), Brännlund et al. (1985) and Brännlund (1989) extensively studied wood markets
in developed countries in the 80's but time series analyses have become less common
in Europe in the last decade, as highlighted by Toppinen and Kuuluvainen (2010).
However, we observe a recent renewed interest in this type of approach, as shown by
the number of very recent articles on wood products markets (Parajuli and Chang,
2015; Parajuli et al., 2016; Kristöfel et al., 2016; Daigneault et al., 2016; Kinnucan,
2016; Jochem et al., 2016; Sun and Niquidet, 2017; Parajuli and Zhang, 2017, among
others). However, most of the studies are based on North American, Chinese (Wan
et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2015, 2017) and Scandinavian data (Mutanen and Toppinen,
2005) and the scarce papers about central Europe usually focus on energy wood only
(Kristöfel et al., 2016; Sun and Niquidet, 2017)76.
With time series on Great Britain, Iriarte-Goñi and Ayuda (2012) analyze the impact
of wood use on economic development. These authors ﬁrst calculate the apparent con-
sumption of wood as the quantity produced minus net exports on the period 1871-1936
and ﬁnd that the series are trend stationary. They then estimate price and income
elasticities with OLS on 3 diﬀerent periods: according to their results, income elasticity
was particularly high (εDI = 6.23) during the WW1 and lower (ε
D
I = 1.22) before and
after that period. Wood can still be considered as a luxury good during the whole pe-
riod. With respect to prices, these authors ﬁnd that the demand for wood was relatively
price-elastic during WW1 (εDP = −1.5) and relatively price-inelastic after (εDP = −0.49).
They also ﬁnd an interesting positive cross-relationship with iron, meaning that iron
was a substitute to wood in the building and shipbuilding sector.
As reviewed in Daigneault et al. (2016), the literature before the year 2000 ﬁnds
relatively low short run demand and supply price elasticities of softwood stumpage
(εDP = −0.001 to − 0.85; εSP = 0.06 to 0.63). We present a review of some price-
elasticities found in the post 2010 developed countries literature in Table 5.1. Both
supply and demand elasticities of wood products are found to be below 1, with the ex-
ception of wood pellets supply in Austria (Kristöfel et al., 2016). In general, we observe
that elasticities are slightly higher in Europe than in the US.
With the same methodology as ours, Daigneault et al. (2016) ﬁnd inelastic demand
and supply, thanks to their model with data on the softwood market between 1950 to
2001. Their results are in line with those of the recent literature. In a study on softwood
76See Jochem et al. (2016) and Zafeiriou et al. (2012) for analyses of roundwood markets in Germany
and Greece, respectively.
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lumber, Song et al. (2011) estimated a supply-demand system of equations with an Error
Correction Model, using US monthly time series data from 1990 to 2006. Their results
reveal relatively low demand and supply elasticities (εDP = −0.18; εSP = 0.23). Another
interesting result of the latter study is the negative trend on the demand side, meaning
that, ceteris paribus, technological progress reduces the demand for wood along time.
Parajuli and Chang (2015) also found low price-elasticities on the softwood sawtimber
stumpage market. Their result reveal that the market is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by natural
calamities and the 2008 housing crisis.
To the best of our knowledge, the only econometric analysis of wood markets over
time in Switzerland is Pauli et al. (2009). These authors regressed the supply on prices,
costs, natural disasters and a time trend and the demand on prices, GDP, import prices
and storage costs. Their results reveal low supply elasticities but very high demand
elasticities (-8.26), which do not seem realistic (Pauli et al., 2009, p.84). However,
their econometric analysis contains two major drawbacks: ﬁrst, the price endogeneity
is not correctly taken into account and supply and demand are estimated separately via
a simple OLS regression. Second, the stationary nature of the series is not discussed,
which casts doubts on the reliability of statistical inference from their results.
Table 5.1: Wood price-elasticities in developed countries in the post 2010 literature
Study Wood product Region Period εDSR ε
S
SR ε
D
LR ε
S
LR
Pauli et al. (2009) All assortments Switzerland 1995-2005 -8.36 0.73
Majumdar et al. (2010) Softwood lumber US 1959-2009 0.18 to 0.21
Song et al. (2011) Softwood lumber US 1990-2006 -0.14 0.16 -0.18 0.23
Zafeiriou et al. (2012) Roundwood Greece 1974-2008 0.97
Parajuli and Chang (2015) Softwood sawtimber stumpage Louisiana (US) 1955-2013 -0.38 -0.44 0.49
Daigneault et al. (2016) Softwood sawlog US 1950-2001 -0.08 to -0.18 0.15 to 0.26 -0.24 to -0.48
Daigneault et al. (2016) Softwood pulp US 1950-2001 -0.07 to -0.12 0.15 to 0.49 -0.13 to -0.44
Kristöfel et al. (2016) Wood pellets Austria 2000-2014 -0.66 to -0.76 1.03 to 1.18
Jochem et al. (2016) Construction wood Germany 1993-2013 -0.95
Parajuli and Zhang (2017) Hardwood sawtimber stumpage Louisiana (US) 1955-2014 -0.85 0.73
5.4 Data description
Our time series analysis covers the period 1949-2013 on a yearly basis. The dependent
variable (Qt) is the quantity of roundwood produced from forests in Switzerland in
millions of m3. Various data sources have been used and hence we had to make diﬀerent
assumption to make series consistent77. In particular, Qt corresponds to round lumber
and industrial wood for construction purposes and a marginal part of Qt is also used for
77Data sources, units and variables description are available in Table e.1, in the Appendix. All
assumptions and methods are listed in the Appendix.
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the production of furniture. We assume that the market clearing condition is fulﬁlled,
such that Qt is the same on the demand side as well as on the supply side.
We consider diﬀerent covariates, presented in Table 5.2, constrained by data availability:
Pt: The volume-weighted average real price of wood for construction purposes in 2011CHF/m3.78
Given the lack of consistent data, aggregation and weighted averages had to be
used. In general, those prices correspond to wood sold at the closest railway sta-
tion or at the exit of the forest, Free On Board. This variable enters both supply
and demand decisions. We expect it to take a negative sign on the demand side
and a positive sign in the supply side, in line with classical economic theory.
Psubst: The average real import price of steel, iron and other metallic materials in
2011CHF/kg. We use this variable as an indicator for the price of a substitute
in the building industry. If steel is indeed a substitute to wood, we expect the
coeﬃcient associated with this variable to be positive.
Pxt: An index of volume-weighted average production real prices of raw wood from all
assortments and essence from publicly-owned forests in Germany (DESTATIS,
2017) (100=2011). This exogenous index is likely to proxy the price of foreign
wood in Switzerland, since Germany is the biggest exporter of wood in Switzerland
(about 45% of the value of all imported wood products come from Germany in
2013, followed by Italy with 11% (FOEN,2013)). This variable accounts for the
exchange rates diﬀerentials by multiplying the raw data by an index of exchange
rates between Germany and Switzerland (Swiss National Bank, 2017).
Investmentt: The real amount invested in construction in Switzerland in billion of
2011CHF. We use it as an indicator of the economic health in the building sector
and of general business cycles. It enters the demand side and is expected to come
with a positive coeﬃcient.
Wage in forestryt: The real wage paid to the logging crew in Switzerland in 2011CHF/hour
(Niederer and Bill, 2015). We use this variable as an indicator of the cost of labor,
the main input in the logging industry. We expect that this variable will have a
positive impact on the marginal cost and thus a negative impact on the supplied
quantity.
78Prices were deﬂated thanks to the consumer price index (Source: FSO).
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it: The real average interest rate on savings in %. This variable is used to account for
the cost of capital. As in the case of the wage, we expect that this variable will
have a positive impact on the marginal cost and thus a negative impact on the
supplied quantity.79
Penergyt: The volume-weighted average real price of energy wood in 2011CHF/m3.80
Again, given the lack of consistent data, aggregation and weighted averages had
to be used. In general, those prices correspond to wood sold at the closest railway
station or at the exit of the forest, Free On Board. We use this variable to test
whether energy wood is a production substitute or complement to construction
wood. We formulate no a priori assumption on the sign of this variable coeﬃcient.
Indeed, as wood can either be transformed into construction or energy wood,
there are some substitution possibilities on the production side. However, the
production of construction wood also causes wooden waste, which can only be
used as energy provider. Therefore, energy wood and construction wood can be
complementary as well as substitutes in production.
Stormt: The volume of fallen wood due to major natural calamities in million of
m3(Usbeck, 2015). Two major events need to be noted: Vivian, a major storm
that happened in 1990, and Lothar, which happened in December 1999 but whose
eﬀects were observable in 2000. These storms destroyed large parcels of forests.
It is estimated that 10 million trees (13 million m3 (FOEN, 2014c)) fell because
of Lothar. In 2000, the Swiss government decided to subsidize the forest industry
in order to extract fallen trees from forests, which certainly had an impact on the
supplied quantity.
Tt: A time trend that takes into account technological or preferences changes.
We do not include any indicator of household income because the demand is only
indirectly driven by households. Investment in construction is probably a better driver
of the demand for timber and mostly arises from ﬁrms or the public sector. The latter
variable is also correlated with Gross Domestic Product (corr.=0.88).
Figure 5.3 shows both endogenous series, namely the quantity of roundwood (Qt) and
its associated price (Pt). The quantity produced has been increasing on average since
79It is worth noting that the user cost of capital would be a better measure for this variable, since it
also includes the depreciation rate. However, to the best of my knowledge, this variable is not available
for Switzerland so far in time.
80Prices were again deﬂated thanks to the consumer price index (Source: FSO).
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Qt 3.25 0.92 1.74 7.61
Pt 254.46 143.81 71.17 498.74
Psubst 1.69 0.58 0.87 3.13
Pxt 75.22 16.84 31.52 111.40
Investmentt 39.54 14.68 7.69 61.88
Wage in forestryt 15.14 10.57 1.96 32.53
it 6.47 4.25 0.20 11.97
Penergyt 102.98 36.96 57.56 186.87
Stormt 0.38 1.86 0 13.98
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Figure 5.3: Timber wood production and price
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Figure 5.4: Annual time series
the beginning of the period but starts declining after 2008. We observe 2 main peaks:
Vivian in 1990 and Lothar in 2000. These storms and the subsidies that followed
Lothar increased the production of wood by roughly 44% for Vivian and 103% for
Lothar (FOEN, 2014c). From 1949 to 2013, the production of construction wood has
increased by 44%.
The real price of timber remained high until the mid 60's and started declining after
that. This price in 2013 is 70% lower than in 1949 but has stabilized after 2000.
Figure 5.4 shows the evolution of our independent variables (not-log-transformed) for
our period of interest. The real price of steel decreased since the beginning of the period
until the 2000's. We then observe a slight rebound. The price of wood in Germany has
been increasing over the whole period but there are some periods of slower growth from
1955 to 1965, 1980 to 2000 and 2005 to 2013. The economic crisis of the mid-70's caused
by the oil shock caused a decrease of investment in construction, similarly to the burst
of the Swiss housing bubble in the beginning of the 90's. This is visible in the third
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graph. According to the fourth graph, wages in forestry increase on the entire period.
The price of energy wood has decreased until 2000. It started increasing slowly since
then, as shown in the sixth graph. On the last graph, three peaks of fallen wood are
clearly observable and correspond to the three strongest storms in 1967, 1990 (Vivian)
and 2000 (Lothar).
5.5 Econometric approach
Analyzing the whole market, it is important to deal with the issue of endogeneity.
Indeed, at the equilibrium, prices and quantities are simultaneously determined by the
market according to both demand and supply. Therefore, a system of simultaneous
equations, accommodating both sides of the market, is necessary to instrumentalize
the endogenous variables. This model can then be estimated using a Two Stage Least
Squares (2SLS) or 3SLS approach. Contrary to 2SLS, 3SLS assumes that error terms
of the equations system are correlated. 3SLS is usually more eﬃcient for this kind of
model and thus preferred in our case (AlDakhil, 1998). However, the main drawback
of 3SLS is its sensitivity to misspeciﬁcation (Hausman, 1978).
The use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in a time series context is usually not recom-
mended if series are not stationary. Indeed the non-stationary nature of series leads to
the problem of spurious regressions and thus to unreliable statistical inference (Granger
and Newbold, 1974). We thus observe two diﬀerent types of model in the literature:
variants of the Error Correction Model (ECM) developed by Engle and Granger (1987a)
or the Lagged Adjustment Model (LAM) also called distributed lag model (Koyck, 1954;
Jorgenson, 1966; Houthakker and Taylor, 1970) with simultaneous equations81. Hsiao
(1997a; 1997b) have indeed demonstrated that the 2SLS and 3SLS estimators are consis-
tent with cointegrated time series82 and that one may not worry about non-stationnarity
in a dynamic simultaneous equation context, as far as the estimation residuals are sta-
tionary (Hsiao and Fujiki, 1998)83. In this case, short run and long run variable impacts
81Studies using the ECM include Song et al. (2011); Parajuli and Chang (2015); Parajuli et al.
(2016); Parajuli and Zhang (2017) and LAM Polyakov et al. (2005); Mutanen and Toppinen (2005);
Daigneault et al. (2016)
82The current and lagged variables being trivially cointegrated (Hsiao, 1997b)
83Although stationarity tests are not relevant in a dynamic simultaneous equation context (Hsiao,
1997a), we tested all series with Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), Philips-Perron
(Phillips and Perron, 1988) and KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) tests and found that all series are
non-stationary on levels but stationary on ﬁrst diﬀerences. Results of these tests are available in Table
e.2, in the Appendix.
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can be inferred straightforwardly from the estimations and their linear transformation
(see Hsiao and Fujiki, 1998, p. 69). Parajuli et al. (2016), studying the sawtimber mar-
ket in Louisiana, have also shown that both methods lead to similar results in terms
of elasticities. In this Chapter, we thus follow Polyakov et al. (2005), Mutanen and
Toppinen (2005) and Daigneault et al. (2016) and estimate a LAM on a simultaneous
dynamic demand-supply equations system using 3SLS.
We tested up to 4 lags of the dependent (DV) and independent variables (IDV) on both
supply and demand sides of the model and compute the Bayes information criteria (BIC)
for each estimated model. The BIC selects the model with no lagged IDV but a single
lagged DV. Hence the best model contains a single lagged DV (Qt−1). This speciﬁcation
corresponds to the standard geometric lag function (Koyck, 1954), which assumes that
the eﬀects of lagged IDV decrease with a geometric pattern. The short run eﬀect of
a given variable thus correspond to its immediate eﬀect at time t, while the long-run
eﬀect is the addition of the IDV lags on the whole period.
The inclusion of a lagged variable on the demand side increases the BIC, which indicates
a worse model than without this lag. In addition, the coeﬃcient associated with this
variable is not signiﬁcant. We therefore choose to add the lagged DV on the supply
side only. This speciﬁcation allows to understand the supply adjustment speed, while
assuming that long term and short term elasticities are equal on the demand side (i.e.
the demand adjusts immediately).84
5.5.1 Structural breaks
Since our time series cover a long period of time, a number of structural breaks (SB)
are expected (Toppinen and Kuuluvainen, 2010). We thus cautiously study structural
breaks using a supremum Wald test85 on the univariate regression Qt = α + βPt + t
and using Gregory and Hansen (1996) approach (ghansen)86.87
84Testing the residuals of the chosen model with a cumulative periodogram white-noise test
(Bartlett, 1955), we do not reject that residuals are white noises, revealing no serious problem of
autocorrelation. (Prob > B = 0.06 for the demand and Prob > B = 0.33 for the supply, with B the
Barltett's statistic. Adding up to 4 lagged DV on the demand side does not increase the probability
Prob > B).
85This command is provided by the estat sbsingle command on Stata14
86Stata14 command: ghansen
87A serie of tests for structural breaks exist in the literature, such as the cumulative sum of recursive
residuals. Extending further this Chapter could require to use diﬀerent tests for structural breaks and
compare the results.
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The supremumWald test identiﬁes a break in 1962. Except for the statistical reason, the
year 1962 is marked by the adoption in the Swiss Constitution of the article on nature
and landscape protection, which may have had an impact on the forest harvesting
policy.
The ghansen approach identiﬁes other breaks88: level breaks in 1991 and 2001 that
correspond to the storms Vivian and Lothar respectively and regime breaks in 1994.
The fact that the storms produce structural breaks is not a surprise. However, our
results tend to contradict the ﬁndings of Kinnucan (2016) that natural disasters cause
a regime break (i.e. a rotation in the curves), since, in our case, the tests indicate a shift
in levels only. Interestingly, the 1994 regime break follows the adoption of the Swiss
forest law, which restricted the wood harvest, by, among other measures, forbidding
clear cuts.
While level breaks are relatively easy to handle with a dummy, regime breaks are
more diﬃcult in a simultaneous equation context. As the price variable is endogenous,
each regime break of price must come with its instruments. The lack of appropriate
additional variable in our data set and the low number of degrees of freedom thus
constrain the possibilities to account for regime breaks. Also, post-estimation tests for
the instruments' strength are not available with more than one endogenous variable.
We thus choose to only allow for a single regime break on the eﬀect of price. For that
purpose, we split the price variable in two, with the cut-oﬀ point in 1994, as suggested
by the ghansen test. To take the level breaks into account, we add the dummy variables
D1962t andD2000t, which take the value 1 for all years after 1962 and 2000 respectively.
We do not account for the 1991 level break, since it came with non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
in every model.
We add a time trend on the demand side, which accounts for preferences changes or
technical progress in the construction sector. We do not include such a variable on the
supply side, since the coeﬃcients came unsigniﬁcant in all tested models and to avoid
issues related with overidentiﬁcation.
We therefore end up with the following models without structural breaks (equation 5.1)
and with structural breaks (equation 5.2):
88It is worth mentioning that all tests of cointegration provided by the ghansen test reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration.
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QDt = αD + βD1 Pt + βD2 Psubst + βD3 Pxt + βD4 Investmentt + βD5 Tt + zDtQSt = αS + βS1 Pt + βS2 Wage in forestryt + βS3 it + βS4 Penergyt + βS5 Stormt + βS6 QSt−1 + zSt
(5.1)
and

QDt = α
DSB + βDSB1 P1949− 1994t + βDSB2 P1994− 2013t + βDSB3 Psubst + βDSB4 Pxt
+βDSB5 Investmentt + β
DSB
6 Tt + z
DSB
t
QSt = α
SSB + βSSB1 P1949− 1994t + βSSB2 P1994− 2013t + βSSB3 Wage in forestryt + βSSB4 it
+βSSB5 Penergyt + β
SSB
6 Stormt + β
SSB
7 D1962t + β
SSB
8 D2000t + β
SSB
9 Q
S
t−1 + z
SSB
t
(5.2)
With the exception of it, Stormt, the trend and the dummies89, we transform all vari-
ables in the natural logarithm form.
5.6 Results
We present the estimation results of equations 5.1 and 5.2, hence respectively without
and with structural breaks in column (1) and (2) of Table 5.3. All coeﬃcients except
Stormt and it can be directly interpreted as short run (SR) elasticities.
Coeﬃcients in Table 5.3 all have the appropriate signs on the demand side estimation.
In particular, we observe that the SR price-elasticity of demand is negative. The magni-
tude of this eﬀect is 1.9 in absolute value and indicates that the demand for construction
wood is rather highly price-elastic. The addition of regime breaks does not result in
any statistically signiﬁcant change in slope, as shown by model (2). A 1% increase in
price should therefore lead to 1.8 to 1.9% decrease in demanded quantity in the short
run.
As expected, the cross-elasticity between construction wood and steel is positive. Steel
is thus a substitute to wood in the construction sector. Indeed, if the price of steel
increases, the latter becomes less attractive, which causes an increased demand for
construction wood of 0.9% for a 1% increase in steel prices. The German price of
wood is positively correlated with the demanded quantity. Indeed, if foreign prices
increase by 1%, the Swiss wood becomes relatively more attractive and the demanded
89As Stormt contains many 0, a log-transformation would cause an important loss of observations.
Also a logarithmic transformation is not suitable for percentage variables such as it.
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Table 5.3: Results of the lagged adjustment model estimation
(1) (2)
SR relationships SR relationships
No breaks With breaks
D
em
an
d
Pt -1.89***
(0.44)
Pt(1949− 1994) -1.85***
(0.42)
Pt(1994− 2013) -1.83***
(0.41)
Psubst 0.85*** 0.86***
(0.28) (0.27)
Pxt 0.40* 0.40*
(0.22) (0.23)
Investmentt 1.00*** 1.04***
(0.20) (0.22)
Tt -0.064*** -0.065***
(0.017) (0.017)
Constant 131.90*** 133.50***
(33.99) (35.18)
Su
pp
ly
Pt 0.28***
(0.067)
Pt(1949− 1994) 0.41***
(0.11)
Pt(1994− 2013) 0.40***
(0.12)
Wage in forestryt 0.11** 0.18**
(0.050) (0.082)
it -0.022** -0.019
(0.0095) (0.011)
Penergyt -0.39*** -0.56***
(0.13) (0.18)
Stormt 0.058*** 0.057***
(0.0061) (0.0067)
D1962t -0.13*
(0.068)
D2000t 0.093*
(0.055)
Qt−1 0.26*** 0.23***
(0.081) (0.091)
Constant 1.03* 1.05
(0.63) (0.13)
Demand Residuals ADFa -4.81** -4.96**
Supply Residuals ADFa -6.38*** -5.70***
Observations 64 64
BIC -99.4 84.8
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
a Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for residuals stationarity (Engle and Yoo, 1987)
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quantity increases by 0.4%. Investment in construction also has a positive impact on
the demand, which is an expected result. For the latter variable, a 1% increase in
investments comes with a 1% increase in wood consumption. Finally, similarly to Song
et al. (2011), we observe a negative trend. That may mean that, thanks to technological
changes, construction became more eﬃcient in using wood or that preferences changes
have diminished the attractivity of wood with time.
On the supply side, we observe a positive but relatively small SR price-elasticity between
0.3 and 0.4, which indicates a price-inelastic supply. Again, structural breaks do not
result in any signiﬁcant changes in slope, which tends to show that the adoption of the
Swiss law on forest did not signiﬁcantly impact the supply responsiveness to prices. The
price of energy wood negatively aﬀects the supply of construction wood. This result
means that suppliers may have some room to substitute the production of construction
wood with energy wood if it becomes more proﬁtable. An increase of 1% in the price
of energy wood leads to a 0.4 to 0.6% decrease in construction wood production. We
also observe a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the fallen wood caused by storms that increased
the wood supply. A million m3 of fallen wood comes with an increase of 0.06% in
the construction wood supply90. The eﬀect of the labor cost (Wage in forestry) is
surprisingly positive91. This may indicate a problem of reverse causality, since wages
in the logging industry may be driven by the logging crew productivity rather than
exogenously given. The cost of capital has the expected negative impact. An increase
of 1 percentage point in the interest rates, leads to a decrease of 0.02% of the supplied
quantity.
The level break in 1962 has an interesting impact. Indeed, years following the adoption
of the constitutional law on landscape and nature conservation have a lower intercept,
suggesting that this policy has had a negative impact on the output. Daigneault et al.
(2016) also found a signiﬁcant impact of the inclusion of the Northern spotted owl in
the Endangered Species list in the US in 1989, which completely stopped the production
in some forests.
90This eﬀect is surprisingly low, given the large impacts of Lothar and Vivian on the production.
Indeed, a rough look at the data indicates between 1990 and 2000, the production increased by 3.9
millions m3, while the fallen wood reached 14 millions m3. The expected impact of one m3 of fallen
wood would therefore be around 0.28 for the year 2000 and we observe approximately the same expected
impact in 1990 and 1967. However, this coeﬃcients indicates an average eﬀect on the whole period
and some relatively small storms may have had no eﬀects on the wood supply. Also, it is possible that
part of the eﬀects may be integrated in the D2000t variable.
91The inclusion of a lag gives similar results.
111
CHAPTER 5. THE SWISS CONSTRUCTION WOOD MARKET
Contrarily, years following 2000 and the storm Lothar have a higher intercept, probably
because of the higher subsidies that were allocated after the storm Lothar and the
relative ease to extract fallen wood from forests.
In general, given the values of the Bayes Information Criteria (BIC), our preferred
model is model (1), without structural breaks.
After estimating the short run relationships, we predict the residuals and test them for
stationarity with an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF). For both models, residuals
are found to be stationary, which conﬁrms the cointegration relationship of the series92.
It is worth noting that ﬁrst stage OLS regressions from the 3SLS come with a much
higher F-statistic than the usual rule of thumbs of 10 for strong instruments (Staiger
and Stock, 1997). Also, the Cragg-Donald F-statistic provided by the ivreg2 command
on Stata14, equation by equation, and presented in Table e.3 in the Appendix show
that the maximal IV relative bias is 5% on the demand side. Moreover, the Anderson
canonical correlation statistics presented in the same Table reject the hypothesis that
equations are underidentiﬁed. However, results from the Sargan statistic for overiden-
tifying restrictions show that our models may be overidentiﬁed. However, excluding
exogenous variables does not aﬀect the Sargan statistic for the demand side.
We observe a signiﬁcant impact of the lagged quantity variable, which suggests that
the supply side adapts over time. Its magnitude is relatively low, indicating relatively
quick adjustment. Long run (LR) elasticities must therefore be computed by taking
into account this adjustment. This is done by dividing the coeﬃcients by 1 minus the
coeﬃcient of the lag variable (see Daigneault et al., 2016). Long run elasticities are
presented in Table 5.4. It is worth reminding that, since we did not include the lagged
DV in the demand equation, SR elasticities are equal to LR elasticities on the demand
side.
Supply long run elasticities are larger than short run elasticities, which conﬁrms Le
Chatelier principle that agents have more time to adapt in the long run. However, sup-
ply elasticities remain low on the long run as well.The supply price-elasticities resulting
from our estimations are in the same order of magnitude as those from recent studies
presented in Table 5.1. In contrast, we ﬁnd higher price-elasticities on the demand side.
This result suggests that the Swiss construction wood may have several substitution
possibilities on the demand side, either with other material or by importing foreign
wood.
92Plots of the residuals are available in Figure e.1 in the Appendix.
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Table 5.4: Long run elasticities
(1) (2)
LR relationships LR relationships
No breaks With breaks
D
em
an
d
Pt -1.89***
(0.44)
Pt(1949− 1994) -1.85***
(0.42)
Pt(1994− 2013) -1.83***
(0.41)
Psubst 0.85*** 0.86***
(0.28) (0.27)
Pxt 0.40* 0.40*
(0.22) (0.23)
Investmentt 1.00*** 1.04***
(0.20) (0.22)
Tt -0.064*** -0.065***
(0.017) (0.017)
Su
pp
ly
Pt 0.37***
(0.097)
Pt(1949− 1994) 0.53***
(0.16)
Pt(1994− 2013) 0.53***
(0.18)
Wage in forestryt 0.14** 0.23**
(0.064) (0.11)
it -0.029** -0.024*
(0.013) (0.015)
Penergyt -0.53*** -0.73***
(0.17) (0.21)
Stormt 0.078*** 0.074***
(0.012) (0.014)
D1962t -0.16*
(0.092)
D2000t 0.12*
(0.069)
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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5.6.1 Forecasting
Although forecasting is subject to the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1972) that agents antic-
ipate changes rationally, it is possible to predict the dependent variable for out of the
sample years and compare it to real values. To do so, we estimate our model93 again
but alternatively drop the ﬁrst (1950 and 1951) and the last 2 years (2012 and 2013).
We then predict years 1950, 1951 with equations 5.3 and 2012 and 2013 with equations
5.4:

QDt = 122.26
(38.99)
− 1.76
(0.50)
Pt + 0.78
(0.29)
Psubst + 0.38
(0.22)
Pxt + 0.94
(0.22)
Investmentt − 0.059
(0.019)
Tt
QSt = 0.73
(0.63)
+ 0.24
(0.068)
Pt + 0.15
(0.052)
Wage in forestryt − 0.018
(0.0094)
it − 0.29
(0.13)
Penergyt
+ 0.057
(0.0059)
Stormt + 0.22
(0.081)
QSt−1
(5.3)

QDt = 133.16
(33.73)
− 1.89
(0.44)
Pt + 0.78
(0.89)
Psubst + 0.39
(0.22)
Pxt + 0.92
(0.19)
Investmentt − 0.064
(0.016)
Tt
QSt = 1.05
(0.63)
+ 0.26
(0.071)
Pt + 0.11
(0.050)
Wage in forestryt − 0.020
(0.0095)
it − 0.39
(0.13)
Penergyt
+ 0.057
(0.0060)
Stormt + 0.27
(0.082)
QSt−1
(5.4)
Comparisons of the forecasts and the real values for the years 1950, 1951, 2012 and
2013 are presented in Table 5.5. For the years under scrutiny, our model tends to
better predict years that are after our sample than before our sample. For years 1950
and 1951, the mean absolute prediction error is 28%, while it is only 11% for years
2012 and 2013. Generally, our model tends to overestimate the equilibrium quantity
for these years.
Table 5.5: Results of the simulations and real values
Equation Prediction Real value ∆ ∆
(mio of m3) (mio of m3) (mio of m3) (%)
1950
Demand Qcons 2.40 1.74 +0.66 +38%
Supply Qcons 1.86 1.74 +0.12 +7%
1951
Demand Qcons 3.22 2.08 +1.14 +55%
Supply Qcons 1.86 2.08 -0.22 -11%
2012
Demand Qcons 3.39 2.97 +0.42 +14%
Supply Qcons 3.46 2.97 +0.49 +16%
2013
Demand Qcons 3.01 2.97 +0.04 +1%
Supply Qcons 3.37 2.97 +0.40 +13%
93 We choose the model without structural breaks, given the values of the BIC
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5.7 Discussion and conclusion
The commitment of the Swiss government to encourage the production of Swiss wood
and its use in buildings is a step towards a more carbon neutral economy. Achieving
this goal requires to mobilize more wood from Swiss forests, what the forest industry is
currently unwilling to do given the lack of ﬁnancial incentives. Encouragements through
subsidies would be useful only if suppliers and consumers react to price changes. We
analyze the eﬀect of the price on construction wood supply and demand thanks to a rich
annual time series data set on the period 1949-2013. The use of the Lagged Adjustment
Model allows to derive long run and short run elasticities, while correcting for price
endogeneity thanks to a simultaneous supply-demand equations system estimated with
the 3 Stage Least Squares approach.
This Chapter and its results, however, have a number of limitations. First, the low
number of observations and the diﬃculty to ﬁnd reliable historical data reduces the
ability to complexify the model. For this reason, we do not consider imperfect com-
petition. The international competition is also imperfectly accounted for and domestic
wood and imported wood are thus considered as very imperfect substitutes94. Finally,
given the lack of consistent data, the storage capacity on the supply, as well as on the
demand side, could not be included in the model. In the same spirit, Solow residuals
could have been used to account for technological changes (Solow, 1957). This would,
however, imply an important data collection regarding the construction sector and is
beyond the scope of this Chapter.
Our results are generally in line with the international literature but show that the de-
mand is quite sensitive to prices changes both in the long run and in the short run. This
is not very surprising, given the numerous substitutes to Swiss wood in construction.
On the other hand, the supply is rather price-inelastic and its responsiveness is lower
in the short run than in the long run. This could be explained by steeply increasing
marginal costs or by the public ownership of forest zones, since public owners may not
only be proﬁt driven.
The structural breaks in our series correspond to changes in the legal context. Although
indispensable, the tight regulation might thus break the Swiss wood provision, leading to
forests' ageing. Since old forests are less able to serve as carbon sinks, adapting the Swiss
forest management to face the climate change challenges might be necessary. The wood
94This assumption is consistent with the ﬁndings of Borzykowski and Kacprzak (2017), which reveals
that 55% of the Swiss population prefers Swiss wood rather than imported wood.
115
CHAPTER 5. THE SWISS CONSTRUCTION WOOD MARKET
production should thus be ﬁnancially fostered to fully integrate the positive externalities
brought by rejuvanation of forests on CO2 sequestration. Given the positive supply
responsiveness to prices, a subsidy might indeed help to meet the goals of the Forest
Policy 2020 and increase the production of Swiss wood to the desired level. In addition,
ﬁnancial incentives may increase the use of Swiss wood in construction and thus reduce
the CO2 emissions of the construction sector.
Finally, given the carbon neutrality of energy wood, the wood policy (FOEN, 2008) en-
courages the use of wood for energy purposes as well. The latter policy may however be
counterproductive to increase the production of construction wood. Indeed, our results
show that construction wood and energy wood can be substitutes on the supply side.
If the demand and thus the price of energy wood increases, suppliers may switch from
construction wood to energy wood, the marginal cost of the latter being lower. This
would reduce the available Swiss wood quantity and thus increase the CO2 emissions
of the construction sector.
The data collection and results from this Chapter open room for new research questions.
First, analyses of structural breaks' welfare eﬀects could provide interesting information
on the total economic surpluses created by the Swiss wood markets. Second, since data
on energy wood had also been collected, one could analyze the energy wood market
with the same kind of method. Finally, a link between the energy wood market and
the roundwood market could be studied. The spatial dimension could also be studied
with a panel data approach, since cantonal data on wood production are available since
200495. This would allow to conﬁrm our results with less concerns about the time series
nature of the data.
95This would lead to a dataset of 26 cantons during 9 years and thus 234 observations. However,
independent variables are only available at the national scale.
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Conclusion
The Swiss forests provide highly valuable services to the population. While they have
generally grown, both in surface and standing wood volume, some forest zones are under
pressure because of climate change or demographic development. Swiss forests' ageing
also diminishes their ability to provide some services such as carbon sequestration. On
the other side, the forest industry stands in a ﬁnancially diﬃcult situation and needs
the support of public administrations to cover their deﬁcits. Indeed, wood harvesting
is generally not a proﬁtable activity in Switzerland because of the important harvest
restrictions arising from the multifunctional management practices, among other rea-
sons. However, because of its CO2 neutral aspect, wood is expected to take a growing
importance in energy provision. In addition, the demand for wood from the construc-
tion sector may increase in the future, since wood products can oﬀset some CO2 and
thanks to less restrictive ﬁre norms. Furthermore, the potential for a (reasonable) in-
crease in forest harvest in Switzerland is acknowledged by all parties: thanks to strict
regulations, more harvesting would create some positive externalities on other forest
ecosystem services, in particular biodiversity and carbon sequestration. Along with
the creation of unexploited forest reserves, the increased forest rejuvenation could also
diversify the types of Swiss forests and thus improve their resilience to climate change
and their resistance to wildﬁres.
This thesis shows that Swiss people, in particular city-dwellers, are willing to pay a
substantial amount for the conservation of their forests (Chapter 2). This amount is
largely higher than the actual costs of creating new forest reserves and restricting access
to some forests is also relatively well accepted. Since forest recreational activities are
found to be travel costs inelastic (Chapter 3), these restrictions should only slightly
decrease the forests recreational beneﬁts, in particular if access-restricted reserves are
created in less densely populated regions. With respect to forest carbon sequestration
(Chapter 4), international forest carbon oﬀsets are not particularly frowned upon but
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making salient the price diﬀerential with domestic forest carbon oﬀset increases their
acceptability.
Since the forest industry does respond to ﬁnancial incentives (Chapter 5) and creates
indispensable positive externalities on other FES, a better integration of these external
beneﬁts may proﬁt both environmental and economic sustainability of Swiss forests. To
improve the Swiss forest policy, I thus suggest deepening the existing federal convention-
programs and designing a new framework, which, in parallel to the creation of forest
reserves, should include some Payments for Ecosystem Services, directly linked with
the wood harvest. This could take the form of a pigouvian subsidy per m3 of wood
produced and would integrate the positive externalities and thus push the equilibrium
wood quantity closer to its socially optimal level (Pigou, 1920). The amount of the
ﬁnancial incentives could vary depending on the region. Indeed, external beneﬁts of the
wood exploitation are probably lower in the Swiss Central Plain than in mountainous
areas. Demographic development puts the Central Plain's forests under pressure and
the higher accessibility already imply lower marginal costs. Therefore, the subsidy
should be close to zero in this region and the priority should go to the creation of new
forests reserves instead. The incentive should also give priority to construction wood
rather than energy wood. From an environmental point of view, the use of wood as
energy provider makes sense at the end of its life cycle only. The subsidies should
therefore rather foster the cascade use of wood (Steubing et al., 2015). Since beneﬁts
of cantonal forests spill over other Cantons (Chapter 1), they should preferably be
entirely ﬁnanced by the Confederation rather than by Cantons.
However, there are political resistances to subsidies in general and for the wood pro-
duction in particular. A debate on how to promote the production of Swiss wood has
already been held at the Swiss Parliament during the revision of the Law on Forest in
201596 and subsidies have been rejected.
Despite these resistances, this thesis shows that both economic and environmental sus-
tainability are two tied birds and killing one at the expense of the other is senseless.
Two birds, one stone: a direct subsidy to the wood production could give the right
incentives to forest owners and improve the economic and environmental sustainability
of Swiss forests
96See https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AﬀairId=20140046
Accessed: 12.01.2018
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Limitations
These recommendations should be considered with caution, since results from this the-
sis suﬀer from several limits. First, the national scale of this study does not take into
account the regional heterogeneity. There might be diﬀerences linked with the topog-
raphy and hence the costs of harvesting, the population density, the proximity to the
borders and hence the international competition. Central plain forests indeed do not
face the same issues as Alpine forests and so do the forests owners.
The low level of production might also be due to structural ineﬃciencies, leading to high
marginal costs. Mack (2015) indeed ﬁnds an important degree of technical ineﬃciency
in the production of wood and Mack and Schoenenberger (2008) suggest that subsidies
even decrease the eﬃciency. However, the subsidies under scrutiny in this study are
not linked to the quantity produced but rather to the (stated) costs of other direct
services provided by the forest industry, while the eﬃciency is measured in terms of
the quantity produced. A direct subsidy by m3 of wood is more likely to give the
right incentives than existing subsidies. However, structural ineﬃciencies should also
be tackled, in particular by better exploiting potential scale economies and reducing
potential monopsonistic power within the wood processing sector.
The development of new wooden products, by stimulating the demand for wood, might
also help foster the production (Rey and Thalmann, 2017). Prices could rise and hence
increase the incentives to produce more.
Potential for future research
This thesis and the rich data sets created leave room for future research. The survey
used in Chapter 2 and 3 elicited both travel cost estimates and contingent valuation
estimates for the same individuals. While the former correspond to use values and the
latter to non-use values, there certainly exists a link between them, which deserves to
be analyzed, as shown by the recent work of Jeon and Herriges (2017).
The time series collected and used in Chapter 5 also deserve more attention: welfare
eﬀects could provide interesting information on the total economic surpluses created
by the Swiss wood markets and the energy wood markets could also be studied. In
addition, a link between the energy wood market and the roundwood market could be
analyzed.
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Finally, an extensive analysis of the relationships between forest ecosystem services and
their values would be of great interest. A better understanding of these conﬂicts and
synergies would indeed improve the credibility of the total economic value framework
and the comprehensibility of ecosystem services assessment.
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A Chapter 1
Descriptive statistics
Table a.1: Summary statistics of covariates for Swiss (CH) and Geneva (GE) sub-
samples
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
CH
Age 39.070 14.448 18 81 228
Green member 0.158 0.365 0 1 228
Members in household 2.996 1.349 1 6 227
Urban 0.732 0.444 0 1 228
V isit frequency 2.412 1.492 0 4 228
Distance 6.722 17.201 0 150 228
Forest concerned 1.232 1.166 0 3 228
Swiss wood 0.118 0.324 0 1 228
(Income)a 76'108 40'599 17'500 180'000 88
GE
Age 42.089 13.231 19 81 191
Green member 0.164 0.371 0 1 189
Members in household 2.555 1.208 1 6 191
Urban 0.801 0.400 0 1 191
V isit frequency 2.251 1.629 0 4 191
Distance 7.191 14.028 0 110 191
Forest concernced 1.419 1.193 0 3 191
Swiss wood 0.0524 0.223 0 1 191
(Income)a 76'250 34'326 17'500 140'000 74
a We provide the descriptive statistics of the income variable but do not include it in the ﬁnal model.
Age represents the age of the respondent. We included this variable because it is
statistically diﬀerent across sub-samples. Also, as this variable is usually correlated
with income, it may aﬀect WTP. Green member is a binary variable taking the value
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1 if the individual is member of or donates to an environment friendly association.
The proportion of members is similar in both sub-sample. We expect this variable to
be positively correlated with WTP. Members in household is the number of persons
that composes the household. Households in the CH sub-sample are composed of a
signiﬁcantly higher number of individuals, which is why we included this variable in
the model. Urban is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the individual lives in an
urban area within the Canton of Geneva; V isit frequency is a categorical variable
representing the annual frequency of visits in a forest; Distance is the distance in
kilometers from respondent's home to the most visited forest; Forest concerned is
an index representing the perception of the state of Swiss forests97. We added these
variables because of their potential eﬀect on WTP for our program. Finally, Swiss wood
is a dummy indicating whether the respondent favors more expensive Swiss wood rather
than cheaper imported wood. This variable is signiﬁcantly higher in the Swiss forest
sub-sample. Income corresponds to the middle point of the income class proposed.
Estimations
Ceteris paribus, respondents accept more often the bid if they are older, member of
environment friendly associations and concerned about the state of Swiss forests. The
number of household's member is negatively correlated with the bid acceptance for
the Swiss program and positively for the Geneva program. Since larger households
usually recreate more often in forests and do it in the closest forest, they may put a
higher value on the closer Geneva forests and consider their income constraints when
asked for Swiss forests. This point is also reﬂected in the coeﬃcients associated with
the V isit frequency variable. Indeed a frequent forest visitor is more likely to accept
the bid for the Geneva program but less likely for the Swiss program, which tend to
highlight that the higher the usage, the higher the value attributed to Geneva protected
forests. Preferences for Swiss wood rather than imported wood is positively correlated
with the bid acceptance for the Swiss program: an unsurprising result since domestic
wood is considered as environmentally more friendly than imported wood (only 30% of
respondents think that the exploitation of wood may threaten biodiversity).
97This index is created from answers to the following questions: According to you, in the last 20
years, the general health of Swiss forests has: a) improved, b) stayed the same, c) degraded, According
to you, in the last 20 years, the surface of forests in Switzerland has: a) increased, b) stayed the same,
c) decreased, According to you, in the last 20 years, biodiversity in Swiss forests has: a) improved, b)
stayed the same, c) degraded. This index ranges from 0 to 3, the higher the index, the more concerned
the respondent is about the state of Swiss forests.
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Table a.3: Results from the spike model
CH GE CH GE
ln(Bid) -0.743*** -1.124*** -0.875*** -1.850***
(0.120) (0.223) (0.145) (0.358)
Age 0.00812 0.0348*
(0.0119) (0.0179)
Green member 0.172 -1.220***
(0.385) (0.468)
Members in household -0.167 -0.00859
(0.112) (0.166)
Urban -0.657** 0.0647
(0.306) (0.519)
Distance 0.0441 -0.0140
(0.0340) (0.0186)
V isit frequency -0.219* 0.232*
(0.123) (0.129)
Forest concerned -0.0000585 -0.564**
(0.135) (0.258)
Swiss wood 0.482 0.878
(0.480) (1.056)
Constant 4.324*** 5.946*** 5.958*** 9.060***
(0.654) (1.091) (0.980) (2.190)
N 134 122 134 120
Pseudo-R2 0.317 0.484 0.410 0.613
AIC 119.9 81.28 120.1 77.31
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table a.4: Data used in the non-parametric model
10 60 100 250 500 1000 Total
CH
Yes 26 22 18 12 6 6 90
% of Yes 0.79 0.81 0.56 0.41 0.18 0.21
PAVA % of Yes 0.80 0.56 0.41 0.19
No 7 5 14 17 27 23 93
N 33 27 32 29 33 29 183
GE
Yes 34 25 19 3 3 1 85
% of Yes 0.92 0.76 0.58 0.11 0.30 0.09
PAVA % of Yes 0.92 0.76 0.58 0.16 0.09
No 3 8 14 25 7 10 67
N 37 33 33 28 10 11 152
This data can be derived from Table 1.1 when excluding protesters
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B Chapter 2
Table b.1: Explanatory variables
Variable Description
R35 Gross annual income class of the household: 0-35'000 CHF
R35_50 Gross annual income class of the household: 35'000-50'000
R50_80 Gross annual income class of the household: 50'000-80'000
R80_120 Gross annual income class of the household: 80'000-120'000
R120_160 Gross annual income class of the household: 120'000-160'000
R160_200 Gross annual income class of the household: 160'000-200'000
R200 Gross annual income class of the household: 200'000 and +
FR French speaker
IT Italian speaker
Jura Lives in the Jura region
Rural Lives in a rural area or small and isolated town
Often Goes often in forest (as opposed to sometimes or never)
Member Member of an environmental friendly association
Swiss Wood Prefers Swiss wood over cheaper imported wood
Reserve Agrees to create forest reserves
Number of children Number of children in the household
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Table b.2: Determinants of protest answers
Selection probit
R35 0.247
(0.188)
R35_50 0.102
(0.150)
R50_80 0.113
(0.131)
R120_160 -0.00669
(0.175)
R160_200 0.689
(0.240)
R200 -0.0474
(0.247)
FR 0.199*
(0.111)
IT 0.215
(0.135)
Jura -0.0840
(0.329)
Rural 0.00147
(0.109)
Age 0.0103***
(0.00376)
Female -0.260**
(0.101)
Often 0.200*
(0.101)
Member -0.135
(0.103)
Swiss Wood 0.148
(0.988)
Reserve -0.363***
(0.0986)
Number of Children 0.104**
(0.509)
Constant -1.511***
(0.250)
Observations 987
Pseudo-R2 0.0526
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Questionnaire
• La durée de l'enquête est d'environ 15 minutes.
• La conﬁdentialité et l'anonymat des données sont absolument garantis
• Cette enquête récolte des informations sur la perception des forêts suisses par ses
habitants. Elle a pour but de constituer une base, utile pour faciliter la prise de décision
en matière de gestion forestière et de politique environnementale.
Question ﬁltre: Avez-vous plus de 18 ans et habitez-vous en Suisse?
 Oui  Non (ﬁn de l'entretien)
LA NOTION DE FORÊT MENTIONNÉE DANS LES QUESTIONS SUIVANTES
COMPREND TOUTES LES SURFACES COUVERTES D'ARBRES OU
D'ARBUSTES EN SUISSE D'UNE SUPERFICIE AU MOINS ÉQUIVALENTE À
CELLE D'UN TERRAIN DE FOOTBALL.
1. Selon vous, au cours de ces 20 dernières années, la surface forestière
suisse: (une seule réponse possible)
 a augmenté  est restée identique  a diminué
2. Par rapport à vos expériences personnelles, vos souvenirs vis-à-vis de la
forêt sont: (une seule réponse possible)
 Négatifs  Mitigés  Positifs
3. À quelle fréquence vous rendez-vous généralement en forêt ? (une seule
réponse possible)
 Souvent  Parfois  Jamais (Rendez-vous directement à la question 7)
4. En forêt, pratiquez-vous les activités suivantes?
Flâner (promenade, détente, respirer l'air frais, pique-niquer)  Oui Non
Pratiquer du sport (randonnée, jogging, VTT, équitation, accrobranche)  Oui Non
Observer la nature (la faune, la ﬂore)  Oui Non
Chasser, cueillir des champignons ou des fruits, collecter du bois  Oui Non
Votre activité professionnelle est en forêt  Oui Non
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4.a. Parmi les activités que vous avez sélectionnées, quelle est l'activité
que vous pratiquez le plus souvent ? (une seule réponse possible)
 Flâner (promenade, détente, respirer l'air frais, pique-niquer) Pratiquer du sport (randonnée, jogging, VTT, équitation, accrobranche) Observer la nature (la faune, la ﬂore) Chasser, cueillir des champignons ou des fruits, collecter du bois Votre activité professionnelle est en forêt .
5. D'une manière générale, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous satisfait de vos
visites en forêt ?
 Satisfait  Indiﬀérent  Insatisfait
6. Dans les 12 derniers mois, dans quel type de forêts vous êtes-vous rendu
en Suisse? (plusieurs réponses possibles; vous pouvez vous référer à la
carte envoyée dans la lettre que vous avez reçu à la maison)
 Forêt urbaine (située à l'intérieur d'une ville/village) Forêt du Jura (sans les forêts urbaines) Forêt de plaine ou du Plateau (sans les forêts urbaines) Forêt des Alpes, Préalpes ou Sud des Alpes (sans les forêts urbaines)
(En fonction des réponses, poursuivre avec les questions suivantes pour chaque type de
forêts indiqué et compléter le tableau)
• Pour une forêt (soit urbaine, de plaine, du Jura, des Alpes) : combien de fois vous y
êtes-vous rendu dans les 12 derniers mois ? (approx.)
• Quelle distance parcourez-vous généralement depuis votre lieu de départ pour vous
rendre dans ce type de forêt ? (kilomètres) [Attention: il s'agit bien du lieu de départ
pour visiter la forêt, pas nécessairement le lieu de domicile. Exemple : si je vais à
Zermatt en vacances et que, entre autres, je me promène dans une forêt, je dois indiquer
les kilomètres parcourus depuis Zermatt jusqu'à l'entrée de cette forêt]
• Quel moyen de transport utilisez-vous généralement pour eﬀectuer l'essentiel du trajet
? (3 propositions, une seule réponse possible) [même remarque indiquez le moyen de
transport entre le lieu de départ et la forêt]
• Combien de temps mettez-vous généralement pour vous y rendre ? (minutes) [même
remarque: depuis le lieu de départ et la forêt]
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• Combien de temps passez-vous en moyenne dans cette forêt ? (minutes)
• A quel moment visitez-vous généralement cette forêt ? (3 propositions, plusieurs
réponses possibles)
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7. Lorsque vous achetez des produits en bois, achetez-vous en priorité des
produits réalisés à partir de bois suisse?
 Oui  Non  Je ne sais pas Je n'achète pas de produits en bois (Passer à la question 9)
8. Achetez-vous en priorité des produits en bois labélisés (par exemple
FSC, PEFC, COBS)?
 Oui  Non  Je ne sais pas
9. Êtes-vous d'accord avec les aﬃrmations suivantes ?
Aﬃrmations D'accord Pas d'accord Sans avis
La forêt suisse fait partie de l'identité et du patrimoine du pays.   
Le bois des forêts suisses n'est pas assez exploité.   
L'exploitation du bois joue un rôle important dans l'économie suisse.   
L'exploitation du bois contribue à l'entretien des forêts.   
L'exploitation forestière gâche le paysage et gêne l'accès aux forêts.   
L'exploitation du bois en Suisse menace la biodiversité.   
Il y a trop d'activités de détente et de loisirs dans les forêts suisses.   
Certaines zones forestières, abritant des animaux sauvages, devraient   
être interdites d'accès à la population.
L'État devrait autoriser plus souvent le dézonage de forêts pour   
y construire des logements
10.Parmi les deux alternatives proposées, laquelle privilégiez-vous ? Vous
pouvez être indiﬀérent.
(Lisez la question de la manière suivante :  A : Augmentation de l'exploitation du bois
suisse contre B : Protection accrue de la faune et la ﬂore forestière) A : Augmentation de l'exploitation du bois suisse B : Protection accrue de la faune et la ﬂore forestière Indiﬀérent / ne se prononce pas
 A : Création de lieux d'activités récréatives en forêt B : Création de réserves forestières pour protéger la faune et la ﬂore Indiﬀérent / ne se prononce pas
 A : Augmentation de l'exploitation du bois suisse B : Création de lieux d'activités récréatives en forêt
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 Indiﬀérent / ne se prononce pas
11. Un tiers du territoire suisse est couvert de forêts dont 5% sont protégées. Celles-ci
abritent un écosystème riche et varié, permettent d'atténuer les eﬀets du changement
climatique et protègent contre certains dangers naturels (avalanches, glissements de
terrain, érosion. . . ). Aﬁn de préserver et développer de manière durable la forêt suisse
et la diversité de ses fonctions, la Confédération envisage de doubler la surface des
réserves forestières protégées d'ici à 2030. La protection de nouvelles surfaces a pour
avantages :
• Une meilleure protection de la biodiversité
• Une réduction du nombre de catastrophes naturelles (avalanches, glissements de ter-
rain)
• Une plus forte atténuation des changements climatiques
Mais ce programme engendrerait également des inconvénients:
• Une augmentation des coûts logistiques pour la mise en place du programme
• La baisse de revenus des exploitations forestières
• La mise en place de limitations d'accès aux zones forestières
On envisage de ﬁnancer la hausse des dépenses par un impôt spéciﬁque consacré au
ﬁnancement du programme. La Confédération a besoin de connaître l'avis de la pop-
ulation sur ce sujet aﬁn d'orienter sa politique environnementale et évaluer la manière
dont cette mesure pourrait être instaurée.
Vous pourriez être amené à contribuer concrètement à ce programme. De ce fait, il est
important que votre réponse reﬂète bien votre disposition à contribuer à la création de
nouvelles réserves forestières. Ainsi, avant de répondre, soyez attentif au fait que votre
revenu est limité et que vous pourriez être sollicité pour contribuer à d'autres causes,
mais que la réussite du programme dépend principalement de son ﬁnancement.
Par conséquent, est-ce que votre ménage serait prêt à payer un montant de [Random
in Sample] 12.- / 30.- / 60.- / 120.- / 240.- / 480.- / 780.- / 1000.- CHF par an (soit 1.-
/ 2.50 / 5.- / 10.- / 20.- / 40.- / 65.- / 83.- CHF par mois) pour soutenir la création de
nouvelles réserves forestières en Suisse? Oui  Non
Dans ce cas, combien votre ménage serait-il prêt à payer au maximum par an pour
soutenir le programme? ____CHF/an
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(Si montant > 0, allez à la question 11.b. ; si montant = 0 ou refus de répondre, allez
à la question 11a. puis 12
11.a. Pour quelle raison n'êtes-vous pas disposé à contribuer au
programme? (une seule réponse possible)
(Laisser le sondé répondre et ensuite classer la réponse, en lui demandant de bien
conﬁrmer. Une seule réponse possible) Financièrement, je ne peux pas me le permettre, mais si je pouvais je le ferais. Il existe d'autres problèmes plus urgents à régler. Les problématiques liées aux forêts
ne sont pas une priorité. Je ne me sens pas concerné par les problématiques liées à la forêt La forêt, pour moi, n'a aucune valeur Je souhaiterais avoir plus d'informations à ce sujet. Il s'agit d'un bien appartenant à la collectivité, ce n'est pas raisonnable de me
demander de payer pour cela. J'estime que ce n'est pas à moi de payer pour protéger la forêt, mais à la collectivité
publique, aux propriétaires de forêt et/ou aux utilisateurs des forêts. Je paie déjà assez d'impôts. Je ne fais pas conﬁance à l'État. Rien ne me garantit que l'argent sera bien employé
pour ﬁnancer le programme.
11.b. Cette somme sera partagée entre les quatre éléments suivants:
1) La compensation de la baisse de revenus des exploitants forestiers
2) La protection de la biodiversité (faune, ﬂore) en forêt
3) La création de nouveaux lieux d'activités récréatives pour compenser les limitations
d'accès
4) L'amélioration de la capacité des forêts à protéger contre les dangers naturels
Quel pourcentage de la somme indiquée au préalable attribueriez-vous à
chacun des quatre éléments, que je vous répète ?
• La compensation de la baisse de revenus des exploitants forestiers_____%
• La protection de la biodiversité (faune, ﬂore) en forêt_____%
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• La création de nouveaux lieux d'activités récréatives pour compenser les limitations
d'accès_____%
• L'amélioration de la capacité des forêts à protéger contre les dangers naturels_____%
11.c. Voulez-vous modiﬁer le montant maximum indiqué à la question
précédente?
 Oui _______CHF/an  Non
Informations générales
12. Vous êtes :  une femme  un homme
13. Quelle est votre année de naissance ? ___________
14. Code postal : __________
15. De combien de personnes se compose votre ménage (vous compris)?
Nombre d'adultes (plus de 18 ans) : ______ Nombre d'enfants (moins de 18 ans) : ______
16. Etes-vous membre et/ou versez-vous régulièrement des dons à une ou
plusieurs organisations environnementales ?
 Oui  Non
17. Par votre travail ou vos activités associatives, êtes-vous en lien direct
avec les intérêts du milieu forestier ?
 Oui  Non
18. En plus de votre résidence principale, disposez-vous d'une résidence
secondaire ou d'une location à la saison ou à l'année en Suisse ?
 Oui  Non
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19. Quel est votre proﬁl professionnel actuel ? (une seule réponse possible;
indiquez l'activité principale)
 Femme  Homme au foyer  Cadre supérieur(e) Étudiant(e)  Indépendant(e) Employé(e)  Retraité(e) Cadre  Sans emploi
20. Quel niveau d'étude avez-vous atteint ? Si vous êtes en train d'étudier,
mentionnez le niveau qui correspond aux études que vous avez achevées.
 École obligatoire Apprentissage École post-obligatoire (École de commerce, maturité . . . ) Formation professionnelle supérieure Université, École polytechnique, HES
21. Quel est le revenu brut annuel de votre ménage ?
 Moins de CHF 35'000.-  Entre CHF 120'000.- et 160'000.- Entre CHF 35'000.- et CHF 50'000.-  Entre CHF 160'000.- et 200'000.- Entre CHF 50'000.- et CHF 80'000.-  Plus de 200'000.- Entre CHF 80'000.- et CHF 120'000.-  Pas de réponse
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Table b.3: Indicators of representativity
Survey Switzerland
Females 51% 51%a
Age 18% 27%b
42% 38%b
40% 35%b
Cantons ZH 12% 18%a
BE 10% 12%a
VD 11% 9%a
AG 7% 8%a
SG 5% 6%a
GE 6% 6%a
LU 3% 5%a
TI 16% 4%a
VS 4% 4%a
FR 4% 4%a
Others 22% 24%a
Annual gross income meand 83'349 120'624a
Education level 8% 12%c
35% 39%c
12% 9%c
21% 14%c
25% 26%c
Member 37% 23%e
aOFS 2013
bOFS 2009
cOFS 2014
dMean calculated with the central point in each class
eWorld Value Survey 2007
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© FSO 2016
Figure c.1: Map of the Swiss forest zones. Source: FSO (2016b) (Central Plain and Midland are used interchangeably
within the Chapter)
Table c.1: Description of forest zones. (Source: FOEN, 2014b and FSO, 2015b)
Forest zone Total Forest Forest Pop. Forest/cap Private Conifers Forest dens. Prod. intens.
km2 km2 % 1000hab a/hab % % m3/ha m3/ha
Switzerland 41'285 12'582 30 7'204 18 29 67 350 3.8
Jura 4'766 2'341 49 1'023 23 22 53 378 4.7
(11.5) (18.6) (14.2)
Midland 9'836 2'262 23 4'304 5 45 51 386 7.5
(23.8) (18.0) (59.7)
Alps, Prealps and 26'684 7'979 30 1'880 42 27 75 332 2.5
Southern Alps (Alps) (64.6) (63.4) (26.1)
Percentage of total in parentheses
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Pooled model
Table c.2: Descriptive statistics for the second step (pooled)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
NV 45.32 70.58 1 400 1'073
TCUrban 1.06 4.73 0 78.11 1'073
TCMidland 2.89 10.96 0 150.21 1'073
TCJura 3.01 12.31 0 127.58 1'073
TCAlps 9.94 31.44 0 352.57 1'073
Relaxes 0.93 0.25 0 1 1'073
Does sport 0.60 0.49 0 1 1'073
Observes nature 0.71 0.453 0 1 1'073
Collects resource 0.38 0.49 0 1 1'073
Age 50.31 14.5 18 93 1'073
Economic interest 0.25 0.43 0 1 1'073
Bad memories 0.028 0.17 0 1 1'073
The pooled model diﬀers from the separated models by the inclusion of the dummy
variables Urban, Midland and Jura, to indicate the speciﬁc forest zone and by the
absence of the Residence variable. We select the following speciﬁcation for the pooled
model:
ln(λi) = E[NVi] = a+ βTCUrbanTC × Urbani+ (5.5)
βTCMidlandTC ×Midlandi + βTCJuraTC × Jurai+
βTCAlpsTC × Alpsi + βX2X2i + ui
With a a constant; TC × s the interaction variables with each forest zone s and βTCS
the associated coeﬃcients; X2i the explanatory variables for the second step, βX2 the
associated coeﬃcients and u an error term.
We handle the data as a panel, since we have 4 observations per individual (one ob-
servation per forest zone). After dropping non-complete observations, the pooled data
contains 829 individuals, who visit 1.3 forest zones in average. We therefore analyze the
results from 1073 observations that passed the hurdle. We run the usual Hausman test
to decide between ﬁxed or random eﬀects and do not reject random eﬀects (p-value =
0.13). To test for random eﬀects, we then apply the Breusch-Pagan LM test and do not
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reject the null hypothesis of no random eﬀects. A simple pooled model (i.e. without
random, nor ﬁxed eﬀects), presented in Table c.3, is therefore the most appropriate.
Table c.3: Results of the HZTNB estimation for the pooled model
V isitss (Participation) Coef. (Std. Err.)
Urban -0.76*** (0.063)
Midland -0.18*** (0.059)
Jura -0.81*** (0.064)
French 0.0646 (0.051)
Italian -0.18*** (0.067)
Children 0.10* (0.052)
Member 0.12** (0.047)
Age 0.0070 (0.0081)
Age2 -0.000068 (0.000080)
Secondary Residence -0.0021 (0.067)
Well informed 0.10** (0.048)
Constant -0.45** (0.20)
NVs (Frequency)
TCUrban 0.0011 (0.014)
TCMidland -0.0099** (0.0046)
TCJura -0.041*** (0.0038)
TCAlps -0.015*** (0.0018)
Relaxes 0.11 (0.19)
Does sport 0.39*** (0.10)
Observes nature 0.19* (0.11)
Collects resource 0.16* (0.093)
Age 0.0094*** (0.0034)
Economic Interest 0.27*** (0.10)
Bad Memories 0.18 (0.31)
Constant 2.77*** (0.28)
Observations (total) 3800
Non-zero observations 1073a
ln(α) 0.55***
Vuong stat. for ZTNB over ZINB -6.79***
Accuracy 53%
a 829 individuals, 1.3 observations per individual on average
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table c.4: Travel costs elasticities from the pooled model
Urban Midland Jura Alps
εTCs 0.0012 -0.03** -0.12*** -0.14***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Mean TCs 6.5 9.0 19.8 27.1
Observations 1073
Standard errors calculated with the Delta method in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table c.5: Individual Consumer Surpluses from the pooled model
Urban Midland Jura Alps
CS per visit n.a. 101.3** 24.6*** 69.01***
[8;194] [20;29] [52;86]
Observations 1073
95% conﬁdence intervals calculated with the Delta method in brackets
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
NB: Since the travel cost elasticity is positive for urban forests,
we do not provide the consumer surplus for urban forest.
171
APPENDIX
Table c.6: Results of the ZINB estimation
Urban Midland Jura Alps
V isitss (Participation)
Residences -0.69*** -0.59*** -1.26*** -1.33***
(0.13) (0.099) (0.12) (0.15)
French 0.10 0.35*** -0.67*** -0.21*
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12)
Italian 0.23* 0.78*** 0.58* 0.15
(0.15) (0.15) (0.30) (0.18)
Children -0.19* -0.22** -0.43*** 0.22*
(0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11)
Member -0.21** 0.019 -0.38*** -0.15
(0.10) (0.095) (0.12) (0.10)
Age 0.031* -0.011 -0.017 -0.060***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.018)
Age2 -0.00028 0.00014 0.000051 0.00066***
(0.00017) (0.00015) (0.00020) (0.00018)
Secondary Residence 0.14 0.18 0.15 -0.60***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.18) (0.16)
Well informed 0.042 0.053 -0.19 -0.46***
(0.11) (0.096) (0.12) (0.11)
Constant 0.71* 0.68* 2.87*** 2.04***
(0.42) (0.39) (0.56) (0.44)
NVs (Frequency)
TC -0.0021 -0.0070** -0.033*** -0.011***
(0.0099) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0013)
Relaxes 0.77* 0.31 -0.45 0.63**
(0.42) (0.27) (0.39) (0.27)
Does sport 0.53** 0.51*** 0.29 0.41***
(0.24) (0.14) (0.23) (0.14)
Observes nature 0.089 0.031 0.27 0.49***
(0.26) (0.16) (0.26) (0.16)
Collects resource -0.16 0.28* 0.13 0.27**
(0.23) (0.15) (0.22) (0.14)
Age 0.021** 0.014*** 0.0026 0.00015
(0.0086) (0.0047) (0.0076) (0.0052)
Economic Interest 0.076 0.15 0.47** 0.41***
(0.27) (0.17) (0.24) (0.15)
Bad Memories -1.78** 0.34 0.28 0.23
(0.75) (0.47) (0.46) (0.40)
Constant 1.77*** 2.36*** 3.62*** 2.35***
(0.65) (0.35) (0.60) (0.40)
ln(α) 0.62*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.54***
(0.16) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10)
Vuong stat. for ZINB over NB 2.44*** 8.38*** 8.17*** 8.57***
N 1038 1010 1034 973
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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D Chapter 4
Table d.1: Descriptive statistics (1st stage)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Endowment CHF 7.2 1.87 2 10 299
Contribution >0 0/1 0.86 0.35 0 1 299
Contribution (% of initial endowment) 0.70 0.4 0 1 299
Climate concern 0/1 0.86 0.34 0 1 299
Small contributions are important 0/1 0.85 0.36 0 1 299
Green member 0/1 0.09 0.29 0 1 299
Moral obligation 0/1 0.67 0.47 0 1 299
Belief about others' contribution (% of initial endowment) 0.53 0.30 0 1 299
Frequent forest user 0/1 0.19 0.39 0 1 299
Practical reservations 0/1 0.27 0.45 0 1 299
Ethical reservations w.r.t. the commodiﬁcation of nature 0/1 0.48 0.5 0 1 299
Table d.2: Average marginal eﬀects on contributions (Tobit model)
Tobit
Climate concern 0.083
(0.27)
Small contributions are important 0.50**
(0.24)
Green member -0.021
(0.22)
Moral obligation 0.028
(0.16)
Belief about others' contribution 2.71***
(0.30)
Frequent forest user 0.24
(0.21)
Practical reservations -0.24
(0.16)
Ethical reservations w.r.t. the commodiﬁcation of nature -0.064
(0.14)
Observations 299
Pseudo-R2 0.24
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table d.3: Descriptive statistics (2nd stage)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Belief about others' contribution abroad 0/1 0.70 0.46 0 1 256
Second-year student 0/1 0.43 0.520 0 1 256
Frequent forest user 0/1 0.19 0.39 0 1 256
Experience with domestic site 0/1 0.35 0.48 0 1 256
Oﬀsetting abroad is acceptable 0/1 0.29 0.45 0 1 256
Ethical reservations w.r.t. the commodiﬁcation of nature 0/1 0.49 0.50 0 1 256
Carbon markets are acceptable 0/1 0.21 0.41 0 1 256
Green member 0/1 0.10 0.30 0 1 256
Economy the priority 0/1 0.11 0.31 0 1 256
Table d.4: Average treatment eﬀects
(1) (2)
OLS GLM
Eﬃciency treatment (T1) 0.11* 0.12*
(0.06) (0.06)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2) 0.026 0.025
(0.06) (0.06)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3) -0.025 -0.024
(0.06) (0.05)
Belief about others' contribution abroad 0.26*** 0.24***
(0.05) (0.04)
Second-year student 0.068* 0.067*
(0.04) (0.04)
Frequent forest user 0.033 0.034
(0.06) (0.06)
Experience with domestic site -0.043 -0.043
(0.04) (0.04)
Oﬀsetting abroad is acceptable 0.019 0.023
(0.04) (0.04)
Ethical reservations w.r.t. to the commodiﬁcation of nature -0.031 -0.032
(0.04) (0.04)
Carbon markets are acceptable 0.0083 -0.0069
(0.05) (0.05)
Green member 0.10 0.11
(0.06) (0.07)
Observations 256 256
Adjusted R2 0.15
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table d.5: Average treatment eﬀects on the probability to contribute (extensive margin)
(1) (2)
Logit OLS
Eﬃciency treatment 0.022 0.030
(0.058) (0.058)
Conﬁdence treatment 0.032 0.039
(0.056) (0.059)
Local beneﬁts treatment 0.0048 0.018
(0.055) (0.060)
Belief about others' contribution abroad 0.19*** 0.22***
(0.029) (0.054)
Second-year student 0.029 0.025
(0.039) (0.041)
Frequent forest user 0.042 0.040
(0.059) (0.048)
Experience with domestic site -0.024 -0.022
(0.040) (0.042)
Oﬀsetting abroad is acceptable 0.068 0.056
(0.051) (0.042)
Ethical reservations w.r.t. to the commodiﬁcation of nature 0.013 0.010
(0.039) (0.040)
Carbon markets are acceptable -0.040 -0.030
(0.049) (0.051)
Green member 0.13 0.081
(0.11) (0.051)
Covariates Yes Yes
Observations 256 256
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table d.6: Average marginal eﬀects from Cragg model: 2nd stage
Contributions to the international programme > 0 (0/1)
Eﬃciency treatment (T1) 0.021
(0.056)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2) 0.029
(0.054)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3) 0.0038
(0.054)
Belief about others' contribution abroad 0.18***
(0.037)
Second-year student 0.033
(0.039)
Frequent forest user 0.030
(0.054)
Experience with domestic site -0.026
(0.039)
Oﬀsetting abroad is acceptable 0.052
(0.046)
Ethical reservations w.r.t commodiﬁcation of nature 0.013
(0.038)
Carbon markets are acceptable -0.021
(0.048)
Green member 0.092
(0.088)
Contribution to the international programme (% of total contribution)
Eﬃciency treatment (T1) 0.11**
(0.046)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2) -0.0050
(0.047)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3) -0.044
(0.047)
Belief about others' contribution abroad 0.13***
(0.040)
Second-year student 0.059*
(0.032)
Frequent forest user 0.0070
(0.047)
Experience with domestic site -0.027
(0.037)
Oﬀsetting abroad is acceptable -0.018
(0.034)
Ethical reservations w.r.t commodiﬁcation of nature -0.046
(0.033)
Carbon markets are acceptable 0.024
(0.041)
Green member 0.052
(0.051)
Observations 256
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Questionnaire
Welcome and thank you for participating to our experiment on climate policy!
Please read questions and texts carefully and answer sincerely without communicating
with your classmates. By participating to this experiment, you can earn up to CHF
10 if you answer all questions until the end of the survey. Your answers will be treated
anonymously. Your participation and answers have no impact on your ﬁnal grade.
You will now have to answer 4 true/false questions. We give you CHF 2 for your
participation and every correct answer will be rewarded by other CHF 2. You have 90
seconds to answer all 4 questions.98
1. The demand curve for a good/service is generally downward sloped. True  False
2. The income-elasticity of demand for an inferior good is negative. 
True  False
3. Macroeconomics analyses households and ﬁrms' decisions.  True 
False
4. It is unfair that poor households pay the same amount for their health
insurance as a billionaire . This is a normative statement.  True False
5. Economists generally assume that individuals are irrational and altruist
and maximize the welfare of the society (homo oeconomicus).  True False
6. In 2014, Switzerland exported more coﬀee than chocolate, in monetary
value.  True  False
7. Perfect competition refers to a market where a ﬁrm has no inﬂuence
on prices.  True  False
8. Monopoly is an imperfect competition market structure, wherein a
single buyer will push the price downward.  True  False
98Students were randomly provided 4 questions among the following 10.
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9. The opportunity cost of an activity represents the value of the best
alternative.  True  False
10. The invisible hand described by Adam Smith is a metaphor to illus-
trate the State's intervention in the economy.  True  False
Congratulations! You have earned CHF_________. We remind you that you must
ﬁnish answering the questionnaire to receive this amount. Instructions on how to be
paid are given at the end.
Please read the following text:
Climate warming is a phenomenon of increasing temperature at the world level. It
is partly caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from human activities. Main
consequences on the environment and humankind predicted by the IPCC (Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change) are the following:
1. Polar glaciers melting and increasing sea level
2. Extinction of numerous vegetal and animal species
3. Lower land productivity
4. More diﬃcult access to water resources
5. Increasing number of extreme meteorological phenomena (heavy rains, storms,
drought, etc.)
6. Increasing mortality linked with heat, extension of zones infested by diseases such
as cholera, malaria, allergies...
7. Mass migration by people who have lost their land
8. Risk of global geopolitical destabilisation and civil wars
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the main greenhouse gas responsible for climate warming.
CO2 emissions are mainly caused by the combustion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil or
natural gas, for energy production or industrial activities. However, deforestation across
the world has contributed to GHG emissions to a larger extent than transportation.
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Indeed trees absorb CO2 from the atmosphere and are thus important carbon sinks, so
that increasing reforestation or reducing deforestation are eﬀective and eﬃcient tools
to reduce CO2 emissions.
Part 1:
You now have the opportunity to participate in a real reforestation programme, which
will allow taking CO2 out from the atmosphere. Thanks to your contribution, we
will ﬁnance tree planting, which would oﬀset CO2 emissions linked with all economic
activities, including your own activities.
The funding to reforestation programmes will be taken from the amount that you have
earned in the previous questions. You can freely decide which amount you wish to give
to tree planting, without exceeding the amount that you have earned.
The money will really be used to ﬁnance reforestation. We will receive a certiﬁcate
attesting the tree planting. If you participate and wish it, your name can be added on
the reforestation certiﬁcate. Otherwise, you can keep complete anonymity.
Please note again that your participation to this experiment is not mandatory and will
have no impact on your ﬁnal grade.
What amount of your earnings do you want to (total must be equal to
your earnings - otherwise an error message is displayed):
Give to the reforestation programme: CHF_______
Keep for you: CHF_______
At the end of the survey you will receive CHF______ and CHF______ will be
used to ﬁnance reforestation.
Among the following reasons, which one is the main reason why you did
not contribute more to the reforestation programme?
• I prefer using the money for things that are more valuable to me
• I have the feeling that I legitimise a bad behaviour
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• I disagree with individual CO2 oﬀsetting
• I do not want to consider natural resources as a marketed commodity
• I do not agree to be asked to buy something within the framework of this survey
• I would like more information
In your opinion, what share of their endowment other participants on
average contributed to the reforestation programme? _________%
Part 2:
You now have the choice to split your contribution between two diﬀerent reforestation
programmes. You can freely allocate your amount between the two programmes. Please
notice that we will collect all participants' contributions and ﬁnance trees from the
overall amount. We will complete the missing fraction of a tree, if needed. Hence there
is no problem if you cannot ﬁnance an entire tree.99,100
Table d.7: Reforestation programmes
Programme 1 Programme 2
Place: Visp, Switzerland Place: Limay, Nicaragua
CO2 sequestration / tree / year: 15kg CO2 sequestration / tree / year: 15kg
Cost / tree: CHF10 Cost / tree: CHF3
Neutral treatment (T0): The above programmes are very similar, but diﬀer accord-
ing to the place where they are implemented: Programme 1 plans to plant trees
in Wallis, Switzerland and programme 2 in Limay, Nicaragua.
Eﬃciency treatment (T1): The above programmes are very similar, but diﬀer ac-
cording to the place where they are implemented: Programme 1 plans to plant
trees in Wallis, Switzerland and programme 2 in Limay, Nicaragua. A new tree in
Switzerland has the same CO2 sequestration potential as a new tree in Nicaragua
but the same amount of money allows to plant more trees in Nicaragua than in
Switzerland, the price per tree being lower in Nicaragua. As the place of emission
reduction has no importance for the stock in the atmosphere, it is more eﬃcient
99After this point, each individual randomly received one of the following treatments.
100To avoid order eﬀects, programmes are randomly numbered 1 or 2.
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to plant trees where it is the cheapest: with the same amount it is possible to buy
more trees in Nicaragua and thus to further reduce CO2 emissions.
Conﬁdence treatment (T2): The above programmes are very similar, but diﬀer
according to the place where they are implemented: Programme 1 plans to plant
trees in Wallis, Switzerland and programme 2 in Limay, Nicaragua. Both pro-
grammes are strictly controlled by external institutions. In Switzerland, local au-
thorities are directly taking part in the programme while in Nicaragua, the United
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) oversees the projects to avoid any
abuses. These institutions guarantee that the money sent will indeed be used to
implement reforestation programmes, in Switzerland as in Nicaragua.
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3): The above programmes are very similar, but diﬀer
according to the place where they are implemented: Programme 1 plans to plant
trees in Wallis, Switzerland and programme 2 in Limay, Nicaragua. A new tree in
Switzerland has the same CO2 sequestration potential as a new tree in Nicaragua
but reforestation in Switzerland implies a series of advantages for the local popu-
lation. The Swiss population indeed enjoys forest to recreate: it is estimated that
Swiss people spend more than 80 hours per year in forests, for leisure such as hik-
ing, mushrooms picking, etc. Forests also allow to protect the Swiss population
against natural hazards such as avalanches, landslides or rock slides. Moreover,
Swiss forests are home to numerous local species, in particular amphibians and
lichens, under the threat of extinction. Finally, forests are also a source of income
for part of the population. In 2014, the gross income from the forest industry in
Switzerland amounted to CHF 900 millions.
How much of your contribution do you wish to allocate to (total must be
equal to your contribution - otherwise an error message is displayed):
The Swiss programme: CHF____________
The Nicaraguan programme: CHF____________
Among the following reasons, which one is the main reason why you did
not contribute more to the Nicaraguan programme?
• Local beneﬁts are more important in Switzerland than in Nicaragua
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• It is unfair to compensate Swiss CO2 emissions abroad
• I do not trust the Nicaraguan government for the implementation of this pro-
gramme
• It is not my duty to pay for a programme in Nicaragua
• None of the above
Among the following reasons, which one is the main reason why you did
not contribute more to the Swiss programme?
• Populations in Nicaragua need more ﬁnancial help than in Switzerland
• Local beneﬁts are more important in Nicaragua than in Switzerland
• The price of a tree is lower in Nicaragua and hence, for the same amount, I can
reduce more CO2 if I buy trees in Nicaragua rather than in Switzerland
• It is not my duty to pay for this programme
• None of the above
In your opinion, for which programme did your classmate contribute the
most?
• The programme in Switzerland
• The programme in Nicaragua
• Their contribution is, on average, the same for both programmes
It is possible to oﬀset GHG emissions by other means than reforestation
(renewable energy, methane recuperation, etc.). If the programme
proposed to contribute to another type of project instead of reforestation,
would your contribution have been:
• The same
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• Higher
• Lower
If the reforestation programme abroad had not been in Nicaragua but in
an industrialised country, would your contribution have been:
• The same
• Higher
• Lower
Please answer the following questions:
Never Sometimes Regularly Often
Have you ever been to the Visp region?    
Have you ever been to Nicaragua?    
How often do you go to forests?    
How do you agree with the following statements?
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Are you member of or donate to an environmental friendly organisation?
• Yes
• No
Are you:
• Male
• Female
How old are you? __________ years old
What is your ZIP code? ______________
Is your mother tongue Spanish or are you originally from Latin America?
• Yes
• No
What type of diploma have you earned?
What type of study did your parents complete?
Please indicate the interval that best represents your personal monthly
budget (without rents nor insurances).
We thank you for your participation to this survey!
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Table e.1: Data sources, units and description
Variable Unit Description Sources
Qt Millions of m3 Quantity of roundwood produced Siegenthaler and Ritzman-Blickenstorfer (1996)
FSO (1990), FOEN, (1996; 2014g)
Pt 2011CHF/m3 Volume-weighted average price of roundwood FSO (1976; 2015c)
Psubst 2011CHF/kg Average import price of steel, iron and other metallic material FSO (2015c)
Pxt Index 2010=100 Average producer price of raw wood from German public forests DESTATIS (2017)
accounting for exchange rate diﬀerentials Swiss National Bank (2017)
Investmentt Mio of 2011CHF Investment in building infrastructure FSO (2015c)
Wage in forestryt 2011CHF/hour Average wage paid to forest workers Niederer and Bill (2015)
it % Real average interest rate on savings Swiss National Bank (2017)
Penergyt 2011CHF/m3 Volume-weighted average price of energy wood FSO (1990), FOEN, (1996; 2014g)
FSO (1976; 2015c)
Stormt 1000m3 Quantity of fallen wood due to natural calamities Usbeck (2015)
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Table e.2: Stationarity tests
Variable ADF Phillips-Perron KPSS
Zt lags form Zρ lags form η lags form
Qt -0.88 2 no t -11.01* 2 no t 0.97*** 5 no t
∆Qt -7.78*** 1 no t -81.50*** 1 no t 0.25 5 no t
Pt -1.62 0 t -10.50 0 t 0.18** 6 t
∆Pt -7.05*** 1 t -57.82*** 1 t 0.16** 8 t
Psubst -0.41 1 no t -4.13 1 no t 1.03*** 5 no t
∆Psubst -2.80*** 1 no t -68.26*** 1 no t 0.07 8 no t
Pxt -2.14 0 t -13.68 0 t 0.17** 5 t
∆Pxt -7.74*** 0 t -66.24*** 0 t 0.08 5 t
Investmentt -1.37 1 t -5.51 1 t 0.26*** 5 t
∆Investmentt -4.61*** 1 t -36.48*** 1 t 0.12 5 t
Wage in forestryt -0.78 1 t 0.93 1 t 0.27*** 5 t
∆Wage in forestryt -3.56** 0 t -27.58*** 0 t 0.15** 5 t
it -0.31 2 no t -0.65 2 no t 1.09*** 5 no t
∆it -5.27*** 1 no t -36.40*** 1 no t 0.09 4 no t
Penergyt -0.63 0 no t -4.06 0 no t 0.90*** 6 no t
∆Penergyt -3.38*** 0 no t -64.21*** 0 no t 0.36* 4 no t
Stormt -8.16*** 0 no t -66.71*** 0 no t 0.22 6 no t
∆Stormt -13.65*** 0 no t -64.21*** 0 no t 0.04 4 no t
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
t: trend, no t: no trend
For augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and Phillips-Perron tests (Phillips and Perron, 1988),
lags and functional forms have been chosen thanks to the Bayesian Information criteria. H0: The series is non-stationary
For KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) test, the number of lags was selected by automatic bandwidth selection and
autocovariances weighted by Bartlett Kernel. H0: The series is stationary
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Figure e.1: Plots of the residuals
Table e.3: Post-estimation tests
D
em
an
d Anderson canon. corr. stat.b 46.19***
Cragg-Donald F-stat.c 35.01+++^^^
Sargan statisticd 9.12**
Su
pp
ly Anderson canon. corr. stat.b 16.97***
Cragg-Donald F-stat.c 3.90
Sargan statisticd 6.88
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
+ 20% maximal IV relative bias , ++ 10% maximal IV relative bias, +++ 5% maximal IV relative bias
^ 20% maximal IV size, ^^ 15% maximal IV size, ^^^ 10% maximal IV size
b Underidentiﬁcation test (H0: Equations are underidentiﬁed)
c Weak identiﬁcation test (Stock and Yogo, 2005)
d Overidentifying restrictions test (H0: instruments are valid and excluded instruments are correctly excluded)
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Description d'une base de données en vue d'établir la demande
de bois en Suisse
Production de bois en Suisse : 1851-2012
Nous avons construit la série temporelle retraçant la production à partir de de trois
sources.
• (1851-1960) : De 1851 à 1990 : Statistique historique de la Suisse, de Hansjörg
Siegenthaler et Heiner Ritzman-Blickenstorfer, pp.576-577 (ci-après Siegenthaler
and Ritzman-Blickenstorfer, 1996), disponible à la bibliothèque de l'Oﬃce Fédéral
de la Statistique (OFS) à Neuchâtel. Ce document contient la production totale
de bois à brûler et de bois de construction en 1000m3.
• (1961-2001) Entre 1961 et 1990, l'Annuaire La forêt et le bois de 2002 (ci-
après FOEN, 2002) produit par l'OFS et l'Oﬃce Fédéral des Forêts et disponible
sur internet permet le recoupement avec Siegenthaler and Ritzman-Blickenstorfer
(1996) et fournit des données jusqu'en 2001 sur la récolte totale de bois, par groupe
d'essences et d`assortiments, en 1000 m3. De cette source, on peut obtenir la ré-
colte totale par essence (résineux/feuillus) et par groupe d'assortiments (grumes
/ bois d'industrie / bois de feu). Entre 1961 et 1990, on constate que Ritzman
a construit la série bois de construction en additionnant la quantité de bois de
grume avec celle de bois d'industrie et que la terminologie  bois à brûler  dans
Siegenthaler and Ritzman-Blickenstorfer (1996) équivaut au bois de feu dans l'an-
nuaire (2002). Il faut noter que Siegenthaler and Ritzman-Blickenstorfer (1996) a
probablement fait une erreur, car la comparaison avec annuaire 2002 révèle une
diﬀérence systématique : en eﬀet, Siegenthaler and Ritzman-Blickenstorfer (1996)
est toujours 10x inférieur à l'annuaire 2002 alors que les deux utilisent la même
mesure en 1000m3. FOEN (2002) comportant une décimale supplémentaire et
donc plus de précision, nous optons pour ces données entre 1961 et 2001.
• (2002-2014) Entre 1970 et 2014, l'Annuaire La forêt et le bois de 2015 (ci-après
FOEN, 2015) disponible sur internet permet de compléter la série. La classiﬁcation
est identique, si ce n'est que le bois de feu est maintenant appelé bois-énergie et
que celui-ci est séparé en bûches et plaquettes à partir de 2004. Ces dernières sont
incluses dans la série car  jusqu'à la révision de la statistique forestière en 2004,
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Figure e.2 : Série temporelle de la production de bois de construction (Qcons) et de
bois énergie (Qenerg) en Suisse en 1000m3 (1851-2012)
les plaquettes n'ont pas été recensées séparément . À partir de 2004 également,
une rubrique autres assortiments apparaît et correspond à  bois résineux et
feuillu sous forme de piquets, petites perches, plots à fendre à tavaillons, etc. .
Cette dernière rubrique n'est pas incluse dans la série. Enﬁn, une diﬀérence entre
FOEN (2002) et FOEN (2015) est à remarquer. Dans FOEN (2015), la récolte
est exprimée en 100m3p (milliers de mètres-cube-produit). En l'occurrence, on
constate que, pour ces assortiments et ces essences, un millier de mètre cube est
équivalent à un millier de mètre-cube-produit.
• (2015) Nous complétons cette série avec les données de l'OFS consultables sur
le site FSO (2015a).
Dans la Figure e.2, nous avons alors reporté les séries temporelles du bois énergie et du
bois de construction sur la période 1851-2015, en adoptant les déﬁnitions suivantes :
Bois de construction = bois d'industrie + bois de grumes
Bois à brûler = bois de feu = bois-énergie = bûches + plaquettes
1000m3=1000m3p
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Si on se concentre premièrement sur le bois énergie, à la lecture de la Figure e.2, nous
constatons que son importance relative ne cesse de diminuer jusque dans les années
2000. La production de bois énergie reste toutefois relativement stable jusqu'à la ﬁn de
la deuxième guerre mondiale, sans tendance particulière. Celle-ci devient baissière, jus-
qu'au premier choc pétrolier en 1973 où elle s'inverse fortement. Une première lecture
grossière de cette tendance semble donc indiquer que la production de bois énergie suit
le chemin inverse de l'augmentation des prix du pétrole et du mazout montrant que ces
produits peuvent être substitués l'un avec l'autre. L'avènement récent du pellet et des
plaquettes pousse à la hausse la production de bois énergie, car elle permet notamment
l'utilisation de bois de moindre qualité. Nous pouvons aussi constater que cette série est
plus stable que celle du bois de construction, les variances étant de 560 et 1094 milliers
de m3, respectivement. C'est uniquement pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale que la
production de bois-énergie est supérieure à celle pour la construction, aﬁn de répondre
à la pénurie des substituts énergétiques importés. Le bois de construction, reste relati-
vement stable, mais gagne en importance relative jusqu'à la deuxième guerre mondiale.
À partir de ce moment, nous assistons à une forte croissance de la production jusqu'en
2007. La production de bois de construction semble sujette à de fortes variations suite
à des évènements particuliers. Ainsi, les ouragans Vivian et Lothar en 1990 et 1996 ont
eu un impact notable sur la production. Ceci peut s'expliquer par le fait que le bois
est subitement devenu plus accessible, son exploitation ne nécessitant plus l'abattage
d'arbres. De plus, la Confédération a versé des subventions pour le nettoyage des forêts
touchées par ces tempêtes. Le bois de construction étant majoritairement composé de
résineux, plus sensibles aux vents, il est logique que la production de ce type de bois
soit plus impactée par les ouragans que celle de bois-énergie. La série de production
du bois de construction semble également plus impactée par l'évolution conjoncturelle.
En eﬀet, la construction fait partie des secteurs annonciateurs d'une crise économique
et subit relativement fortement les récessions, avec pour corollaire, la diminution de
demande de bois par ce secteur. On le voit tout particulièrement entre 2008 et 2012 où
la crise économique a eu un eﬀet important sur la production de bois en Suisse.
Les prix du bois en Suisse : 1928-2012
Nous avons dû faire appel à diﬀérentes sources pour construire la série des prix nomi-
naux.
• (1898-1921) (T0) Il existe une série de prix pour les  bois de sciages et de
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construction  et les  bois de feu  dans les forêts cantonales uranaises (der
Holzmarkt, 1922). Cette série peut être éventuellement ajoutée aux donnés ulté-
rieures décrites plus bas. Nous mettons cependant en évidence que les hypothèses
qui en découlent sont nombreuses. Il faudrait ainsi notamment supposer que les
forêts du Canton d'Uri soient représentatives de la Suisse et la composition des
bois qui en sont extraits soit identique et que la méthodologie d'agrégation des
prix soit la même que celle utilisée dans les tableaux nationaux suivants. Par sou-
cis de cohérence, nous avons décidé de ne pas intégrer ces données dans la série
des prix.
• (1928-1934) (T1) L'Oﬃce Fédéral de la Statistique propose, sur son site internet,
une section  Statistique et histoire  (FSO, 2015c). Dans la sous-section  Prix
 on trouve un  indice des prix de gros par marchandises  pour les  matériaux
de construction  et les  combustibles et papier . Il est ainsi possible de faire
le lien avec les prix des années suivantes mais des données manquent entre 1928
et 1934 pour le bois-énergie. Cependant, pour ces années, l'Indice des Prix à
la Consommation (IPC), disponible sur le site de l'OFS, et l'indice des prix de
gros sont extrêmement corrélés (0.93 pour IPC et l'indice bois de feu). Il est
ainsi possible de lier T1 et T2, sous l'hypothèse que l'évolution des prix du bois-
énergie durant cette période est uniquement due à l'inﬂation. La série de prix peut
ensuite être étirée jusqu'en 1806 grâce à l'indice des prix de gros. Les informations
concernant ces mesures sont peu nombreuses. Pour le bois de construction, il est
indiqué :  bois de construction FM  et pour le bois de feu,  Bois de chauﬀage
hêtre  et  bois de chauﬀage sapin . Comme pour T2, une moyenne pondérée
pour le bois de feu a été considérée pour agréger les essences. (31% de sapin et
69% de hêtre)
• (1934-1955) (T2) Entre 1934 et 1949, le tableau Tabelle der gewogenen Dur-
schnittspreise von inländischem, rohem unverarbeitetem Nutz- un Brennholz 4.
Quartal 1934 bis Ende 1949 (Tableau des prix moyens pondérés du bois d'÷uvre
et du bois à brûler indigènes, bruts et non-travaillés) (ci-après T1), disponible
dans la revue der Holzmarkt (1955) à la bibliothèque HBD de l'ETHZ retrace les
prix moyens trimestriels du bois en Suisse par essence et par assortiment. Le bois
à brûler (Brennholz) consiste en deux catégories : sapin/épicéa (résineux) et hêtre
(feuillus). Le bois d'÷uvre (Nutzholz) est, lui, séparé en : résineux (Nadelholz)101
101Résineux s'entend ici par : sapin/épicéa, pin, mélèze
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et feuillus (Laubholz)102. Les prix s'entendent  nächste Bahnstation unverladen
 (prochaine gare non-chargé) ou pour le bois d'÷uvre (pas dans tous les cas) 
nächste Säge  (prochaine scierie). L'assortiment de bois d'÷uvre, résineux cor-
respond aux bois de dimensions I à III et l'assortiment de bois à brûler, de 
Sagklötze Normalqualität von 40-49cm Mittendurchmesser  (billes de sciages de
qualité n de 40-49 cm de diamètre). Pour obtenir une moyenne annuelle, nous
avons fait la moyenne des trimestres. Aﬁn d'agréger les prix de la même façon
que les quantités (bois de construction et bois à brûler), nous avons appliqué une
moyenne pondérée des essences. Pour le bois de feu, nous avons pris 31% (max. à
50% en 2000 suite à l'ouragan Lothar et min. à 16% en 2012) de résineux et pour
le bois d'÷uvre 85% (max à 91% en 1968 et min 79% en 1975). Ces pourcentages
correspondent à la moyenne des proportions de résineux entre 1965 et 2012 cal-
culée à partir des annuaires 2002 et 2013. Il faut noter que les prix de 1934 ne
sont observés que sur la période octobre-décembre 1934.
• (T3) Entre 1947 et 1951, le tableau Prix moyens pondérés des bois d'÷uvre et des
bois de feu bruts indigènes de la période allant du 4e trimestre 1947 au 2e trimestre
1951 (ci-après T3) est également disponible dans la revue der Holzmarkt (1955) à
la bibliothèque HBD de l'ETHZ. Ces prix s'entendent  station ferroviaire la plus
proche, marchandise non-envagonnée . Les prix entre 1947 et 1949 permettent de
faire la comparaison avec T2 et indique que la même méthodologie a été utilisée.
Une précision supplémentaire est apportée : le bois de feu est mesuré en quartier.
La même méthodologie que pour T2 a été utilisée.
• (T4) Entre 1949 et 1953, le tableau Prix moyens pondérés des bois d'÷uvre et
des bois de feu bruts indigènes de la période allant de 1949 au 1er trimestre 1953
(ci-après T4) est disponible dans la revue der Holzmarkt (1955) à la bibliothèque
HBD de l'ETHZ. Les prix entre 1949 et 1951 permettent de faire la comparaison
avec T3 et indique que cette série suit celle issue de T3. La même méthodologie
que pour T2 et T3 a été utilisée.
• (T5) Entre 1951 et 1954, le tableau Prix moyens pondérés des bois d'÷uvre et
des bois de feu bruts indigènes de la période allant de 1939 au 4e trimestre 1954
(ci-après T5) suit également la même série que les tableaux précédents.
102Feuillus s'entend ici par : hêtre, chêne
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• (1956-1978/79) (T6) Entre 1952 et 1963/1964, le tableau Prix moyens pondérés
des bois d'÷uvre et des bois de feu bruts indigènes de la période allant de 1939
à la 3e période 1963/1964 (ci-après T6) est également disponible dans la revue
der Holzmarkt (1979) à la bibliothèque HBD de l'ETHZ. La comparaison des
moyennes annuelles eﬀectuées par nos soins pour les années 1939 et 1952-1955
et celle de T6, indique que T6 suit également la même série. Une précision est
apportée : le prix du bois d'÷uvre est mesuré en CHF par m3 et le prix du bois de
feu (en quartier) est mesuré en CHF par stère. Un changement de méthodologie est
constaté puisque les prix sont maintenant agrégés en année forestière comportant
3 périodes de 4 mois et allant de septembre à août. T6 n'est donc pas strictement
comparable avec les données précédentes. La même méthodologie d'agrégation
que pour les données précédentes a été utilisée.
• (T7) Entre 1963/64 et 1978/79, Prix moyens pondérés des bois d'÷uvre et des
bois de feu bruts indigènes (ci-après T7) suit la même série que T6. La mé-
thode d'agrégation est la même que précédemment jusqu'à l'année 1964/65. Dès
1965/66, nous avons utilisé les pondérations découlant des statistiques de FOEN
(2002) et FOEN (2015), pour chaque année.
• (1980-1984) (T8) Entre 1980 et 1984, le tableau Prix moyens du bois de grumes
et du bois de feu suisses, de 1979 à 1984 (ci-après T8) est disponible à l'OFS sur
demande. Il n'est pas noté de changement de méthodologie signiﬁcatif, mais la
continuité avec les données précédentes n'a pas pu être assurée, car les dates ne
pouvaient pas être recoupées. Contrairement à T2-T7, le bois d'÷uvre est séparé
en bois de grumes (résineux=sapin/épicéa et feuillus=hêtre) et bois d'industrie
(sapin/épicéa seulement). Le bois de grumes résineux correspond à la moyenne
de tous les assortiments, alors que le bois de grumes feuillu reste de la même
qualité que T2-T7. Le bois d'industrie correspond à du bois à papier, 1ère classe,
non écorcé, 1m, chargé sur wagon. Les prix sont annoncés par tiers de l'année
forestière, ce qui rend possible, la transformation en prix sur l'année civile. Pour le
bois de feu, la même méthodologie que T2-T7 a été utilisée. Pour le bois d'÷uvre,
ne disposant pas des prix du bois d'industrie, feuillu, le calcul du prix du bois
d'÷uvre est impossible. Il faut noter que le prix du bois de feu de 1980 est basé
uniquement sur les prix de mai à décembre.
• (1983-1992) (T9) Entre 1983 et 1991, le tableau Prix moyens pondérés, en francs,
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du bois brut suisse vendu aux bords des routes forestières praticables pour des ca-
mions (ci-après T9) est disponible à l'OFS sur demande. Il convient tout d'abord
de noter le changement de lieu où les prix sont constatés par rapport à T2-T8. De
plus, la période du relevé n'est que de janvier à avril pour cette période. Les assor-
timents sont classiﬁés de la même manière que T8, à la diﬀérence près que le bois
d'industrie, feuillus, apparaît dans les statistiques comme bois pour la fabrication
de panneaux de particules, feuillus, ces bois correspondent à des bois de feuillus
de 1ère classe. Pour l'agrégation, il a fallu procéder en deux temps. Premièrement,
un prix regroupant le bois d'÷uvre, pour les feuillus et les résineux séparément
était nécessaire. Pour les résineux, nous avons procédé à une moyenne pondérée
des prix des grumes et du bois à papier, en utilisant les pondérations (pourcen-
tage de grumes résineux dans le bois d'÷uvre résineux, en moyenne 84% mais les
pondérations varient chaque année) découlant des annuaires 2002 et 2013. Pour
les feuillus, nous avons procédé à une moyenne pondérée des prix des grumes et
du bois pour panneaux de particules, en utilisant les pondérations (pourcentage
de grumes feuillus dans le bois d'÷uvre feuillus, en moyenne 64% mais les pondé-
rations varient chaque année) découlant des annuaires 2002 et 2013. Puis, aﬁn de
regrouper les essences, nous avons utilisé les moyennes crées et y avons appliqué
la même méthodologie que T7 (dès 1965)-T8.
• (1992-2012) (T10) Entre 1992 et 1996, le ﬁchier Prix à la production des bois
bruts est disponible sur le site web de l'OFS. Il faut noter le lieu de mesure
des prix : Prix de vente moyens du bois brut indigène non façonné, à port de
camion (y compris les chablis). Ce ﬁchier est bien plus détaillé que les tableaux
précédents, ce qui implique un travail d'agrégation conséquent. Tout d'abord, nous
avons calculé des moyennes annuelles avec les prix trimestriels fournis. Ensuite,
pour les grumes de résineux, nous avons procédé à une moyenne simple de tous
les assortiments, pour garantir la continuité avec les tableaux précédents. Pour les
grumes de feuillus, nous avons utilisés les prix des billes de sciage de qualité n, 40-
49cm de diamètre comme dans T2-T9. Le bois d'industrie résineux est constitué
de bois de classe 1, long. Il faut noter que le bois à papier n'a pas pu être pris
en compte. Le bois d'industrie étant indiqué en CHF par tonnes, le facteur de
conversion de l'annuaire 2013 propose de multiplier par 0.9 pour obtenir la mesure
en CHF m3, ce qui a été fait. Le prix des grumes est ici en CHF/Fm La même
méthodologie d'agrégation que T7-T9 a ensuite été appliquée. Concernant le bois-
195
APPENDIX
énergie, la même méthodologie que T7-T9 est appliquée.
• (T11) Entre 1996 et 2000 le ﬁchier Prix à la production des bois bruts est dispo-
nible sur le site web de l'OFS (FSO, 2015). Il est identique à T10, mais il est plus
détaillé et précise que ces prix ne comprennent pas la TVA. Pour les grumes de ré-
sineux, il s'agit d'une moyenne de tous les assortiments de sapins et d'épicéas. Les
prix étant désagrégés dans le ﬁchier source pour la première fois. Pour les grumes
de feuillus, nous continuons sur les prix des billes de sciage de qualité n, 40-49cm
de diamètre. Pour les bois d'industrie et énergie, le processus est identique à T10
et les méthodes d'agrégation également.
• (T12) Entre 2000 et 2013, le ﬁchier Prix à la production des bois bruts est dis-
ponible sur le site web de l'OFS (FSO, 2015). Il est encore plus détaillé que T11.
Pour les grumes de résineux, la méthode est identique à T11. Pour les grumes
de feuillus, la nomenclature a changé et les billes de sciages de hêtre de qualité
n, 40-49 cm de diamètre deviennent des billes de sciages 4B, 40-49 B, min. 3m
mais ces deux catégories sont identiques (cf. Jan Boni). Les méthodologies sont
ensuite identiques à T11. Il convient de noter que le prix des plaquettes n'a pas
été pris en compte dans le prix du bois énergie, mais qu'il devrait l'être puisque
les quantités incluent les plaquettes (le prix des plaquettes est disponible à partir
de 1992 mais les quantités produites seulement depuis 2004).
Du fait des nombreux changements et transformations et de la non-exhaustivité de
certaines données, cette série de prix doit plutôt être considérée comme un indicateur
plutôt que comme une série de prix eﬀectif. Dans la Figure e.3, nous avons alors reporté
les séries temporelles du prix du bois énergie et du prix du bois de construction sur la
période 1934-2012, en adoptant les déﬁnitions suivantes :
P Bois d'÷uvre= P bois de construction = x% P bois de grumes + (1-x%)P bois
d'industrie
P Bois d'industrie = P bois à papier (résineux) + P bois pour panneaux de particules
(feuillus) (jusqu'en 1992)
Pour la construction de la Figure e.4, les prix nominaux sont déﬂatés par l'Indice des
Prix à la Consommation (base de 2011). À partir de la Figure e.4, nous constatons que
les prix réels du bois-énergie baissent constamment depuis 1934, avec une stabilisation
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Figure e.3 : Série temporelle des prix nominaux moyens du bois de construction et du
bois énergie en Suisse en CHF par m3 (1851-2013)
Figure e.4 : Série temporelle des prix réels moyens du bois de construction et du bois
énergie en Suisse en CHF par m3 (1914-2013) aux prix de 2011
197
APPENDIX
Figure e.5 : Prix moyens à l'importation de l'acier, du fer et de la feraille en
CHF/kg(1886-2013)
dans les années 2000. Les prix du bois de construction ont par contre d'abord augmenté
jusque dans les années 60 puis diminué jusqu'au début des années 2000.
Prix de l'acier
Le prix de l'acier correspond aux prix à l'importation de l'acier, du fer et de la ferraille.
Ces données proviennent de FSO (2015a) de 1886 à 1987 puis de 1988 à 2013 de AFD
(2014).
Salaire dans l'industrie forestière
Le salaire moyen dans l'industrie forestière de 1939 à 2014 est donné par Niederer and
Bill (2015) en CHF/heure.
Dégâts dus aux catastrophes naturelles
Pour tenir compte du bois tombé lors de catastrophes naturelles, nous utilisons les
données de Usbeck (2015) fournies par le Professeur Thomas Wohlgemuth, en milliers
de m3. Ces données sont disponibles de 1865 à 2014.
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